

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control:
Rec'd:17176
February 28, 1957
7:53 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1004, February 27, 4 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1004, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 171, DAMASCUS 122,
BEIRUT 153, AMMAN 171, USUN 59, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED

Ben Gurion seems to have regained control his coalition without important sacrifice of maneuverability in wind up Knesset debate on his policy statement of February 21 (EMBTel 996). By vote of 72 to 29 Knesset approved coalition resolution in support of his statement.

Only concession to Ahdut Avodah and Mapam, which had threatened to leave coalition unless Israel's requirements in Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh were fully met, was element in resolution stating Prime Minister's statement should be studied by Knesset foreign affairs and security committee "in spirit of resolutions adopted by Knesset on January 23," which said IDF must remain in Sharm el Sheikh until free navigation assured, and Israel must remain in civil control of Gaza.

Re Gaza Strip, Prime Minister said best solution would be one reached in cooperation with UN on condition Egyptians do not return there, but neglected usual mention of Israel remaining at least in civil control.

Re Tiran Straits, he said the "means must not be confused with the ends". Israeli forces occupied Sharm-el-Sheikh for sole purpose of opening passage to Eilat, they serve no other purpose and will be withdrawn as soon as that purpose has been achieved."

Cabinet met last night following debate for discussion of Eban talks with Secretary. It was to reconvene this morning.

Threatened defection of Ahdut Avodah and Mapam was squelched in intra-coalition discussions before Knesset debate, in which it was not even necessary for Ben Gurion to participate, according to reliable press sources.

LAWSON

CWD:DMB

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Action

NEA

Control: 16630

Rec'd: February 27, 1957
1.41 p.m.

Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1007, February 27, 5 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1007. REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 173, AMMAN 173,
USUN 60, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

Press reported Cabinet meeting virtually on round-the-clock basis to discuss developments Eban's conversations with Secretary and Hammerskjold, but, thus far, GOI has declined to reveal any details through official channels. Communique issued late last night merely reported cabinet had two sessions Monday on conversations and had instructed Eban to proceed on "present lines."

Foreign Ministry informally advised Embassy that atmosphere of hopefulness surrounded Cabinet's discussions. Press continued to report final reverberations of threatened defection Ahdut Avodah and Mapam on question of Gaza strip (EMBTel 998) but Foreign Ministry officials said that breach, which had never been very serious, now closed and coalition members had once more achieved near unanimity of approach.

Meanwhile, it was apparent that government through reliable press channels, was conditioning public to acceptance of arrangement for Gaza that might not have Israel exercising civil control which until very recently was widely held to be Ben Gurion's minimum requirement. Both HAARETZ (Independent) and HABOKER hinted broadly that Israel's real position focused more particularly on exclusion of Egypt than retention of administration for Israel.

Nearly every paper reported solution Aqaba Gulf question within reach, and many thought there was possibility of it being disposed of before principals went on to question of Gaza.

Press welcomed intervention of man of "Pearson's stature" as represented by his "informal proposals" but expressed disappointment with his suggestion of stationing UNEF on both sides of armistice lines and rehabilitation of Egypt-Israel armistice agreements.

LAWSON

MGG:DEM/10

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FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4552, FEBRUARY 27, 7.PM

NIACT

WHEN AMBASSADOR MADE HIS INITIAL CALL ON FOREIGN SECRETARY THIS AFTERNOON, LLOYD EXPRESSED CONCERN AT REPORTS HE HAS FROM BRITISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON TODAY INDICATING APPARENT HITCH IN ISRAELI PROBLEM RE EVACUATION GAZA AND SUGGESTING THAT US MAY FIND IT NECESSARY IN CIRCUMSTANCE TO MOVE IN DIRECTION SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. LLOYD EMPHASIZED THAT OPINION HERE IS STRONGLY OPPOSED SANCTIONS AND POSSIBLE US MOVE THIS NATURE IS WORRISOME. BRITISH FAVOR CANADIAN RESOLUTION AND ESTIMATE THAT IT HAS CHANCE OF ADOPTION IF US SUPPORTS.

LLOYD EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THIS INFORMATION ON DEVELOPMENTS IS NOT AS COMPLETE OR UP TO DATE AS HE WOULD LIKE. WHILE UK BELIEVES IT IS FULLY INFORMED SITUATION WASH, LLOYD SAYS DIXON NEW YORK REPORTS FEELING HE NOT FULLY AWARE US THINKING THERE.

AMBASSADOR SEENING LLOYD AGAIN TOMORROW MORNING CONNECTION PRESENTATION CREDENTIALS AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION ON OUR LATEST THINKING WHICH DEP COULD PROVIDE BY THAT TIME.

BARBOUR

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NOTE: MR. IRWIN (BNA) INFORMED 3:15 P.M. 2/27/57 CEI

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Control: 16985

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 28, 1957

3:36 A.M.

Info

FROM: BEIRUT

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2076, FEBRUARY 27, 6 P.M.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2076, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 169,
BAGHDAD 198, CAIRO 257, DAMASCUS 291, JIDDA 84.

PRESIDENT CHAMOUN SENT WORD TODAY THAT HE IS EXTREMELY
DISTURBED OVER REPORT FROM FOREIGN MINISTER MALIK THAT RES-
OLUTION CO-SPONSORED BY LEBANON CALLING FOR SANCTIONS IF ISRAEL
DOES NOT EVACUATE GAZA AND SHARM-EL-SHEIKH HAS NO CHANCE OF
RECEIVING EVEN SIMPLE MAJORITY UNLESS UNITED STATES THROWS ITS
WEIGHT BEHIND IT. PRESIDENT SAID FAILURE OF UNITED STATES TO
VOTE FOR THIS RESOLUTION WOULD IN A MATTER OF HOURS OBLITERATE
ALL PROGRESS UNITED STATES HAS MADE IN ARAB WORLD DURING LAST
FEW MONTHS AND WOULD GRAVELY AFFECT POSITION OF LEBANON, AND
GREATLY EMBARRASS PRESIDENT CHAMOUN AND KING SAUD.

TOMORROW FOREIGN OFFICE WILL PRESENT AIDE MEMOIRES TO DIPLO-
MATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN BEIRUT OF UNITED NATIONS MEMBERS
URGING SUPPORT LEBANESE-SPONSORED RESOLUTION. SECRETARY GENERAL
FOREIGN OFFICE SADAKA WHO CONVEYED CHAMOUN'S MESSAGE TO EMBASSY
SAID HOWEVER AIDE MEMOIRES WOULD NOT BE PRESENTED TO SOVIET
BLOC NATIONS SINCE "UNFORTUNATELY THEY ARE ON THE ARAB SIDE".
SADAKA WENT ON TO SAY IF RESOLUTION FAILED TO PASS BECAUSE OF
UNITED STATES VOTING AGAINST OR ABSTAINING, WHILE SOVIET BLOC
STRONGLY SUPPORTED IT, EFFECT IN ARAB WORLD WOULD BE
CATASTROPHIC.

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FROM: Damascus

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1967, February 27, Noon.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1967; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 220, CAIRO 259.

In conversation with Embassy officers February 25 Egyptian Charge Radwan made following comments:

(1) Fedayeen movements: Groups of Fedayeen and others who filtered through Israel and Jordan during November hostilities came to Egyptian Embassy Damascus to demand food, money, housing, under threat demonstrations. GOS provided 5,000 Egyptian pounds initially on condition they returned Jordan and later GOE provided similar amount. Radwan denied existence airlift by Syrian airways from Syria or Jordan. (EMBTTEL 1959).

(2) GOS position re Israel withdrawal: Foreign Minister Bitar asked Egyptian Embassy prior "summit" meeting to inform Cairo that GOS could never accept internationalization Aqaba or confinement UNEF to "Gaza border". Acceptance phrase "Gaza border" in place "armistice lines" would constitute tacit recognition Israeli control El Auja, other DZ's. Radwan indicated GOE accepted ICJ adjudication Aqaba and GOS position more uncompromising than GOE.

(3) Refinery: Radwan denied Egyptian experts had endorsed Czech refinery offer as claimed by GOS officials or that Minister Public Works Kayyali already committed to Czechs. Radwan added Kayyali would not dare withhold such commitment from him and implied GOE "with difficulty" supported inclusion Kayyali in Cabinet.

(4) US has exaggerated idea of number Soviet bloc technicians in Syria which number far less than 200. Many Egyptian technicians now in Syria.

MOOSE

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Rec'd: February 27, 1957
3:36 a.m.

Info,
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FROM: Ankara

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1976, February 27, 9 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1976; REPEATED INFORMATION ISTANBUL, IZMIR UNNUMBERED

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On February 26, Political Counselor discussed substance .
DEPCIRTEL 681 and 691 with Dikerdem, Acting Director General,
Foreign Office's Economic Department.

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Dikerdem remarked that conditions for Israeli withdrawal Agaba
and Gaza matter national life and death to Israel. Added that
while GOT supports Israeli withdrawal, would nevertheless prefer
arrangement whereby UNEF would stay for some time on Egypt-
Israeli border, since GOT does not trust Nasser, has evidence
that new arms arriving Egypt from USSR, and convinced that
frontier patrol would add to area stability.

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58

Action
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FROM: New York

Control: 16756

Rec'd: February 27, 1957
5:48 pm

Info
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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: DELGA 813, February 27, 5 pm

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SENT DEPARTMENT DELGA 813, REPEATED INFORMATION BANGKOK 2

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Re Bangkok's 2499 to Department

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USDEL has been in daily contact with Thai delegation discussing Middle East situation and briefing Thai delegates re US policies and position to extent permitted.

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IO

FROM: NEW YORK

Control: 16865

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 27, 1957

10:02 P.M.

Info

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: DELGA 815, FEBRUARY 27, 9 P.M.

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PRIORITY

RE PALESTINE/ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

PEARSON (CANADA), NOBLE AND DIXON (UK), SPENDER (AUSTRALIA), AND MUNRO (NZ) MET WITH LODGE AT THIER REQUEST THIS A.M. THEY WERE ALL AWARE US WORKING ON DRAFT RES AND EAGER LEARN CONTENTS OF RES AND PROGRESS OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

PEARSON REFERRED TO TALKS GOING ON, INCLUDING FRENCH, IN WASHINGTON, AND SAID THEY MIGHT MAKE WHOLE OPERATION UNNECESSARY. LODGE REPLIED THERE WERE NO HOPEFUL SIGNS YET, BUT STILL HOPE.

SPENDER STATED AUSTRALIAN POSITION THAT THERE MUST BE EFFECTIVE ASSURANCES FOR FREE PASSAGE IN GULF AQABA, AND THAT FOR GAZA THERE SHOULD BE SOME KIND OF UN ADMINISTRATION, BUT THEY DID NOT CONTEMPLATE EXCLUDING EGYPT. IF THESE TWO POINTS ADEQUATELY COVERED IN RESOLUTION, AUSTRALIA WOULD NOT NECESSARILY OPPOSE POSSIBILITY OF SANCTIONS, IF NECESSARY, TO OBTAIN WITHDRAWAL.

MUNRO SAID THEY COULD GO ALONG WITH CANADA'S IDEAS. PEARSON INDICATED HE MORE AND MORE OF IMPRESSION THAT REFERENCE TO SOME FORM OF PRESSURES WILL HAVE BE MADE. HE FELT IF ARABS ABSTAINED ON ADEQUATELY BALANCED DRAFT, AND IF EGYPT DID NOT ACTIVELY OPPOSE UNEF IN SHARM EL-SHEIKH AND A UN ROLE IN GAZA ADMINISTRATION, CANADA MIGHT BE ABLE GO ALONG WITH SOME FORMULATION ON SANCTIONS. LODGE STATED US CONVINCED MERE BRUTUM FULMENS NOT SUFFICIENT. WE HAD ALWAYS PURSUED "DOUBLE-BARRELED" APPROACH OF PUTTING AN END TO INVASION AND GETTING AT BASIC CAUSES. TO THIS END WE SOUGHT TO COUPLE ASSURANCES NOT UNLIKE CANADIAN IDEAS WITH EFFECTIVE PRESSURE TO GET ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW.

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-2- DELGA 815, FEBRUARY 27, 9 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

DIXON SAID UK POSITION SIMILAR TO THAT OF OTHERS, BUT THEY FELT IT SHOULD BE SO PUT IN RES THAT ASSURANCES COME AUTOMATICALLY INTO EFFECT UPON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

MUNRO ASKED WHETHER HE CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD US TO BE PUTTING MORE EMPHASIS ON WITHDRAWAL THAN UPON CONCOMITANT ASSURANCES.

LODGE ANSWERED THAT US DOES NOT THINK ISRAEL IS IN TOO GOOD POSITION TO BARGAIN FOR THINGS WHEN IT IS FORCEFULLY

OCCUPYING ANOTHER COUNTRY'S TERRITORY. MUNRO AGREED THERE SHOULD NOT BE AN QUID PRO QUO FOR ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL, BUT THERE SHOULD BE CONNECTION BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL AND ASSURANCES.

LODGE SAID US WANTS CONNECT IDEAS WITHOUT MAKING QUID PRO

QUO. IF WE DON'T SUCCEED IN GETTING ISRAELIS OUT, WE WILL

BE HANDING OVER WHOLE ARAB WORLD TO SOVIETS. THAT, HE SAID,

IS KIND OF POWER POLITICAL SITUATION WE WISH TO AVOID. PEARSON

AGREED, SAYING THAT WAS WHY MAJOR PRESSURES BEING PUT ON ISRAEL.

SPENDER CONCURRED WITH THIS POSITION.

DIXON SAID CRUX OF UK POSITION WAS WHETHER "AUTOMATICITY"

APPLIED TO ASSURANCES. MINUS SUCH BALANCING FACTOR IN RESOLUTION,

UK COULD NOT SUPPORT SANCTIONS. DIXON SAID THEY WOULD BE IN

GREATEST DIFFICULTY WITHOUT THIS, AND "WERE REALLY IN APPALLING DILEMMA". THEY DID NOT WANT TO BECOME OPENLY INVOLVED WHEN US

WAS DEALING WITH ISRAELIS, BUT IF OUR LATEST EFFORTS WERE NOT

SUCCESSFUL UK MIGHT HAVE TO TAKE SOME INITIATIVE ON ITS OWN.

PEARSON SUGGESTED ONE WAY TO GET OVER-ALL BALANCE WOULD BE

TO WORK OUT IN ADVANCE WITH SYG THAT WHEN (AND IF) HE WAS ABLE

TO REPORT ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL HAD BEGUN HE COULD ALSO ANNOUNCE

HE WAS DISPATCHING SOMEONE TO GAZA TO ASSIST IN TAKEOVER.

THIS WOULD GIVE BALANCE NOT ONLY IN WORDING BUT ALSO IN IMPLEMENTATION.

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-3- DELGA 815, FEBRUARY 27, 9 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

DIXON ALSO SUGGESTED OTHERS MIGHT UNILATERALLY MAKE DECLARATIONS
SIMILAR TO US RE FREE PASSAGE OF GULF AQABA. HE CONCLUDED MEETING
BY INDICATING UK COULD GO NO FURTHER ON SANCTIONS THAN LANGUAGE
OF CANADIAN DRAFT.

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 816, FEBRUARY 27, 9 P.M.

PRIORITY

VERBATIM TEXT

RE PALESTINE

LODGE SAW FAWZI (EGYPT) AND MENON (INDIA) TO GIVE THEM
DEPT'S REACTION TO SUGGESTIONS MADE TO US RE RES CONTAINED IN
DELGA 810.

WE GAVE THEM FOLLOWING PARA TO REPLACE FIFTH PREAMBULAR PARA:

"NOTING THAT THE SYG'S REPORT OF 24 JANUARY 1957, IN DEALING
WITH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, STATES THAT NO CLAIM TO BELLIGERENT
RIGHTS SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE STRAITS
OF TIRAN AND THAT, UPON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS
FROM THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH AREA, THE UNEF WOULD MOVE INTO THE
AREA TO FUNCTION IN SUPPORT OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT, AND THAT ON
2 FEB. THE GA ADOPTED A RES CALLING FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE MEASURES SET FORTH IN THIS REPORT."

WE GAVE THEM ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS OF SANCTIONS CONDEMNATORY
PARAS (A) OPERATIVE PARA 2 OF GADEL 154; OR (B) THE FOLLOWING:

QUOTE

REQUESTS THE SYG TO REPORT NOT LATER THAN 72 HOURS AFTER THE
ADOPTION OF THIS RES ON ITS IMPLEMENTATION BY ISRAEL;

DECLARES THAT, IN THE EVENT OF THE SYG'S NOT BEING ABLE
INFORM THE GA THAT ISRAEL IS WITHDRAWING FULLY BEHIND THE
ARMISTICE LINE, ISRAEL WILL STAND CONDEMNED FOR ITS REPEATED



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-2- DELGA 816, FEBRUARY 27, 9 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GA, AND ACCORDINGLY, IN SUCH EVENT, CALLS UPON ALL GOVTS, WITH EFFECT FROM THE DATE OF RECEIPT OF THE SYG'S REPORT, TO WITHHOLD ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL, AND IN GENERAL TO REGULATE THEIR PEACEFUL RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL SO AS TO BRING ABOUT RESPECT FOR THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER AND THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GA CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL.

UNQTE

RE LAST PREAMBULAR PARA OF RES (DELGA 810) WE URGED DELETION PHRASE "AND THAT THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE ENVISAGED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EGYPTIAN CONTROL OF THE TERRITORY AS ESTABLISHED BY THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT".

AT TIME WE PUT ABOVE TO FAWZI (EGYPT), HE SAID HE HAD NOT RECEIVED CAIRO'S REACTION TO TEXT CONTAINED IN DELGA 810. FAWZI REPORTED ON HIS MORNING'S CONSULTATIONS WITH ARAB COLLEAGUES WHO HE SAID WERE VIOLENTLY OPPOSED TO US DRAFT RES. ACCORDING TO FAWZI, ARABS OBJECT TO LINKING WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES WITH ASSURANCES TO BE GIVEN TO ISRAEL. THEY ALSO STRONGLY OBJECT TO INCLUDING IN THIS RES OPERATIVE PARA 6 (DELGA 810), WHICH DEALS WITH SETTLEMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN PARTIES. THEY WANT TO AVOID ANY REFERENCE TO PALESTINE QUESTION SETTLEMENTS AND THEY OBJECT TO ADVISORY COMMITTEE (OPERATIVE PARA 7) BECAUSE ARABS BELIEVE ITS COMPOSITION UNFAVORABLE TO THEM. FAWZI ALSO SAID THAT ARABS EXPRESSED SOME DOUBT AS TO HOW STRONG IN FACT OUR SANCTIONS PARA REALLY IS, AND ARABS WOULD VOTE AGAINST PRESENT DRAFT.

LOUTFI (EGYPT) SAID LATER IN DAY THAT THEY STILL HAD NOT RECEIVED CAIRO'S REACTION BUT THAT FAWZI ASKED HIM TO CONVEY TO US THAT OUR 5TH PREAMBULAR PARA AS GIVEN ABOVE "WAS IMPOSSIBLE" FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW. LOUTFI SAID IT WAS SO UNACCEPTABLE THAT FAWZI COULD NOT PUT IT TO CAIRO.

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-3- DELGA 816, FEBRUARY 27, 9 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

MENON LATER ECHOED STRONGLY EGYPTIAN POINT OF VIEW RE FIFTH PREAMBULAR PARA. RE ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS OF SANCTIONS AND CONDEMNATORY PARAS, HE SAID "HE FELT SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT SATISFACTORILY". RE OUR DELETION IN LAST PREAMBULAR PARA OF RES (DELGA 810), HE AT FIRST OBJECTED STRONGLY AND LATER SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER TRYING TO CONVINCE EGYPTIANS TO ACCEPT FOLLOWING: "NOTING FURTHER THE CONTENT OF THE SYG'S SPECIAL MEMORANDUM OF 26 FEB. AND ITS ASSERTION THAT HIS STATEMENT OF 22 FEB. WAS MADE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LEGAL SITUATION ESTABLISHED BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT".

JAMALI (IRAQ) CALLED ON LODGE LATER IN DAY TO EMPHASIZE STRONG ARAB OPPOSITION TO INCLUSION IN OUR RES REFERENCE TO SETTling DISPUTES BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS AND REQUESTING ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS. JAMALI SAID THAT "RATHER THAN HAVE A RES THAT HURTS ARABS AND UNITED STATES TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE COMMUNISTS, HE WOULD RATHER HAVE NO RES AT ALL". HE STRESSED THAT "ISRAEL SHOULD BE TREATED AS A CRIMINAL AND NOT A VICTOR AND THAT OUR RES PROVIDED COMMUNISTS WITHIN THEIR COUNTRY AND ARAB WORLD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY ATTACK ARABS FRIENDLY TO WEST". HE OPPOSED INCLUSION IN RES OF ASSURANCES ON SHARM EL-SHEIKH AND GAZA. HE SAID HE FAVORED A SIMPLE RES "WITH NO COMPLICATIONS" AND SUGGESTED THAT WE CONSIDER MODIFYING ARAB RES.

LODGE

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DAB 6/13/57

AIR POUCH

PRIORITY

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KA 320.5784a

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TEL AVIV

431

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

February 27, 1957

REF : Embassy Telegram 1000, February 25, 1957.

13 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION REC'D 3-5	DEPT. IN F O OTHER CIA-12 USIA-10 OCB-1 OSD-4 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3
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SUBJECT: Transmittal of Texts of Israel Foreign Ministry White Paper on Egyptian Violations, and Foreign Ministry Communiqué on Continuing Egyptian Fedayeen Activity.

The Embassy transmits, herewith, as Enclosure 1, five copies of the Israel Foreign Ministry White Paper formally published on February 24 setting forth what it claims to have been Egypt's acts of hostility against Israel and its own Jewish population during the past eight years (text supplied by the Information Division of the Foreign Ministry), and the Foreign Ministry's Communiqué of February 23 charging continuing Egyptian Fedayeen activities which it claims are encouraged by the "propitiatory attitude of the United Nations toward Arab belligerency," (text supplied by the Government Press Office). This last named communiqué was summarized in the reference telegram.

The Foreign Ministry White Paper was formally published on February 24, the eighth anniversary of the signing of the Israel-Egypt Armistice Agreement; however, its contents were made known to the local press as far back as February 11. An Embassy officer has been informed that Pinhas Eliav, number two man on the American Desk of the Israel Foreign Ministry, assumed responsibility for the compilation and contents of the document.

When first mentioning the document on February 12, the local press described it as pointing out that "Egypt has violated with impunity the Preamble of the United Nations Charter and six of its Articles, nine Security Council resolutions, eight General Assembly resolutions, five Articles of the General Armistice Agreement, etc." In conjunction with the formal publication, Walter Eytan, Director General of the Foreign Ministry, declared that from the moment when the Israel-Egypt Armistice was signed, the Egyptians have been waging a total war ... against Israel, and that they have been doing it with impunity and that each act that went without punishment encouraged them to continue. At the time of the earlier issuance of the contents to the local press, a Foreign Ministry spokesman attempted to tie in the record of Egyptian violations with the present case against Israel in the United Nations. He questioned why the United Nations, having failed to take steps against Egypt, is now pressing Israel to accept a return to a situation of lawless belligerency.

RWS

RWSchleck:jl
REPORTER

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From _____

Comment:

The White Paper appears to make some effort to buttress its charges by citing remarks by Egyptian leaders, Egyptian official documents, and statements by the United Nations. However, in a number of cases, the evidence presented consists of flat statements that the Egyptians said or did something without citing any source for the information. For example, none of the charges made in the section accusing Egypt of persecuting Jewish civilians in violation of the Geneva Convention, is supported by a source citation. At the same time, the accusations of violations of this document in regard to prisoners of war are based on the statements of two Israeli soldiers.

For the Ambassador:

William L. Hamilton, Jr.

William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosures:

- WOB*
- 1) 5 copies of the Israel Foreign Ministry White Paper.
 - 2) 5 copies of the Foreign Ministry's Communique on Egyptian Fedayeen Activities.

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MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INFORMATION DIVISION, JERUSALEM

674.840/2-2757
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EGYPTIAN VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

United Nations Charter

BELLIGERENCY

Egypt's exercise of alleged "rights of war" under her oft-proclaimed doctrine of unilateral belligerency; her continued armed attacks against Israel; her naval blockade and economic boycott; the repeated threats of her leaders to annihilate Israel and their consistent refusal to arrive at a peaceful settlement with Israel are in clear and open violation of the following provisions of the United Nations Charter:

"We the peoples of the United Nations, determined... to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained... and for these ends to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours... and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims."

— Preamble

"The purposes of the United Nations are... to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."

— Article 1 (2)

"All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."

— Article 2 (3)

From the signing of the Israel-Arab Armistice Agreements in February 1949 to the end of 1956, Arab attackers, including Egyptian-trained Fedayeen, carried out 3,367 raids into Israel territory, killing 443 Israelis and wounding 963.

"They tried to force us to negotiate with Israel, but we refused. I informed them... that we will never negotiate with Israel."

— Abdul Nasser, 6 July 1955

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"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration."

— Article 33 (1)

"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

— Article 2 (4)

ECONOMIC WARFARE

Egypt's economic warfare against Israel, including the blockade against Israel-bound vessels at the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Akaba, the air blockade and the general anti-Israel economic boycott, is in violation of the following provisions of the Charter (in addition to the provisions of the Preamble quoted above):

"The purposes of the United Nations are ... to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic character."

— Article 1 (3)

"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."

— Article 25

"With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations ... the United Nations shall promote ... solutions of international economic ... problems."

— Article 55 (b)

"All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."

— Article 56

"There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations between the Arabs and Israel."

— Abdul Nasser, 14 October 1955

"Egypt will be glad when her army and that of Syria will meet on the ruins of this treacherous people, these Zionist gangs."

— Abdul Nasser, 18 December 1955

"No person, or other legal entity, is permitted to conclude an agreement, directly or indirectly, with institutions or persons in Israel, or persons acting on her behalf in another country. This covers any commercial, financial or other transactions."

— Article 1, Boycott Regulations adopted by the Arab League Council in Cairo on 14 December 1954 and published in the Egyptian Official Journal on 23 October 1955

In 1949 and 1950 Egypt established a series of gun emplacements in the Sharm el Sheikh area in order to prevent ships from sailing freely in the Gulf of Akaba to and from the port of Eilat. These guns have blockaded the Gulf of Akaba for the past six years.

"In accordance with the Orders dated 7 July 1955, issued by the Minister of War and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the Regional Boycott Office for Israel is appointed to be the only authority for issuing permission to vessels to pass through the Egyptian Territorial Waters in the Gulf of Akaba."

— Egyptian orders for maritime traffic in the Gulf of Akaba, 1955

In defiance of the Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951, which called on Egypt "to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound", the Egyptian authorities persisted in acts of confiscation, detention and sheer molestation of ships proceeding to and from Israel even in respect of goods which were not included in the "contraband list".

"There can hardly be any doubt that all seafaring nations, and for that matter all nations, must, as a matter of principle, be very greatly concerned in the maintenance of the freedom of international shipping — not least through the Suez Canal.... In the view of my Government, the measures decided upon by the Egyptian Government and the practices applied by it cannot be reconciled with the Charter."

— Mr. Borberg, representative of Denmark, at Meeting 663 of the Security Council, 25 March 1954

(See also violations listed under "United Nations Resolutions")

PERSECUTION OF MINORITIES

Egypt's acts of persecution, expropriation and deportation perpetrated against foreign nationals in Egypt — and the Jewish community in particular (including Egyptian nationals of the Jewish faith as well as non-Egyptian Jews) — constitute a grave violation of the following provisions of the Charter :

"The purposes of the United Nations are ... to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."

— Article 1 (3)

"The United Nations shall promote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."

— Article 55c

"All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action ... in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."

— Article 56

The Egyptian Government, in line with its policy of deporting all Jews not in possession of Egyptian nationality — and depriving of their citizenship and deporting those who acquired Egyptian nationality after 1 January 1900 — has, since early November 1956, ordered some 21,000 Egyptian Jews to leave the country (4,000 of them within 7 days). The deportees are compelled to leave virtually all their property behind them.

Jewish hospitals in Cairo and Alexandria have been sequestered, the sick ejected and the medical staff arrested. There has been interference with the supply of food to Jewish humanitarian institutions.

About 1,000 Jews of foreign nationality have been imprisoned under wretched physical conditions in the Prison des Barages in Cairo. Special detention centres are operating

in various public buildings, where detainees are herded together in crowded and unsanitary conditions. Altogether, between 2,000 and 3,000 Jews have been arrested.

Bank accounts have been frozen, property sequestrated, hundreds of industrial and commercial concerns taken over by the Government (among these the department stores of Cicurel, Chemla, Hanau and Chalos, the banking houses of Zilka and Mosseri, and the Pinto cotton firm) and Jewish employees generally dismissed.

(Based on official lists of sequestration under Egyptian Military Proclamation No. 4, published in the Extraordinary Egyptian Official Journal of 8 November 1956)

The assets sequestrated or frozen by the Egyptian Government up to the end of November 1956 are estimated at well over \$220,000,000.

United Nations Resolutions

INVASION OF 1948

The invasion of Israel by the Arab States, headed by Egypt, in 1948 was in open defiance of the following General Assembly and Security Council resolutions :

"The General Assembly... appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations." (Concerning the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish and an Arab state).

— General Assembly, Resolution 181 (II),
29 November 1947

"The Security Council... appeals to all Governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now occurring in Palestine."

— Security Council, 691, 5 March 1948

"The Security Council calls upon all... to take immediately... the following measures: (a) cease all activities of a military or para-military nature, as well as acts of violence, terrorism or sabotage; (b) refrain

"The Charter and the United Nations will not crumble, will not fall apart, if one more of the General Assembly's resolutions is not put into effect. We do not choose to comply with the General Assembly's resolution on Palestine."

— Mahmoud Fawzi, Egyptian representative in the Security Council, 25 February 1948 (Doc. S/PV 255)

"The Royal Egyptian Government declare, now that the British Mandate in Palestine has ended, that the Egyptian armed forces have started to enter Palestine."

— Cable from the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Security Council, 15 May 1948 (S/743)

"On the termination of the British Mandate in Palestine, instructions were given to forces of the Egyptian army to enter Palestine..."

from bringing and from assisting and encouraging the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel, goods, individuals, whatever their origin."

— Security Council, 723, 17 April 1948

"The Security Council... calls upon all Governments and authorities, without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned, to abstain from any hostile military action in Palestine, and to that end to issue a cease-fire order to their military and para-military forces to become effective within 36 hours after midnight, New York Standard Time, 22 May 1948."

— Security Council, 773, 22 May 1948

"The Security Council . . . addresses an urgent appeal to the interested parties to accept in principle the prolongation of the truce for such a period as may be decided upon in consultation with the Mediator."

— Security Council, 875, 7 July 1948

The Egyptian regular forces are proceeding with their operations."

— Official communication delivered by the Egyptian Government to the Security Council, 22 May 1948 (S/767)

"The Egyptian Government regrets that it cannot abide by the recommendation of the Security Council to cease fire in Palestine."

— Reply of the Egyptian Government, 26 May 1948.

"The Arabs are not prepared to accept prolongation of the truce."

— From the Mediator's Report to the Security Council, 8 July 1948 (S/873)

"The Security Council, taking into consideration that the Provisional Government of Israel has indicated its acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce in Palestine; that the States members of the Arab League have rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator and of the Security Council in its Resolution of 7 July 1948 for the prolongation of the truce in Palestine, and that there has consequently developed a renewal of hostilities in Palestine; determines that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter."

— Security Council, 902, 15 July 1948

RAIDS ACROSS THE BORDER

In continuing, to this day, the incursions into Israel of the Fedayeen, the Egyptians have been violating that portion of the General Assembly's resolution of 2 November 1956 which —

"...urges the parties... to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory."

— General Assembly, 997 (ES-I),
2 November 1956

The following Israeli casualties were incurred, as a result of illegal incursions across the border, during the months of November and December 1956 and January 1957: November — 8 killed, 16 wounded; December — 1 killed, 4 wounded; January — 4 wounded.

SUEZ AND AKABA BLOCKADE

The economic war being waged by Egypt against Israel — in particular, the blockade of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Akaba — violates the following United Nations resolutions :

"The Security Council...

FURTHER NOTING . . . that the Egyptian Government has not complied with the earnest plea of the Chief of Staff, made to the Egyptian delegate on 12 June 1951, that it desist from the present practice of interfering with the passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel . . .

FINDS that the maintenance of the practice mentioned in Paragraph 4 above is inconsistent with the objectives of a peaceful settlement between the parties and the establishment of a permanent peace in Palestine set forth in the Armistice Agreement;

FINDS FURTHER that such practice is an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure;

FURTHER FINDS that such practice cannot in the prevailing circumstances be justified on the ground that it is necessary for self-defence;

AND FURTHER NOTING that the restrictions on the passage of goods through the Suez Canal to Israel ports are denying to nations at no time connected with the conflict in Palestine valuable supplies required for their economic reconstruction, and that these restrictions, together with sanctions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel ports, represent unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another, including the Arab States and Israel ;

CALLS UPON EGYPT to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal, wherever bound, and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force."

— Security Council, 2322, 1 September 1951

Some of the cases of interference with shipping through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Akaba :

On 31 October 1952, the Norwegian ship "Rimfrost", en route from Eritrea to Israel, was detained at Port Said and its cargo of frozen meat confiscated.

On 2 September 1953, a cargo of Israel-assembled motor cars consigned to Kenya was confiscated aboard the Greek freighter "Parnon".

On 14 December 1953, a cargo of meat was confiscated at Port Said aboard the Italian s/s "Franca Mari" on her way to Haifa.

On 22 December 1953, a shipment of motorcycles and personal effects consigned to Israel was confiscated from the Norwegian freighter "Triton", en route from Melbourne to Genoa.

On 8 July 1955, a similar consignment was taken off the Dutch vessel "Fedala".

On 28 September 1954, the Israel freighter "Bat Galim", en route from Eritrea to Haifa with a cargo of food and hides, was stopped by the Egyptian authorities at the entrance to the Suez Canal. The ship was seized, the cargo confiscated and the crew imprisoned. Not until 1 January 1955 was the crew liberated, but the vessel itself was not released.

On 3 December 1953, Egyptian guns fired at the United States vessel "Albion" at the entry to the Gulf of Akaba, in the belief (as the Egyptian authorities later explained) that the ship's destination was Eilat. (Actually, the "Albion" was carrying a cargo of wheat to the Jordanian port of Akaba.)

On 1 January 1954, Egyptian gunfire was directed, at the entry to the Gulf of Akaba, against the Italian ship "Maria Antonia" on her way from Massawa to Eilat. The ship was forcibly compelled to return to its port of origin.

"The Security Council . . . agrees that any settlement of the Suez question should meet the following requirements: . . .

There should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert — this covers both political and technical aspects . . .

The operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country."

— Security Council, 3675, 13 October 1956

"This occupation being in no sense intended to interfere in any way whatever with innocent traffic through the stretch of sea separating these two islands from the Sinai coast of Egypt, it goes without saying that this passage, the only practicable one, will remain free, as in the past; which is in conformity with international practice and with the recognized principles of international law."

— Aide-Mémoire on the Egyptian occupation of the islands of Tiran and Sanafir, handed by the Egyptian Foreign Minister to U.S. Ambassador Caffery, 28 January 1950

"The General Assembly . . . urges that upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation."

— General Assembly, 997. (ES-I), 2 Nov. 1956

On 3 July 1955, the British ship "Anshun" was fired upon by Egyptian batteries at the entrance to the Gulf of Akaba because she failed to stop and identify herself.

"The Anti-Israel Boycott Committee asked for the passing of legislation designed to tighten the siege against Israel both by confiscating all Israeli goods of all kinds and by seizing all ships carrying goods to or from Israel, as is being practised in all other Arab countries. The Arab Government also asked Egypt to take appropriate measures in order to confiscate food shipments going to Israel through Egyptian territorial waters in a manner similar to the measures undertaken by the Governments of Iraq, Syria and Jordan . . . In conclusion, the Director (of the Coastal Guard Department) asked that the Decree of 10 February 1950 be amended in such a manner as to allow confiscation of food and other commodities . . ."

— Egyptian Government Memorandum
September 1955

"Egypt will not permit the passage of Israel vessels through the Canal."

— Kamal e-Din Hussein, Egyptian Minister of Education, 16 November 1956

"Israel vessels shall never pass through the Canal."

— Mahmoud Fawzi, Egyptian Foreign Minister, as reported on Radiq Cairo, 3 December 1956

REFUSAL TO MAKE PEACE

Egypt's refusal to reach a peaceful settlement with Israel is contrary to the following United Nations resolutions:

"The Security Council . . . decides that, in order to eliminate that threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, an armistice shall be established."

— Security Council, 1080, 16 November 1948

"The Security Council . . . expresses the hope that the Government and authorities concerned, having undertaken . . . to extend

"Egypt has rejected a suggestion that an Egyptian officer should meet an Israeli in no-man's land to discuss the situation on the Israel-Egyptian border. Egypt will have no direct talks with Israel."

— Col. Salah Gohar, Director of Palestine Affairs in the Egyptian War Ministry, 1 December 1954

"Today I see how the U.N. acts in fulfilling Israel's aspirations. They tried to force us to negotiate with Israel, but we refused. I in-

the scope of the armistice negotiations and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, will at an early date achieve agreement on the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them."

— Security Council, 1376, 11 August 1949

"The General Assembly . . . calls upon every Nation . . . to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to cooperate in supporting United Nations efforts to resolve outstanding problems."

— General Assembly 290 (IV),
1 December 1949

"The Security Council . . . reminds Egypt, Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan that the Armistice Agreements to which they are parties contemplate the return of permanent peace in Palestine, and therefore urges them and the other States in the area to take all such steps as will lead to the settlement of the issues between them."

— Security Council, 1907, 17 November 1950

"Under the Charter of the United Nations, all States are bound to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered . . ."

— General Assembly, 704 (VIII),
8 April 1953

WAR PROPAGANDA AND THREATS

The countless threats uttered against the State of Israel by Egyptian leaders, both in personal statements and through Government organs, in the press and over the radio, have violated the following United Nations resolutions:

"The General Assembly . . . condemns all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or acts of aggression."

— General Assembly, 110 (II), 3 Nov. 1947

"The General Assembly . . . calls upon every Nation: to refrain from threatening or using force contrary to the Charter; to refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any state."

— General Assembly, 290 (IV), 1 Dec. 1949

formed them that we will answer aggression with aggression and that we will never negotiate with Israel."

— Gamal Abdul Nasser, 6 July 1955

"The hatred of the Arabs against the Zionists is very strong, and there is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations between the Arabs and Israel."

— Gamal Abdul Nasser, 14 October 1955

"No one can force the Arab States to make peace with Israel; this question has not even occurred to the leaders of the Arab States. There has been no change whatsoever in the policy of the Arab States with regard to Israel."

— Saif Abu el-Lama, Deputy Secretary-General of the Arab League, 28 Oct. 1956

"There is no thought of signing a peace with the Jews, or even recognizing them."

— Muhammed Salah E-Din, Egyptian Foreign Minister, 24 June 1951

"Egypt irrevocably opposes the recognition of the so-called state of Israel."

— Mahmoud Fawzi, Egyptian Foreign Minister, 14 July 1955

"Israel will not be saved from the Arabs. The day will soon come when Israel will be destroyed under the feet of Arab fighters and the flag of freedom will be unfurled over Palestine."

— Ibrahim Tahawi, Deputy Secretary of the Liberation Rally and member of the Egyptian Cabinet, as reported in "Al Akram", 29 October 1955

"The General Assembly . . . reaffirms its resolutions 110 (II) and 290 (IV) . . . which condemn all propaganda against peace."

— General Assembly, 381(V), 17 Nov. 1950

"Under the Charter of the United Nations, all States are bound . . . to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

— General Assembly, 704(VII), 8 April 1953

"Disperse your enemies with the sword! . . . I assure you that the present truce is only a pause between war and war."

— Sheikh Abdul Latif, in sermon delivered at El Azhar Mosque, Cairo, as reported by United Press, 12 November 1955

"Our war against the Jews is an old struggle that began with Mohammed and in which we achieved many great victories. It is our duty to fight the Jews for the sake of Allah and religion, and it is our duty to finish the war which Mohammed began."

— Col. Anwar Sadat, Egyptian Minister of State, as reported in "Al Ahram", 26 November 1955.

"Egypt will be glad when her army and that of Syria will meet on the ruins of this treacherous people, these Zionist gangs, so that our dead may rest in peace in the knowledge that our countries have been liberated of all foreign encroachment."

— Gamal Abdul Nasser, as reported by Near East Broadcasting Service, 18 December 1955

"We have finally resolved to defend the Arab cause. Our army stands at the frontier, ready to teach the Zionists a lesson they will never forget, when the time is ripe."

— Gen. Abdul Hakim Amer, Egyptian Minister of War, 22 January 1956

"Wait and see, Ben-Gurion! Soon will be proved to you the Arabs' prowess and strength of will. Egypt and the Arab Nation will teach you a lesson and quieten you forever. Egypt will grind you to the dust!"

— Anwar el-Sadat, Egyptian Minister of State, 8 April 1956

"The Israel danger no longer exists. The Egyptian army is strong enough to wipe Israel from the map of the world."

— Abdul Hakim Amer, 11 June 1956

"We must be strong — in order to gain forcibly the rights of the Palestinian people."

— Gamal Abdul Nasser, 19 June 1956

"The United States and others talk of borders and their preservation. Yet they know very well that Israel has no borders and that she is not a state in the legal sense. She presently finds herself behind a string of armistice lines — lines that cannot serve as borders, even if there should be carried on, in the Middle East, a series of long drawn-out battles for many generations."

— "Al Akhbar", Egyptian daily, as quoted by Radio Cairo, 15 January 1957

Israel-Egyptian Armistice Agreement

The exercise by Egypt of the "rights of war" to which she has laid claim throughout the period of the Armistice with Israel has been in flagrant violation of the following provisions of the Israel-Egyptian General Armistice Agreement :

"With a view to promoting the return of permanent peace in Palestine... the following principles, which shall be fully observed by both Parties during the Armistice, are hereby affirmed:

- (1) *The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both Parties.*
- (2) *No aggressive action by the armed forces — land, sea, or air — of either Party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other.*
- (3) *The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected.*
- (4) *The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine."*

— Article 1

"No element of the land, sea, or air military or para-military forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party."

— Article 2(2)

"The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Line is to delineate the line beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move except as provided in Article 3 of this Agreement." (Relating to the withdrawal of the armed forces of the two parties on the day following the signature of the General Armistice Agreement).

— Article 5(3)

"We are still legally at war with Israel. An armistice does not put an end to a state of war. It does not prohibit a country from exercising certain rights of war."

— *Egyptian representative on the Israeli-Egyptian Special Committee, 12 June 1951*

"These volunteers were recruited for service in the National Guard, and not in the regular forces, by the Chief of Intelligence in Palestine, and most of them have a criminal past and they have but one desire: to wreak vengeance on Israel and to steal there. The action of the volunteers was taken in accordance with the proposal of the above-mentioned Chief of Intelligence to the Commanding General of the Armed Forces, who approved it on condition that the volunteers constitute a part of the Egyptian National Guard."

— *From a Memorandum by Lt. Col. Ahmad Salem, Commander of the Egyptian Military Forces in Sinai, 10 July 1955*

"The basic purpose of training this year is the transition from a defensive to an offensive position. The administrative units must work together with the other units and must prepare their men for these operations."

— *From the Training Instructions for 1956/57, to the administrative units of the 3rd Egyptian Infantry Division*

"Every commander must prepare himself and his soldiers for the important battle with Israel in which we are fully immersed, with the aim of realizing our lofty tradition, that is to overpower and destroy Israel in the shortest possible time and with the greatest brutality and bestiality in battle."

— *From the Directives of the Commander of the 3rd Egyptian Infantry Division, dated 15 February 1956*

"Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application of the Armistice Demarcation Line defined in Article 6."

— Article 5(4)

"In the area of the western front under Egyptian control, Egyptian defensive forces only may be maintained. All other Egyptian forces shall be withdrawn from this area to a point or points no further east than El Arish—Abou Aoueigila."

— Article 7(3)

"On the Egyptian side of the frontier, facing the El Auja area, no Egyptian defensive positions shall be closer to El Auja than El Qouseima and Abou Aoueigila."

— Article 8(3)

From the signing of the Israel-Arab Armistice Agreements in February 1949 to the end of 1956, Arab marauders, including Egyptian-trained Fedayeen, carried out 3,367 raids into Israel territory, killing 443 Israelis and wounding 963.

In August 1955, an Egyptian army unit crossed the international frontier into the El Auja area. These forces dug themselves in along several kilometres and set up artillery positions. They refused to heed U.N. appeals to withdraw and had to be dislodged by the Israel Army in November 1955.

The Egyptians established a strong offensive deployment, including artillery, in the area between El Auja and Abou Aoueigila.

(See also violations listed under "United Nations Resolutions — Suez and Akaba Blockade")

International Aviation Agreements

Egypt's air blockade against Israel and the extensive restrictions she has placed on international air traffic are incompatible with the aims of the International Civil Aviation Organization and are in contravention of the Convention on International Civil Aviation as well as of the International Air Services Transit Agreement. The following provisions of these two treaties have been violated:

"Each contracting State grants to the other contracting States the following freedoms of the air in respect of scheduled international air services:

- 1) *The privilege to fly across its territory without landing;*
- 2) *The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes."*

— International Air Services Transit Agreement, Article 1 (1)

"Each contracting State agrees that all aircraft of the other contracting States, being aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services, shall have the right, subject to the observance of the terms of this Convention, to make flights into or in transit non-stop across its territory and to make stops for non-traffic purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior permission, and subject to the right of the State flown over to require landing."

— Convention on International Civil Aviation, Article 5

Under Egyptian regulations governing her air boycott, no aircraft may overfly Egypt, if in the course of its journey it has made or is going to make a landing in Israel.

Flight information is withheld from such planes even in cases of serious danger. Aircraft flying to and from Israel cannot rely upon search and rescue services in accordance with Annex 12 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Radio messages exchanged between Israel airports and aircraft flying to and from Israel are frequently "jammed". Furthermore, Egypt and the other Arab states have consistently refused to co-operate in the establishment of a single Flight Information Centre for the region, thereby undermining centralized control over aircraft movements in the area and endangering air safety.

"Prohibited areas shall be of reasonable extent and location so as not to interfere unnecessarily with air navigation".

— Convention on International Civil Aviation, Article 9

Egypt has declared the area of the Straits of Tiran (Sharm-el-Sheikh) — the sole space through which aircraft may reach Israel from the South without overflying Arab territory — to be a "prohibited zone", and an Egyptian regulation establishes that "Fire will be opened at or into the contravening aircraft without any previous warning." (Oct. 1955)

Geneva Convention Relating to Civilians

Egypt's acts of persecution, deportation and hate-mongering against foreign nationals in Egypt, as well as against Egyptian nationals of the Jewish faith, constitute also a breach of the following provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

"Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or occupying Power of which they are not national".

— Geneva Convention, Article 4

"Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.

Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion".

— Geneva Convention, Article 27

"The taking of hostages is prohibited".

— Geneva Convention, Article 34

Since early November, some 21,000 Egyptian Jews have been arbitrarily expelled from Egypt. About 1,000 Jews of foreign nationality have been imprisoned under wretched physical conditions in the Prison des Barages in Cairo.

On 23 November, the preachers in Egyptian mosques throughout the country read a proclamation by the Egyptian Minister of Religious Affairs, telling the Egyptian people that all Jews were Zionists and enemies and that Egyptians should not collaborate with them.

Some 900 persons — for the most part members of deported families — are being held as hostages to ensure the silence of these families after they leave the country.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

"No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality."

— Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 15,2), adopted and proclaimed by the U.N. General Assembly, 10 December 1948.

Egyptian Jews who acquired Egyptian nationality after 1 January 1900 are being stripped of their nationality and being expelled, in their thousands, from Egypt.

Geneva Convention Relating to Prisoners of War

The ill-treatment of Israel prisoners-of-war in Egyptian hands, and the inhuman methods employed by the Egyptian authorities to extract military information from them, contravened the following provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War:

"Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power... seriously endangering the health of prisoners of war in its custody is prohibited and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention . . ."

— Article 13

"Instead of receiving medical aid, he was subjected to renewed maltreatment and interrogation by more modern methods. He was subjected by his interrogators to powerful electric shocks by means of electrodes attached to his head and also to his genitals . . . This went on in the presence of a Medical Officer who certified now and then that the 'treatment' could go on".

— From summary of statement by Lt. J. Etkes before Israel medical board, in presence of Major J. Austin of UNEF, 27 January 1957.

"On 17 January, 10 soldiers entered our cell and started beating us cruelly . . . They threw me to the floor and started jumping on my body. I was hit flush on my right eye by a nailed jackboot. The effect of the blow is still clearly discernable".

— From Lt. Etkes' statement

"No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer... may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind".

— Article 17

"The next morning a group of officers arrived and started interrogating him, first threatening him with physical violence, and then beating him and thrusting lighted cigarettes into his nostrils and ears and throwing burning matches at his face in order to extract information from him . . . The same maltreatment and interrogation went on after lunch and in the evening. The prisoner was given multiple injections all over his body, which caused, in his words, 'frantic hardening of the muscles'. Then one of the officers put a loaded pistol to Etkes' head and threatened to shoot him, explaining that 'bullets are very cheap in Egypt'. On a number of occasions he was put on the 'operating table', pushed off it, and dragged about the room".

— From Lt. Etkes' statement

"All effects and articles of personal use... shall remain in the possession of prisoners of war".

— Article 18

"The evacuation of prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely... The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who are being evacuated with sufficient food and potable water, and with the necessary clothing and medical attention".

— Article 20

"...Prisoners of war may not be held in close confinement except where necessary to safeguard their health and then only during the continuation of the circumstances which make such confinement necessary".

— Article 21

"Prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as favourable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power... The said conditions shall make allowance for the habits and customs of the prisoners and shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.

The foregoing provisions shall apply in particular to the dormitories for prisoners of war as regards both total surface and minimum space and the general installations, bedding and blankets".

— Article 25

"The basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep prisoners of war in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies. Account shall also be taken of the habitual diet of the prisoner".

— Article 26

"He was found by an Egyptian patrol, which tried to find out by pricking him with a bayonet whether he was still alive. (He had collapsed from loss of blood 5 hours earlier.) They stripped him of his outer clothes, documents and wristwatch. His wound was left unattended... After a delay of an hour or so, he was taken on his way to Cairo... a journey which lasted three and a half days. No medical treatment was offered during this time, and he received practically no food or drink."

— From Lt. Etkes' statement

"On the left upper third of his thigh there is an irregular retracted flesh wound, still discharging, of approximately one inch length, which apparently was not sutured because of infection and probably inadequate wound excision".

—From Lt. Etkes' statement

"His prison room was small and very dark and got hardly any light from a small window near the ceiling. He was not taken for a walk until the visit of the representative of the Red Cross on 17 December 1956, six weeks after his capture."

— From Lt. Etkes' statement

"For a long time he was kept in his tiny cell, the size of which was no more than 3 x 3.5 metres. It was only after he started a hunger strike lasting two days that he was allowed into the prison court for a few hours every day."

— From Sgt. J. Anixter's statement,
27 January 1957

"The prisoner suffered severely from acute diarrhea. His food consisted of some tea and bread in the morning, beans for lunch and sometimes a small piece of meat in the evening, which he was not always able to eat."

—From Lt. Etkes' statement

"Prisoners of war shall have the right to make known to the military authorities in whose power they are, their requests regarding the conditions of captivity to which they are subjected.

They shall also have the unrestricted right to apply to the representatives of the Protecting Powers . . . if they consider it necessary . . . in order to draw their attention to any points on which they may have complaints to make regarding their conditions of captivity.

These requests and complaints shall not be limited . . . They must be transmitted immediately. Even if they are recognised to be unfounded, they may not give rise to any punishment".

— Article 78

Constantinople Convention of 1888

Egypt's blockade of the Suez Canal violates the following provisions of the Constantinople Convention :

"The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.

Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace.

The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade".

— Article 1

"The Maritime Canal remaining open in time of war as a free passage, even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to the terms of Article 1 of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the Canal, shall be committed in the Canal and its ports of access, as well as within a radius of 3 marine miles from those ports, even though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent Powers . . ."

— Article 4

"On the 12th of November the Red Cross representative was due to visit them again. Before his arrival an Egyptian officer threatened that they would be decapitated if they dared complain".

—From Sgt. Anixter's statement

"We are still legally at war with Israel. An armistice does not put an end to a state of war. It does not prohibit a country from exercising certain rights of war".

— Egyptian representative on the Israel-Egyptian Special Committee during discussion on Suez Blockade, 12 June 1951

"Egypt prevents any ship flying the Israeli flag from passing through Suez, regardless of what cargo it carries. Moreover, the Egyptian authorities confiscate both the ship and the cargo together. Regarding non-Israeli ships which are passing through the Canal with cargoes bound for that country, their papers, cargoes and transactions are examined, and if any merchandise suspected of being war material is found, this is instantly confiscated. The Arab League is at present discussing the possibility of including foodstuffs for Israel in the category 'War material' with the view of immediate confiscation."

— Izadin Abdul Haziz, Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires in Amman, 28 August 1956.

"The measures which shall be taken in the cases provided for by Articles 9 and 10 of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the free use of the Canal".

— Article 11

(Article 9 states: *"The Egyptian Government shall, within the limits of its powers resulting from the Firmans, and under the conditions provided for in the present Treaty, take the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the said Treaty . . . "*)

(Article 10 states: *"Similarly, the provisions of Articles 4, 5, 7 and 8 shall not interfere with the measures which His Majesty the Sultan and his Highness the Khedive, in the name of his Imperial Majesty, and within the limits of the Firmans granted, might find it necessary to take for securing by their own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order . . . "*)

STATE OF ISRAEL
Government Press Office

Saturday
February 23, 1957

PRESS RELEASE NO. 1

The Israel Foreign Ministry spokesman announced on Friday: the propitiatory attitude of the U.N. toward Arab belligerency continues to encourage the Egyptians in their campaign of aggression. In utter disregard to the provisions of the Charter, Egypt persists in the dispatch of Fedayeen gangs from its own territory as well as from the territory of other Arab states.

Last night Fedayeen murder squads carried out 4 raids against Israel citizens. In one attack a lorry was fired upon in the vicinity of Megiddo, two of its passengers were injured, one of them seriously. Two other assaults were carried out in the neighbourhood of Beit Naballa while Fedayeen from Jordan shot at the guards of the village and opened fire on the vehicle of an Israel patrol. One policeman was injured. Another police constable received injuries while his patrol was attacked by Fedayeen near Affula.

These raids have been carried out in the wake of a series of Fedayeen incursions from Sinai through the U.N. lines into the southern part of the country.

While these raids are being perpetrated well inside Israel territory, Egypt openly publicizes her determination to carry on her campaign of murder and terror against Israel.

The Cairo radio stated today: "there is no doubt that the Israel army spokesman, in his statements on Fedayeen activities, has a certain aim in view, namely, to denounce Egypt as an aggressive state; and to prove that Israel requires guarantees in order to deter Egyptian aggression. Egypt has openly and on many occasions defined its attitude. The Fedayeen problem will continue to exist even if Israel obtains guarantees from all the countries of the world...any statement made by the Israel army spokesman about Fedayeen activities serves ipso facto as propaganda for the Fedayeen".

Egypt's acts of aggression as well as her unabashed declarations of continuing warfare insistently pose for the citizens of Israel the question: will the U.N. favour the aggressive acts and purposes of the Egyptian dictator as against their own security and their inherent right to peaceful existence.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AmEmbassy BERN.

590

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

February 27 1957

REF :

2 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION NEA 4	DEPT. RM/R 2	EUR 5
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SUBJECT: Conversation with Lebanese Minister on Middle Eastern Situation

There is forwarded as of interest to the Department as well as to Cairo, Beirut and Damascus, a copy of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Nadim DIMECHKIE, Minister of Lebanon in Bern, and the reporting officer in which the Minister expressed his views on the possibilities of a settlement in the Middle East.

The undersigned requested an appointment with the Minister as he had just returned from the Middle East and as there had been certain hints from the Legation that such a conversation might be worth while. Mr. Dimechkié is considered by many in the diplomatic community in Bern to be oriented toward the West. He is married to an attractive British woman who is very popular here. He was a student of Mr. Charles Malik at the American University at Beirut and is a great admirer of Malik.

As Mr. Dimechkié saw NASSER on two different occasions he is undoubtedly reflecting his opinion in this expression of views. It is interesting, however, that he is convinced that the Egyptian President finds himself in a very uncomfortable position from which he would like to extricate himself. It may also be significant that Mr. Dimechkié insists that Nasser is willing to come to a settlement on Aqaba and Suez if he is allowed to save face. The Embassy not being au courant of the situation in the Middle East is of course unable to determine the true significance of these statements. It should be noted in that connection, however, that Mr. Dimechkié, who was assigned to Cairo some time prior to coming to Bern, reportedly knew Nasser well at that time and saw him frequently.

cc: Cairo
Beirut
Damascus

William L. Blue
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosure:
Copy of Memorandum of Conversation

WLBlue:aan

REPORTER

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Desp. No. 590
From Bern

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

February 21, 1957

Participants: Mr. Nadim Dimechkié, Lebanese Minister, Bern
Mr. William L. Blue, American Embassy, Bern

Subject : Middle Eastern Situation

I opened the conversation by referring to Minister Dimechkié's recent visit to the Middle East and asked him what his views were as to the possibility of a settlement there. He said that before leaving Switzerland several weeks ago he was very gloomy about the chances of a settlement and that he made the trip to see exactly what was possible. He added that he had visited Cairo and had had two four-hour talks with Nasser. He is convinced that Nasser wants to maintain his ties with the West and is very uncomfortable in his present position, as he is "cornered both politically and economically". He asserted that Nasser prefers a neutral position between Russia and the West similar to that of India and that he certainly wants the Canal open, for Egypt needs the income as the country is in a very difficult position economically at the present time.

Mr. Dimechkié went on to say that Nasser is in his present difficult position partly because the Russians have played their hand very well, while the West has made a series of blunders, from Egypt's standpoint. He pointed out, for example, that when Shepilov was in Egypt some time ago negotiating with Nasser, forty Communists were arrested on the orders of the Egyptian President in an effort to prod Shepilov into a protest. According to Dimechkié, Nasser wished to be sure that Shepilov knew about these arrests before his talks with him began, so he sent copies of a number of newspapers to his hotel two hours before the meeting. Shepilov, however, said nothing despite the provocation. Dimechkié also referred to the recent confiscation of certain Soviet films, which did not lead to any protest. He concluded that Nasser had been on the alert to catch the Communists and the Soviets in a false move, but that so far he had been unsuccessful.

As for the West, however, the situation was the opposite, as far as Nasser was concerned. In the first place, after he had agreed to all of the demands of the World Bank for a loan on the Aswan dam, Dulles had announced very bluntly that no loan would be forthcoming. He said that this was a great blow to Nasser, who had counted on this money heavily and who was willing to pay twice as much interest to the West to avoid having to

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From Bern

rely on the Soviet Union for aid. Dimechkié said that Nasser thereupon seized the Canal, claiming that he needed the funds to build the Aswan dam. Dimechkié admitted that he thought Nasser was wrong to have taken such action.

Minister Dimechkié described as even worse, of course, the French-Israeli attack, into which the British had been drawn at the last minute. He said that there was no question but that there was collusion between the French and the Israeli, that the French Chief of Staff had visited Israel shortly before the attack and thereafter French materiel and equipment flowed into Israel. He asserted that France was motivated by a desire to get at Nasser because they considered that he was responsible for their troubles in Algeria. Dimechkié immediately added that the Algerian situation was in actual fact of French creation. He made reference to eighty thousand Algerians slaughtered by the French in 1945 because they wished to have equal rights with the French. He asserted that there was no question of independence at that time. He indicated that the figure of eighty thousand had been obtained from our Embassy in Cairo. He deplored the French policy on Suez and asserted that they were responsible for the stiffnecked attitude of the Israeli in the present situation.

Returning to the Suez matter, he asserted that the attack came at a time when agreement on Suez seemed possible. Indeed, in his view a compromise could have been reached at a meeting which was scheduled for October 29 in Geneva. The British and French had asked for a delay, he said, as they intended to attack on that day. He stated his belief that this was the reason that President Eisenhower was so furious with the British, French and the Israeli at the time.

As for the Israeli question as a whole, he said that it must "be put into the icebox" for a while, because it cannot be settled now, as passions are still too high in the Middle East. He added, however, that he believes that Nasser is willing to agree to arrangements whereby the Gulf of Aqaba may be used by Israel provided it can be done without making it appear that Israel obtained these rights through her aggression. I attempted to get the Minister to spell out to some extent how he thought Israeli rights could be protected. I asked, for example, if Nasser would agree that UN forces could be placed along the Sinai coast of the Gulf. He evaded this question but reiterated that he thought that Egypt would be willing to allow Israel to use the Gulf even though it was considered to be Egyptian territorial waters. He also insisted that Nasser would be willing to come to an agreement on Suez, but again stated that all was dependent on whether Israel would abandon her present inflexible position.

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I asked the Minister what his views were on Syria. He said that unfortunately this situation was much more dangerous and, of course, much more of a real problem for Lebanon. He went on to say that Saud, who was an absolute ruler, changed his views overnight, and that Nasser, although he was certainly subject to public opinion to an extent, could change over a period of three months, if given the right atmosphere. In the case of Syria, however, he said that he was not convinced that there was any desire for change. He added that he knew that the President and Prime Minister were not happy over the present situation, but that they had no real power.

During his conversation Mr. Dimechkié made reference several times to the wisdom of the United States stand on the British, French and Israeli action in Egypt. He said that as a result, the prestige of the United States was back where it had been in the 1920's before the problem of Israel arose. He asserted that if the United States had not taken this stand the position of the West and its friends would have been hopeless. He added that, as a result of U.S. action, friends of the West were able to speak up without fear of being accused of being traitors. He went on to say "You don't think Charles Malik would have been able to support the 'Eisenhower Doctrine' if you had not taken such a stand, do you?".

WLB
[Handwritten signature]

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No. 1 of 9

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 27, 1957

SUBJECT: German Approach to Israel

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler, German Ambassador
Mr. J. J. Reinstein, GER

COPIES TO: S/S
EUR (2)
NEA
GER
GPA
Embassy, Bonn (2)

Mr. Reinstein referred to the Ambassador's call to the Secretary's Office on February 25 and the conversation which he had with Mr. Reinstein on February 26 reporting that the German Government had communicated with the Israeli Government on the subject of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the straits area and had counseled moderation. Mr. Reinstein said he had been requested to express the Secretary's appreciation for the action which the German Federal Government had taken.

EUR:GER:JJReinstein/ea
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Document 10157, 25 February 1957

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Number 1 of 5 copies, Series #

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 27, 1957

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary of State
Christian Pineau, French Foreign Minister
H. Alphand, French Ambassador
Mr. Rountree, Assistant Secretary
Mr. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary
Mr. Phleger, Legal Adviser
COPIES TO: Mr. J. W. Jones, Deputy Asst. Secretary

S/S(2), G, NEA (2), EUR (2), L, IO, WE, USUN

The French Foreign Minister and the French Ambassador called on the Secretary at 4 this afternoon with the latest suggested modifications by the Israeli Embassy of the unilateral declaration to be made by the Israeli government. There were four specific modifications of the earlier draft which the Secretary and the Foreign Minister considered and after some discussion agreed generally to accept.

M. Pineau said that the Israeli Embassy had suggested that an effort be made to obtain Mr. Hammarskjold's agreement to the implementation of the arrangements following the Israeli declaration. The Secretary replied that it was not practical to attempt to obtain a new agreement with Mr. Hammarskjold and expressed the opinion that since this was a unilateral declaration on the part of the Israeli government, it did not require the approval or even the comments of the Secretary General of the UN. M. Pineau said that in any event he would like to talk to Mr. Hammarskjold about this development in New York tomorrow and that the best that might be expected would be that the Secretary General would remain silent following the release of the Israeli announcement. At M. Pineau's request the Secretary promised to telephone Mr. Hammarskjold before the French Foreign Minister approaches him in New York.

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The Secretary and the Foreign Minister then discussed procedure and agreed that if the Israeli government approved of the declaration, Mrs. Meir would make the announcement in the General Assembly of the UN to be followed by the statements of the American and French UN representatives. The French Ambassador asked whether it would be desirable to inform the British of the Franco-American efforts with the Israelis. The Secretary replied that once the decision had been made by the Israeli government to issue the declaration, it might be useful for the French and American representatives to get in touch with other delegations at the UN to obtain their support. The Secretary expressed his satisfaction with the progress that had been made.

At this point Mr. Phleger and Mr. Wilcox left to meet with the Israeli Minister-Counselor to reach agreement directly with him on the final draft of the Israeli declaration.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister then turned to the last and still incomplete paragraph of the Mollet-Eisenhower communique (paragraph 3) dealing with the Middle East and the Suez problem. The Secretary dictated a proposed paragraph in the Foreign Minister's presence which was finally agreed by the two Foreign Ministers. The communique was then considered completed and ready for release early tomorrow morning.


EUR:JW Jones:bsm

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 27, 1957
5:00 P. M.

SUBJECT: Review of Middle East Events

PARTICIPANTS: Egidio Ortona, Minister, Italian Embassy
NE - Stuart W. Rockwell
NE - Lewis Hoffacker

COPIES TO: NEA (2cc)
NE (2cc)
WE (2cc)
OLI (2cc)

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Mr. Ortona invited comment on the Israeli situation, as of the moment, with particular regard to the Gaza issue. Mr. Rockwell said that the Secretary General, as well as the United States Government, believed that the General Assembly could not modify the substance of the Israel-Egyptian Armistice Agreement without agreement of the signatories of the Agreement. Therefore, substantive changes in the Gaza regime such as those proposed by Israel could not be effected without Egyptian-Israeli agreement. We hoped that Egypt might find it possible not to exercise for the moment certain rights which she is accorded in Gaza by the Armistice Agreement, therefore facilitating the withdrawal of Israeli troops, the entry of the UNEF, and the assumption of other responsibilities by the UN. The Israelis have thus far refused to alter their position but are aware of the proposed United States resolution on withdrawal. The Israeli Government requested today a further postponement of General Assembly action on the withdrawal issue. The United States took the position that further delay was not justifiable. Unfortunately, the Secretary General's report of February 22 was interpreted in the press as implying that Egypt had agreed to make major concessions. Egyptian Minister Fawzi therefore apparently felt obliged to deny any such concessions.

In response to Mr. Ortona's inquiry, Mr. Rockwell said that we have the impression that King Saud has spoken well in Cairo concerning the Eisenhower Doctrine and was in disagreement with Nasser on this point. It was too early to forecast the outcome of the conference of Arab leaders then going on.

Mr. Ortona referred to an earlier conversation with Mr. Berry (Memorandum of Conversation, February 15, 1957) concerning a potential union of North African states and firmer ties between Morocco and Saudi Arabia, as well as between Morocco and Iraq. For the second time, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has asked the Italian

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the Italian Embassy to query the Department concerning possible United States encouragement of such developments. Mr. Rockwell said that as far as he knew we were not actively encouraging any of these reported arrangements.

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This document consists of 4 pages

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Number 1 of 5 copies, Series A

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 27, 1957
Secretary's Office
12 Noon

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal

MAR 8 1957

PARTICIPANTS: Mrs. Golda Meir, Israeli Minister
Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Israeli Minister

COPIES TO: The Secretary
Christian A. Herter - U
Francis O. Wilcox - IO
Herman Phleger - L
William M. Rountree - NEA

S/S, NEA(2), NE(2), IO, C, G, L, R, USUN, Amembassies TEL AVIV, CAIRO

Mrs. Meir began by expressing the appreciation of the Israeli Government for the great personal effort which the Secretary had made to solve the Israeli-Egyptian problem. The Secretary responded that no effort had been spared, and he sincerely hoped for a successful result.

Mrs. Meir said the proposed formula which had been discussed the previous day by Ambassador Eban with Mr. Pineau had been telegraphed to the Government in Jerusalem, and that the Ambassador had been in touch that morning with the Prime Minister. Mr. Ben Gurion's first reaction had been generally favorable, and he was calling the cabinet together urgently to consider the proposal. She hoped during the course of the day to have more definitive information. She thought there may be a "few corrections" but no major revisions. She was anxious that we reach a favorable conclusion as soon as possible, but as a democracy Israel must go through its democratic procedures before making a decision. She remarked that, with a favorable response from the Prime Minister it was to be hoped that "one or two or three days" might be provided to work out the details. She understood the difficulty of the U.S. position at the United Nations, but for Israel it was a strain and created great problems to have over its head a threat of certain action if Israel did not withdraw. It would be extremely helpful, she said, if a few days delay in the United Nations could be provided for discussions of the new proposal, without having to be

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concerned about possible new resolutions, sanctions, and so forth.

The Ambassador interjected that he had spoken to the Prime Minister while the Foreign Minister was enroute to Washington. He would thus like to describe the Prime Minister's reaction, which was one of "an affirmative spirit" although he had made one or two proposals for clarification. These would be discussed with Mr. Pineau at a meeting already arranged for 2:15 p.m. today. The Ambassador had stressed to the Prime Minister the urgency of the matter and hoped that by today he would have a decision in principle that Israel would agree to solution along the lines proposed. It would not take several days before the basic attitude was determined, although some time might be required for all of the details to be worked out.

The Secretary said that the Israeli representatives must realize the very difficult situation in the General Assembly. Previous delays had been arranged by the exertion of great influence, and even then on a day by day, indeed hour by hour, basis. His last request from Prime Minister Ben Gurion had been to arrange for a postponement until last Monday. While it had not been possible technically to do so, it had been done in substance. Already it was Wednesday, and the problem of additional postponements was perhaps insurmountable. He could appreciate the fact that it might be embarrassing for the Israeli Government to seem to be acting under the threat of events in the General Assembly, and he had tried to avoid that as much as possible. He did not think it would be possible to hold off further unless we could say at least that there was agreement in principle to Israeli withdrawal, and request time to work out details regarding an exchange of views to accompany that withdrawal.

The Foreign Minister repeated the hope that by the end of the day they would have the decision in principle. We could then go over the proposed statement paragraph by paragraph. The Secretary responded that that procedure would be agreeable but he saw no reason why it could not be done in a few hours rather than days. Mrs. Meir maintained that it would be preferable to take two or three days, assuming a favorable cabinet decision. In the event of such a decision the pressure presumably would be lessened.

Responding to the Secretary's query, Mr. Wilcox said the Palestine question was the main item holding up the General Assembly recess. The New Guinea item was before the Assembly, and he thought it could be disposed of quickly. The members would be anxious not to prolong the session by further postponement.

Ambassador Eban remarked that perhaps a postponement would not be needed since there were a number of delegates to the General Assembly having ideas to express who might go ahead with their speeches, without the introduction of any new resolutions, particularly an American resolution. That would have the effect of slowing down matters while the details of the current proposal were being worked out. Mrs. Meir commented that speeches did not worry her; it was "rumors of United States resolutions and American consultations with other delegations" that worried her.

The Secretary said that we had to operate on two fronts to meet two contingencies: 1) that the efforts being made here to solve the problem would work out, and 2) that they would not. It was difficult to keep the situation in a proper state of development at both places. Ambassador Lodge had had talks with other delegations who co-sponsored with us the second resolution of February 2, a proposed draft resolution which might be submitted in the unhappy contingency of failure here. We had made certain suggestions to him regarding this resolution and had received certain proposed amendments, which we had commented on. The Secretary said that he had just authorized a statement to be made by the Department's press officer saying in effect that the United States position remained as described by the President in his television address, and that we were considering at the United Nations how to implement that policy if it should become necessary to do so. The statement would say, however, that we hoped we would not have to pursue the matter at the United Nations and were meeting with the Government of Israel in that respect.

Repeating that she thought it possible to have a reply from Jerusalem during the course of the day, the Foreign Minister said she was sure the Secretary appreciated the difficult position for her Government in light of reports and rumors which were undoubtedly reaching Israel regarding a possible American resolution at the General Assembly. The Secretary responded that some of the stories regarding the American position should reassure Israel. He quoted an item in the Baltimore Sun to the effect that the Administration was in full retreat on the matter of pressure against Israel.

Mrs. Meir wondered about procedures, assuming that the reply from Jerusalem was affirmative. Time would be needed after the reply was received to consider how to implement the arrangement. The Secretary said he did not see why two or three days were needed to complete the matter. If the Israeli decision should be negative, that certainly would not present a prospect upon which we could call for suspension of United Nations consideration. If it were affirmative, relatively little time would be needed to make appropriate statements. He emphasized that we would have to have something definite today if we were to withhold further action on the resolution in New York. The Ambassador said the Prime Minister's first reaction had been such to provide hope that the matter could be worked out, and it would be a tragedy if this opportunity should be lost. He said the statements being made at New York were primarily by people who were not interested in a constructive approach and he was not aware of great pressure from the more moderate delegations. The Secretary responded that most delegations were awaiting knowledge of the United States position. They did not want to commit themselves prematurely and, for our part, we were glad there were those who wished to take our attitude into account.

Mrs. Meir repeated that it was indeed the American attitude which concerned Israel. She recalled that after the meetings over the weekend, we all had been hopeful that a solution was possible and felt that we had

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- 4 -

travelled a long way toward a solution, but that Monday those hopes had been shattered. Surely she said, we should make every attempt this time to succeed.

The Secretary said that Mrs. Meir had previously raised the question of procedure. He wondered why we could not discuss procedure now on the assumption that the Israeli Government's decision would be favorable. He felt there was no need to lose time. We must find a way to put the decision into effect without delay. He would like to have Mrs. Meir's ideas as to what procedures should be followed, then we could move instantly when a decision was rendered.

Responding to Mrs. Meir's comment that she would appreciate the Secretary's ideas in this regard, he said he hoped that, in the main, the arrangements would be carried out in the United Nations, with the Israelis making their statement to be followed by statements by the United States and other delegations who wished to join. The Israelis might say that they were withdrawing and then state what Israel would expect would happen after that withdrawal. That would not need Assembly action. It was important that what was said not be inconsistent with the factual situation as regards the Secretary General, since we must avoid a situation in which Mr. Hammarskjold would feel compelled to "throw a spanner into the machinery". The Ambassador said, regarding the proposed American statement, that the Secretary had indicated the United States would express its hope that the UNEF would not withdraw from the Straits area without prior notice. He hoped that would be included.

The Secretary replied that we would say something along the lines that we hoped the United Nations forces would not be suddenly withdrawn without appropriate notification to the United Nations.

Responding to Mrs. Meir's comment that, after the statements on withdrawal, some delegations which would not like them might put in resolutions, the Secretary said the important thing was that Israel would be stating that it was withdrawing. He hoped that there would be no resolutions submitted after that.

Ambassador Eban remarked that he had promised to let the Secretary know the precise language which Israel would employ regarding the defense of its shipping through the Straits. He hoped a draft would be completed in the course of the day and that he could promptly thereafter give it to the Secretary.

The Secretary suggested that we have further talks about procedures. It was important to get the arrangements down concisely. He would talk with Ambassador Lodge and thought it would be useful if some of his associates could meet with Israeli representatives to pursue the matter.

Mr. Herter emphasized the view we must have something specific if matters in the General Assembly were to be delayed.

NEA:WMRountree:av:ah

SECRET

SECRET

This document consists of 4 pages.
Number 1 of 10 copies. Series A.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 27, 1957

Central
Files

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal Declaration

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Abba Eban, Embassy of Israel
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy of Israel
Dr. Jacob Robinson, Counsellor, Israeli Delegation to the 11th General Assembly
Mr. Francis C. Wilcox, IO
Mr. Herman Phleger, L
COPIES TO: Mr. Leonard Becker, L/UNR
Mr. Fraser Wilkins, IE
Mr. Samuel DePalma

COPIES TO: RM/A, IO, UNP, L, MMA, S/S, USUN

Ambassador Eban and his group called to discuss the arrangements and procedures envisaged in connection with the Israeli withdrawal declaration suggested by Mr. Pineau. Ambassador Eban began by presenting a copy of the proposed Israeli statement concerning its intention to assert the right of free passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba (attached).

Turning next to the points which were discussed on February 24 in the meeting with the Secretary, Ambassador Eban and Mr. Shiloah pointed out that it would no longer be necessary to work out an agreed version of the clarifications sought by Israel and the responses received from the United States since several of the points in question have either been superseded or are no longer being pressed by Israel, and others will be covered in statements to be made by Israel and the United States. Mr. Phleger agreed, but pointed out a number of inaccuracies and clarifications in the responses attributed to the United States in the Israeli memorandum of that conversation. It was further agreed that some of the points covered in the 24 February meeting might be covered in a bilateral exchange of notes.

Ambassador Eban asked if in our statement concerning the Israeli declaration we would be prepared to refer to the question of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran. Mr. Phleger indicated that we would reaffirm our views as set forth in the Aide Memoire of February 11 and, if we elaborated on this point, we would do so on the basis of the statement of the International Law Commission. In this connection, Mr. Wilcox pointed out that Article 2 of the Egyptian-Israeli

Armistice

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Armistice Agreement would appear to prohibit the passage of Israeli warships through Egyptian territorial waters, and by implication through the Straits of Tiran. Ambassador Eban made no response. Mr. Phleger pointed out that the United States might take note of the proposed Israeli declaration concerning its rights in the Gulf of Aqaba, but of course would not subscribe to the Israeli statement. The United States would continue to assert its rights independently.

Ambassador Eban then noted that Israel would no longer press its proposal for a United Nations naval patrol in the Gulf of Aqaba in view of the Secretary General's negative reaction.

Ambassador Eban also asked that the United States reiterate in its statement following the Israeli declaration the statements made by Ambassador Lodge on January 28 and February 2 with regard to UNEF's role in the Sharm-el-Sheikh area. He stated that Israel's former apprehension concerning a unilateral departure of UNEF from its various positions has been allayed by the statement of the Secretary General that he would expect to consult with the UNEF advisory committee concerning any withdrawal of UNEF. Ambassador Eban also suggested that the United States take note of the Secretary General's statement in its statement. Mr. Phleger indicated that we could in our statement indicate our expectation that reasonable advance notice would be given to the Assembly of any plans for the withdrawal of UNEF so that the Assembly would have an opportunity to express its views.

Ambassador Eban then asked whether we would include in our statement any reference to the Suez Canal. Mr. Phleger replied that we did not think it would be productive to relate this matter in any specific way to the present situation.

The discussion then turned to the procedures for dealing with the Israeli declaration in the General Assembly. Ambassador Eban indicated that the Israeli Cabinet was still meeting on this question but that he expected a final and affirmative reaction in the course of this evening. In response to Mr. Wilcox's suggestion that it would be necessary for Israel to take some action tomorrow morning in order to head off further Assembly debate on the basis of the current resolutions being discussed in New York, Ambassador Eban indicated that he would seek authority to make a statement by tomorrow morning which would signify in a general way Israel's intentions and would thus serve as a basis for seeking a postponement of further discussion until Friday, March 1. He hoped that the declaration could be issued by March 1.

It was agreed that it would be important for other governments to be informed of Israel's intentions so that as many as possible could be prepared on Friday to join the United States in making appropriate statements taking into account the Israeli declaration. Ambassador Eban said that he hoped to be able to give the Secretary a final draft of the proposed Israeli declaration tomorrow morning which could serve as the basis for the preparation of a United States statement.

Ambassador

SECRET

-3-

Ambassador Eban next raised the question of a further exchange of communications between Prime Minister Ben Gurion and President Eisenhower. He noted that the need for such an exchange with regard to Israel's intention to assert her rights in the Gulf of Aqaba appeared to be clear. Mr. Shiloah raised the question of a more general statement which would serve to terminate the series of exchanges that have taken place between the Prime Minister and the President on these matters and to do so on a note of agreement. Ambassador Eban said he assumed that Prime Minister Ben Gurion would want to inform the President that Israel's decision to withdraw had been taken partly as an act of faith and in reliance upon the statements of United States policy which it had received. He assumed that the Prime Minister might communicate with the President, notifying him of his government's decision to withdraw and that he would then expect an appropriate reply.

Mr. Phleger stated that this was a matter which would have to be decided in consultation with the Secretary, but expressed the view that a further exchange of communications bearing on at least some of these points would appear to be appropriate.

Ambassador Eban then summarized the Israeli position with regard to the Armistice Agreement and said that his government would continue to take the view that Egypt's assertion of belligerency and its continued behavior as if it were in a state of war with Israel have rendered the Armistice Agreement academic. Mr. Phleger pointed out that the United States has constantly asserted the need to restore full compliance by both sides with the Armistice Agreement. He added that in responding to Israel's request that we state our position with regard to free passage through the Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, we have done so and are continuing to do so on the basis of the normal rules of international law. This meant that in this particular case it is the Armistice Agreement which provides the basis for contesting any assertion of belligerent rights on the part of Egypt. It is the view of the United States that the whole structure of the peace in the area depends on the continuation of the Armistice Agreement. Mr. Meeker added that if Israel maintained its position with respect to the Armistice Agreement, it would itself create a basis for Egyptian claims to belligerent rights.

Attachment:

Proposed Israeli declaration
on Gulf of Aqaba.

TO: JWP: SDePalma:rs
18P

SECRET

(Israeli Declaration on Gulf of Aqaba)

(February 27, 1957)

Israel will protect ships of its own flag exercising the right of free passage on the high seas and in international waters.

Interference by the use or threat of force with ships of Israel flag exercising free passage in the Gulf of Akaba and through the Straits of Tiran will be regarded by Israel as an attack entitling her to exercise her inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter, and to take such measures as are necessary to ensure the free passage of her ships in the Gulf and in the Straits.

February 27 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL ROBERT L. SCHULTZ
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Mr. Parker's letter on the future of the Gaza Strip.

As Ambassador Lodge indicated in his letter to you of January 30, Mr. Daniel Parker's communication to you of January 24 concerning the future of the Gaza Strip has been referred to the Department of State for a reply. A reply has now been sent and a copy thereof is enclosed for your information.

Francis O. Wilcox
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

✓ Copy of letter to Mr. Parker.

IO:UNP:DLGamon:lrr 2/26/57

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FEB 27 1957 A.M.

General
Files

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674.34A/2-2757

CS/U

674.84a/2-27

254
February 27 1957

In reply refer to
IO

Dear Mr. Parker:

Your letter of January 24, 1957, to Colonel Schultz concerning the Gaza Strip has been referred to the Department of State for a reply.

The future of the Gaza Strip is one of the more difficult elements in the complex of Middle Eastern problems now confronting the United Nations. The concentration of refugees in the Strip, together with its limited resources, make any approach to a solution which would provide for a viable economy there extremely difficult. Moreover, the actual ownership of the Strip is in doubt. As you will recall, the Gaza Strip is the only part of the former Palestine Mandate which has not been formally incorporated into either Israel or an Arab state. Neither Israel nor Egypt has claimed sovereignty over the area.

While the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on February 2 can provide an equitable solution for the immediate future of the Gaza Strip, we feel that the final determination of its future can probably best be made in the context of an over-all Israeli-Arab settlement.

The idea presented in your letter under reference, that a mutually acceptable solution to the Gaza problem might be through a suggestion that the United Nations purchase the Strip, is appreciated. While this suggestion involves serious problems, such as whether the United Nations should actually run and administer the territory, and the attitudes of Egypt and Israel, not to speak of the other Arab states, it merits the careful consideration you may be sure it will receive here. Thank you very much for sharing this idea with us.

Sincerely yours,

Francis O. Wilcox
Assistant Secretary

Mr. Daniel Parker,
The Parker Pen Company,
Janesville, Wisconsin.

cc: Colonel Schultz

CLEARANCES: NE - Mr. Rockwell in Draft

IO: UNP: DLS: mon: lmr 2/19/57

IO - Mr. Bloomfield

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674.34A/2-275

5/5 CR
To HNP. Bloom
FEB 20 1957 AM
FEB 27 1957 AM

U. S. MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

January 31, 1957

Sam:

Will you please pass this on to
somebody who can send Mr. Parker an
intelligent answer with carbon copy for
Col. Schultz.

Thanx

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Frank", written over a horizontal line.

Frank Mewshaw

January 30, 1957

Dear Bob:

This is in reply to your note of January 28 attached to a letter from Mr. Daniel Parker concerning the Gaza Strip.

While I could express my own opinion about Mr. Parker's idea, the opinion that really counts on a question like this must come from the State Department. I have taken the liberty, therefore, of sending this letter to the Department with a personal request that it be given a prompt reply.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

Colonel Robert L. Schultz,
U. S. Army,
Military Aide to the President,
The White House,
Washington.

FLMewshaw:kf

cc: Exec

Ref

S. DePalma ✓

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

28 January 1957

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

**Confirming my telephone conversation,
the attached letter has not been
acknowledged and comes from a friend
of the President's. While I run into
many 'ideas' this has a new and
different twist.**

All the best.

Cordially.

**Henry Cabot Lodge
United States Representative to the
United Nations
United Nations
New York, New York**

**Colonel ROBERT L. SCHULZ, U. S. Army
Military Aide to the President**

FORM DS-18b

5-19-50

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DATE

DIV. OF OFFICE

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REMARKS:

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TO	NAME
1	ADAMS
	DE PALMA
	OWSLEY
	SISCO
	BANE
	BAKER
	BOCK
	CRAMER
	GOUGH
	LUDLOW
	MARCUS
	SPIERS
	TYLER
	BROWN
2	GAMON
	HARTLEY
	PEARCE

*for reply after
consulting L.P.B.
and N.G.A.*

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Department of State

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ActionControl:
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FEBRUARY 28, 1957

11:31 AM

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FROM: BEIRUT

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2080, FEBRUARY 28.

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JOINT STATE-USIA MESSAGE.

BEIRUT PRESS REACTION FEB 28 TO CAIRO CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE IS GENERALLY UNHELPFUL TO US AIMS. RADIO LEBANON AND EDITORIALIZED HEADLINES OF BOTH LEFTIST AND ARAB NATIONALIST PAPERS ALL GIVE IMPRESSION THAT NET RESULT OF MEETINGS WAS DECLARATION FAVORING "POSITIVE NEUTRALITY".

PRO-WESTERN ANNAHAR AND CHRISTIAN NATIONAL BLOCS AS SAHAFI HEADLINE NOTHING NEW AND "EISENHOWER PLAN AND US EXPLANATIONS TO SAUD IGNORED. ANTI-EGYPT/SYRIA PPS ORGAN SADA LUBNAN SAID "CAIRO CONFERENCE DENOUNCES EISENHOWER PLAN" AND DEDUCES NASSER ENTIRELY DOMINATED CONFERENCE. OFFERING SARCASTIC CONGRATULATIONS TO SAUD FOR HIS "VICTORY" PAPER SALUTES MAGICAL POWERS WHICH ENABLED HIM TO DENOUNCE FOREIGN PACTS, SUPPORT "POSITIVE NEUTRALITY" YET RENEW DHAHRAN AIRBASE AGREEMENT WITH US.

IN OTHER EARLY COMMENT AN NAHARS MICHEL ABU JAUDEH CONCLUDES "WHAT BEIRUT'S OFFICIALDOM FEARED HAS COME TO PASS: THAT US UNSTABLE STAND REGARDING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD UNDERMINE SAUD'S ARGUMENTS FAVORING BETTER US-ARAB RELATIONS." LE JOUR'S CHALIL GEMAYEL REITERATES THEME EISENHOWER PLAN IS BEING ENDANGERED BY ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE. BEIRUT'S MODERATE MOSLEM MUHIEDINE NSOULI BELIEVES FOUR ARAB LEADERS DID WELL IN NOT ADOPTING ANY FINAL STAND PRIOR TO UN DECISION ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

HEATH

JHF

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2:45 A.M.

Info
RMR

FROM: BANGKOK

SS
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C
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IO
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O

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2554, FEBRUARY 28, 1 P.M.

REFERENCE DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 2919.

REVIEWED WITH ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER SALIENT POINTS
PRESIDENT'S SPEECH FEBRUARY 20 WHICH I HAD ALREADY SENT
RAK AND WHICH HE HAD READ. HIS CONCERN SEEMED CENTER AROUND
FEAR THAT UN WOULD IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON SMALL NATIONS AND
AVOID SANCTIONS ON LARGE NATIONS. THIS FEAR REVEALED WHEN
MAJOR RAK SAID HE WOULD "WAIT AND SEE WHAT POSITION UNITED
STATES TOOK TOWARD SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIA". ACTING
FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE WAS IN CLOSE TOUCH THAI DELEGA-
TION UN AND APPRECIATED EXCHANGING VIEWS THAI-UNITED STATES
DELEGATIONS. ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER INDICATED SINCERE
APPRECIATION PROMPT REPLY HIS QUERY.

BISHOP

OKY

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 819, FEBRUARY 28, 8 PM

PRIORITY

RE PALESTINE-ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

LODGE CONVEYED TO SYG AT SECRETARY'S REQUEST, MAIN POINTS
ISRAELI STATEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL AS HE HAD TAKEN THEM DOWN
OVER PHONE AT 5 P.M.

HAMMARSKJOLD INDICATED THAT PINEAU (FRANCE) HAD, EARLIER THIS
AFTERNOON, SHOWN SYG HIS COPY OF ISRAELI TEXT, ON WHICH SYG
HAD ALREADY HAD A CHANCE TO REFLECT. PINEAU HAD ALSO INDICATED
LINES OF US SPEECH.

HAMMARSKJOLD FELT BIGGEST AREA OF PROGRESS WAS IN ISRAEL
NOW NOT PUBLICLY INSISTING ON EXCLUSION EGYPT FROM GAZA IN ANY
FORM DIRECT OR INDIRECT. HE WAS, HOWEVER, RELATIVELY PESSIMISTIC
AS TO IMPLEMENTATION IN CONNECTION ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE
FEARED, SPEAKING AS DEVIL'S ADVOCATE, THAT ISRAEL WOULD VERY
SHORTLY SEEK CLARIFICATIONS REGARDING HIS INTENTIONS FOR TAKE
OVER. FOR INSTANCE, HE ENVISAGED ISRAELIS SEEKING TO PIN
HIM DOWN ON UN BEING "THE AGENCY" TO TAKE OVER IN GAZA. IN
THIS CONNECTION HE UNDERSTOOD FROM HIS TALK WITH PINEAU THAT
ISRAEL HAD DROPPED REFERENCE TO "INITIAL" TAKE OVER AND SPOKE
ONLY IN TERMS OF EXCLUSIVE UN RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDEFINITE
TIME. HE UNDERSTOOD ISRAEL INTENDING EXPRESS EXPECTATION
UN WOULD BE MAINTAINED IN GAZA UNTIL FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT
NOT MERELY SETTLEMENT GAZA STATUS.

SYG ALSO CONCERNED OVER FORMULATION UNDER WHICH ISRAEL RESERVE
FREEDOM OF ACTION. HE FELT THAT FORMULATION LEFT IT TO BEN
GURION TO DECIDE FOR HIMSELF WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CHANGE IN
THE SITUATION WHICH INDICATED (TO BEN GURION) A RENEWED RISK

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MAY 28 1959

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-2- DELGA 819, FEBRUARY 28, 8 PM FROM NEW YORK

OF DETERIORATION WHICH WOULD FREE ISRAEL TO TAKE ACTION. PINEAU HAD INDICATED US, UK, FRANCE AND OTHERS WOULD ENDORSE THIS.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT PINEAU HAD SHOWN HIM TEXT PURPORTING TO BE DRAFT OF US STATEMENT WHICH TOGETHER WITH STATEMENTS FROM UK, FRANCE, CANADA, NETHERLANDS AND OTHERS WOULD FOLLOW ISRAELI DECLARATION. POINT IN THIS TEXT WHICH CONCERNED HIM WAS THAT WHICH STATED IF SITUATION DID NOT LEAD TO PEACEFUL CONDITIONS THESE STATES WOULD TAKE ACTION INSIDE OR OUTSIDE UN. LODGE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD US STATEMENT WOULD ONLY INDICATE THAT IF THERE WERE CHANGE IN THE SITUATION WHICH AFFECTED PEACEFUL CONDITIONS THAT WOULD BE MATTER FOR UN TO CONSIDER.

HAMMARSKJOLD WAS MOST PESSIMISTIC ABOUT HOW THINGS WOULD DEVELOP IN GA DEBATE. HE AND CORDIER PREDICTED THAT IN ADDITION TO THOSE WHO SPOKE IN SUPPORT OF ISRAELI DECLARATION 50 SPEAKERS WOULD GET UP AND ASK QUESTIONS. HE FELT THIS WOULD LEAD TO A VERY UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION.

LODGE SAW PEARSON (CANADA) RIGHT AFTER SPEAKING TO SYG. PEARSON, TOO, WAS MOST PESSIMISTIC AS TO WHETHER THIS SCHEME WOULD WORK OUT. COMMENTING ON FAWZI'S (EGYPT) STATEMENT TODAY, WHICH HE SAID WAS RATHER STRONG FOR FAWZI, PEARSON SAID THIS NOTHING COMPARED WITH STATEMENTS WE WOULD GET AFTER ISRAEL'S DECLARATION.

GEORGES PICOT (FRANCE) ENQUIRED THIS EVENING WHETHER USDEL WAS ASKING OTHER DELEGATIONS TO MAKE STATEMENTS SIMILAR TO US. WE SAID OUR UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES WERE TO MAKE SIMILAR STATEMENTS, BUT THAT WE HAD RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS RE ASKING SPECIFIC COUNTRIES TO DO SO.

LODGE

• SGC

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1977 FEB 23

510
Central
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for DCI only

March 1

Barring unforeseen developments Israel will announce ~~today~~ withdrawal Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza. Following for your background and guidance in discussions with local Middle East addressee (except Israeli) governments only repeat only on assumption this announcement is made.

As reaffirmed by President February 20, US has been prepared support UN pressures against Israel to effect withdrawal in accordance pertinent resolutions. At same time, US has exerted every effort directly with Israel to effect immediate withdrawal. We have had in mind that even with UN sanctions resolution Israeli withdrawal might be long delayed. ~~Israel has now stated that it will announce in GA March 1 complete withdrawal in accordance UN resolutions. We understand Israel will say this action is based upon certain assumptions, notably re deployment of UN forces and role of the UN in administration of Gaza in accordance pertinent UN resolutions and reports of Secretary General. (Further details re Israeli assumptions will follow). Israel will also make clear that in withdrawing it reserves its rights under Article 51 of Charter to defend its interests re any possible future incursions from Gaza or interference use of Straits in accordance with international law.~~

Be Returned to

574.84A/2-2857

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320.57800

USIA

5v

Drafted by: NEA:WMRountree:hh

2/28/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

William M. Rountree

Clearence: In draft:

The Secretary
L - Mr. Phleger

S/S-CR

SECRET

FEB 28 1957 P.M.

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Planned US and other nations in GA will take note of Israeli statement and express their attitude regarding certain pertinent aspects of the situation which would then exist. Substance US views as set forth Aide Memoire February 11 (made public on February 20 and communicated through USIA channels) will be reasserted and expanded in GA statement. This will include statement US attitude toward transit of Straits, US hope that UN role in administration of Gaza will continue along lines set forth by Secretary General on February 22 for transitory period until final settlement; belief that conditions for peace should be vigorously sought; and hope that in meantime there will be strict compliance of both parties with their international obligations. If after Israeli withdrawal in accordance UN resolution there should be recurrence of belligerency or violation of international obligations, situation will be created calling for UN consideration and US will consult with other members UN to consider action within and without UN appropriate in circumstances to bring about settlement in conformity with principles of justice and international law.

Every effort should be made locally to place Israeli withdrawal in context successful US effort to achieve purposes UN resolutions without rewarding Israel for military operation. Withdrawal gives Israel nothing to which she was not already entitled (e.g. right to transit Straits in accordance international law and Egyptian note to US Ambassador January 28, 1950) once state of belligerency on part of Israel ended. Also it makes less likely reestablishment of conditions in Gaza which would lead to hostilities that area. Assumption stated by Israel as basis for withdrawal already covered by UN resolutions and Secretary General reports,

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or are inherent sovereign rights. US has made no repeat no unpublicized commitments to Israel regarding Israeli withdrawal and given Israel no guarantees. We have held fast to the original position expressed in President Eisenhower's address of Feb. 20. US will, however, note Israeli statement and recall previously announced US positions in pertinent matters. Any rumors of secret US-Israeli understandings or commitments may be vigorously denied.

CODE ROOM: Send to:

Amembassies -

LONDON
PARIS
BAGHDAD
DAMASCUS
BEIRUT
AMMAN
TEL AVIV
CAIRO
JIDDA
ANKARA
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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

674.84A/2-2857

FROM : AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON
REF : Dept's Telegram 569, 212206Z

325
DESP. NO.

February 28, 1957
DATE

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SUBJECT: Transmission of Arabic Text of President's February 20 Speech to King Saud

A translation in Arabic of President Eisenhower's speech of February 20 was presented to Shaikh 'Abdullah BIL KHAIR, Minister of Court, on February 23. Shaikh Abdullah commented that the English text of the speech had been presented to the King by Embassy Tunis prior to his departure from Tunis and that the King would be pleased to have the translation for closer study.

Roger P. Davies
Counselor of Embassy

Copy to: AmEmbassy Benghazi

674.84A/2-2857

HBS

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1957 MAR 18 AM 10 53
no action 3/19/57

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United States
Information Agency

901
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Control: 311
Rec'd: March 1, 1957
8:18 a.m.

IPS FROM: Kabul
Info
I/S TO: United States Information Agency
IAN
IRI NO: TOUSI 175, February 28
IOP/LN
IBS/NB
CCD FOR IPS.
IBS

JOINT STATE-USIA MESSAGE.

CIA
STATE
RMR ✓
RSC
NEA
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OLI
ANIS, Kabul newspaper, on Eisenhower speech, February 26th:
"President Esienhower's attitude demonstrated once more to
whole world America's policy of peace and security. On the
basis his foresight, we dare say President will follow right
path and will cooperate with other peace loving nations in
taking strong attitude against Israel to withdraw her force
Egyptian soil."

BRUCE

DMB

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SECRETNumber 1 of 6 copies, Series A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 28, 1957

SUBJECT: Israeli Situation

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
 Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
 Mr. Arnold Heeney, Canadian Ambassador
 Mr. Lucet, French Minister
 Mr. Coulson, British Minister
 Mr. de Laboulaye, French Counselor
 Mr. Wilcox
 COPIES TO: C. Burke Elbrick

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 The Secretary said that he thought it desirable to review with the representatives of the three countries the developments in connection with Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza strip and the Gulf of Aqaba. He read to them portions of a draft statement which the Israeli representative would make on the following day in the General Assembly regarding the withdrawal of Israeli forces. As for the U.S. position, our attitude toward the problem of the Gulf of Aqaba remains the same as expressed in our aide memoire to the Israelis of February 11. As for the Gaza strip we hope that the UN will continue to administer the area in the period prior to the final settlement of the Israeli-Egyptian problem and we would hope that conditions could be created during the interim period which would make a final settlement possible. We hope that there will be no withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force without consultation with the Advisory Council in the UN. If there should be any change in the situation resulting from forceful action on the part of Egypt, following Israel withdrawal, we believe that this would create a new situation calling for UN consideration.

The Secretary said that the statement to be made by the Israeli representative in the General Assembly will make certain assumptions which have already been embodied in UN resolutions and in reports by the Secretary General. The statement will also

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express certain "expectations" on the part of the Israeli Government. Israel will announce, in effect, its unconditional withdrawal in the areas now occupied, and the Secretary emphasized that Israel will not receive anything in return except what has been provided for in prior UN resolutions. The Israeli Government would not find it easy to make this statement regarding withdrawal and it is entirely possible that the announcement, in the General Assembly might cause internal disturbances within Israel. The Secretary pointed out that the successful implementation of the Israeli announcement would be subject to Egyptian acceptance as well as to Hammarskjold's reaction regarding Israel's "expectations" as outlined in the statement.

The Secretary said that it is obvious that the Arab states wish to create a breach between Israel and the United States and for this reason they had been highly pleased by President Eisenhower's recent speech. He felt that they would be disappointed now that Israel plans to comply with the conditions laid down in the President's speech. The Secretary said he wished to make it very clear that there had been no private understanding of any kind between the U.S. and Israel in developing this solution of the problem.

In reply to Ambassador Caccia's question, the Secretary said that it was hoped that as many governments as possible will make statements in support of the Israeli statement. Ambassador Feeney asked how Hammarskjold could be expected to react to the Israeli statement. The Secretary said that he had spoken to Hammarskjold yesterday and had informed him of the way matters were progressing. The Secretary felt that Hammarskjold should not make any comments on, or reply to, the Israeli statement and he felt that Foreign Minister Pearson of Canada could be very helpful in this connection. Ambassador Feeney asked if the Secretary expected a violent reaction from the Afro-Asian countries. The Secretary said that Egypt may challenge the concept of an international waterway in the Straits of Tiran. While it is true that the Straits come within the territorial limits of the bordering states they have an international character due to the fact that they provide access to an international waterway, namely, the Gulf of Aqaba.

It was agreed that it would be useful to carry on further discussions and consultations on this matter in New York. The Secretary said that Ambassador Lodge had been authorized to discuss with other delegations the question of additional statements in support of the Israeli declaration.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

(1340)

March 5, 1957

EUR - Mr. ✓ Belcher

The Under Secretary has approved the attached memorandum reporting his conversation on February 28 with Ambassador Caccia, subject to revision of the second page. Would you please have this page retyped and send to RM/R for distribution.

done —

RK

Roger Kirk

S/S-RO

Ext. 4154

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 28, 1957

SUBJECT: Israel Withdrawal

PARTICIPANTS: The Under Secretary of State
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
Mr. J. W. Jones, EUR

COPIES TO: S/S(2), NEA(2), BNA, G, EUR(2), IO, L, USON

The British Ambassador paid a courtesy call on the new Under Secretary this afternoon. After greetings and the usual amenities the Ambassador asked if the Under Secretary could tell him anything about the latest developments affecting Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba area. He went on to say that the Israeli Ambassador had shown him and the Canadian Ambassador at noon today a draft of a proposed Israeli unilateral declaration which would be made on the basis of a series of assumptions. Sir Harold said that both his government and the Canadian Government were interested in and encouraged by this development and asked if there were a final decision. He understood that various UN delegates would speak in support of the Israeli declaration and he informed Governor Herter that the UK would be happy to participate. He asked if we had come to any conclusion about procedure and added that the British would much prefer to hear directly from us what if any support we wished from them rather than indirectly through the Israelis. He suggested that Ambassador Lodge let Sir Pearson Dixon know in New York what cooperation was expected and asked if he could inform the UK delegation at the UN that they could expect to hear from Cabot Lodge in due course.

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The Under Secretary replied that he felt sure it would be useful if all maritime powers would declare their strong expression of views regarding the right of innocent passage through territorial waters connecting international waterways. With respect to procedure following the Israeli declaration he promised to telephone an answer later this evening.

The Ambassador then asked what progress if any was being made toward getting an Egyptian answer to our proposals for an interim solution of the Suez Canal problem. The Ambassador said he felt that this was the next most important issue and hoped that the West would take this up vigorously once the problem of Israeli withdrawal had been disposed of. The Under Secretary replied that he felt that the latter was perhaps the key log in the jam and that once it had been removed the other problems would flow naturally into place.

As the Ambassador left the Under Secretary's office, he encountered Mr. Wilcox (Assistant Secretary for International Organization) who informed him that the Secretary wished to see him and the French and Canadian Ambassadors at half past five to discuss the latest developments regarding Israel. The Ambassador agreed to return at that hour and anticipated that the questions he had raised with the Under Secretary would be answered in the subsequent meeting with the Secretary.

EUR:JW Jones:bsm:clc

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 28, 1957

SUBJECT: Israel

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Uberto Bozzini, Second Secretary, Italian Embassy
Lewis Hoffacker, NE

COPIES TO: NE (2 cc)
WE (2 cc)

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Mr. Bozzini asked for comment on the latest developments concerning Israel withdrawal. I said that it now appeared that the necessity for any resolution on this subject might be obviated since Israel is understood to be preparing a statement to be delivered tomorrow afternoon in the General Assembly announcing her intention to withdraw and spelling out her understanding of the status of the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza areas following her withdrawal. It was also expected that following the Israeli statement, the United States and other governments might make known their positions concerning the situation relating to Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh.

Mr. Bozzini asked if the Arabs had been consulted on this new development. I responded that I was not aware of any consultation but that I was confident that Arab Governments concerned would be informed at the appropriate time.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: February 28, 1957

SUBJECT: Israel

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. J. Dolleman, Second Secretary,
Netherlands Embassy

NE - Lewis Hoffacker

COPIES TO: NE (2cc)
WE (2cc)

Dr. Dolleman called to request comment on the latest Israeli developments. I said that the possibility had arisen whereby the necessity for any resolution in the General Assembly might be obviated, since Israel was understood to be preparing a statement to be made tomorrow afternoon in the General Assembly announcing her intention to withdraw from the Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh areas and stating her understanding as to the status of those areas following withdrawal. It is also understood that following the Israeli statement, the United States and other governments might make known their positions concerning the situation relating to Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh.

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This document consists of 2 pages
No. of 11 copies, Series A

Memorandum of Conversation

1370

DATE: February 28, 1957

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal Declaration

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
L - Mr. Phleger
NEA - Mr. Rountree
IO - Mr. Wilcox
NE - Mr. Wilkins

Ambassador Abba Eban, Embassy of Israel
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister Plenipotentiary,
Embassy of Israel
Mr. Rafael, Israeli Delegation to 11th Session
of the General Assembly

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Prior to the meeting in the Secretary's office, Ambassador Eban stated that the Israeli delegation would make a statement at this afternoon's meeting of the General Assembly indicating Israel's intention to make a declaration tomorrow of its plans for withdrawal.

Opening the discussion in the Secretary's office, Ambassador Eban suggested that the group examine the revised text of the Israeli declaration as approved by his Government. In the course of the ensuing discussion a number of modifications and corrections were made in the text.

The Secretary suggested that a series of paragraphs summarizing the position of the United States as expressed in its February 11, 1957 aide-memoire be replaced by a more general reference to the United States aide-memoire. Ambassador Eban agreed.

The Secretary and Mr. Phleger suggested, and Ambassador Eban agreed, that a sentence referring to the statement by President Eisenhower of February 20 to the effect that the function of the UNEF is to assume non-belligerency in the area of the Straits of Tiran be deleted and replaced by a statement that it is generally recognized that UNEF's function in this area includes the prevention of belligerent acts.

At Mr. Wilcox's suggestion, Ambassador Eban also agreed to modify a paragraph which stated that "Interference by the use or threat of force with ships

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of the Israel flag in the Gulf of Aqaba will be regarded by Israel as an attack entitling her to exercise her inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter...." The Secretary pointed out that Article 51 speaks of "armed attack" and not the threat of attack as a justification for self-defense. The language was changed accordingly.

Mr. Phleger noted that in the section dealing with Gaza, the declaration spoke of Israel's expectation that the UN "will be the sole agency" to be utilized in Gaza for performing the functions set forth by the Secretary General in his statement of February 22. He suggested that the word "sole" be deleted as unnecessary. Ambassador Eban replied that his Government attached the greatest importance to this idea.

The Secretary pointed out that if the word "sole" were deleted, the remaining language ("will be the agency") would imply the same meaning without attracting a contradictory statement from Egypt. Ambassador Eban agreed to consider this point further. Note: The word "sole" was omitted from the declaration as read by Mrs. Meir in the Assembly, March 1.7

The Secretary also expressed the hope that Israel would not take an extreme position which would exclude even one or two Egyptian civilians in some appropriate capacity under the UNEF. He pointed out that the situation might even require a few Israeli civilians. He hoped that Israel would not regard "sole" administration by the UN as a breaking point.

A number of other changes, largely of a clarifying or stylistic nature, were also agreed upon. Ambassador Eban undertook to have a revised copy of the Israeli declaration delivered to the Department later in the evening.

After expressing the hope that they might soon see a text of the U.S. statement, Ambassador Eban stated that his Prime Minister intended to write to President Eisenhower pointing out that Israel is undertaking its withdrawal largely on the basis of the President's statement of February 20 and the U.S. memorandum of February 11, and as an act of faith in the continued vigilance of the U.S. with regard to this situation. The Secretary said he believed he could assure the Ambassador of a prompt reply by the President.

There followed a brief discussion of the need for associating as many other governments as possible in general supporting statements. The Secretary noted also the need for bringing the Secretary General up to date and undertook to talk with him. He expressed the view that Israel should not expect any statement from the Secretary General beyond a brief remark referring to General Burns' readiness to make the necessary arrangements for a speedy take-over.

Attachment: att 1P

Text of Israeli Declaration as
Revised Following Discussion in
Secretary's Office, Feb. 28.

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February 28, 1957

The Government of Israel is now in a position to announce its plans for full and prompt withdrawal from the Sharm-el-Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip, in compliance with Resolution I of February 2, 1957.

We have repeatedly stated that Israel has no interest in the strip of land overlooking the western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba. Our sole purpose has been to ensure that, on the withdrawal of Israeli forces, continued freedom of navigation will exist for Israel and international shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran. Such freedom of navigation is a vital national interest for Israel. But it is also of importance and legitimate concern to the maritime powers and to many States whose economies depend upon trade and navigation between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.

There has recently been an increasingly wide recognition that the Gulf of Aqaba comprehends international waters in which the right of free and innocent passage exists

On February 11, 1957, the Secretary of State of the United States of America handed to the Ambassador of Israel in Washington a Memorandum on the subject of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran.

This statement discusses the rights of nations in the Gulf of Aqaba, declares the readiness of the United States to exercise those rights on its own behalf, and to join with others in securing general recognition of those rights.

My Government has subsequently learnt with gratification that other leading maritime powers are prepared to subscribe to the doctrine set out in the U.S. Memorandum of February 11, and have a similar intention to exercise their rights of free and innocent passage in the Gulf and the Straits.

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The Memorandum conveyed by the United States to the Government of Israel on February 11 notes that, in the contemplation of the General Assembly's Resolution (II) of February 2, 1957, units of UNEF will move into the Straits of Tiran area on Israel's withdrawal. It is generally recognized that the function of U.N.E.F. in the Straits of Tiran area includes the prevention of belligerent acts.

In this connection my Government recalls the statements by the representative of the United States in the General Assembly on January 28 and February 2, 1957, with reference to the function of U.N.E.F units which are to move into the Straits of Tiran area on Israel's withdrawal. The statement of January 28, repeated on February 2, said:

"It is essential that units of the United Nations Emergency Force be stationed at the Straits of Tiran in order to achieve there the separation of Egyptian and Israeli land and sea forces. This separation is essential until it is clear that the non-exercise of any claimed belligerent rights has established in practice the peaceful conditions which must govern navigation in waters having such an international interest".

My Government has been concerned with the situation which would arise if the UNEF, having taken up its position in the Straits of Tiran area for the purpose of assuring non-belligerency, were to be withdrawn, in conditions which might give rise to interference with free and innocent navigation, and, therefore, to the renewal of hostilities. Such a premature cessation of the precautionary measures taken by the U.N. for the prevention of belligerent acts would prejudice important international interests and threaten peace and security. Accordingly, my Government has sought and obtained an assurance, embodied in the Secretary-General's Report of 26 February, 1957,

that any proposal for the withdrawal of UNEF from the Gulf of Aqaba area would first come to the Advisory Committee, which represents the General Assembly in the implementation of its resolution of November 2, 1956. It is our understanding that this procedure would give the General Assembly an opportunity to ensure that no precipitate changes were made which would have the effect of increasing the possibility of belligerent acts. We have reason to believe that in such a discussion many members of the U.N. would be guided by the view expressed by Ambassador Lodge on February 2 in favor of maintaining UNEF in the Straits of Tiran until peaceful conditions were in practice assured.

In the light of these doctrines, policies and arrangements by the U.N. and the maritime powers, my Government is confident that free and innocent passage for international and Israel shipping will continue to be fully maintained after Israel's withdrawal.

It remains for me to formulate the policy of Israel both as a littoral State and as a country which intends to exercise its full rights of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran.

The Government of Israel believes that the Gulf of Aqaba comprehends international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto, in accordance with the generally accepted definition of those terms in the law of the seas.

In its capacity as a littoral state, Israel will gladly offer port facilities to the ships of all nations and all flags exercising free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba. We have received with gratification the assurances of leading maritime powers that they foresee a normal and regular flow of traffic of all cargoes in the Gulf of Aqaba.

Israel will do nothing to impede free and innocent passage by ships of Arab countries bound to Arab ports, or to any other destination.

Israel is resolved on behalf of vessels of Israel registry to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and is prepared to join with others to secure universal respect of this right.

Israel will protect ships of its own flag exercising the right of free and innocent passage on the high seas and in international waters.

Interference, by armed force, with ships of Israel flag exercising free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran, will be regarded by Israel as an attack entitling her to exercise her inherent right of self defence under Article 51 of the Charter, and to take all such measures as are necessary to ensure the free and innocent passage of her ships in the Gulf and in the Straits.

We make this announcement in accordance with the accepted principles of international law under which all states have an inherent right to use their forces to protect their ships and their rights against interference by armed force. My Government naturally hopes that this contingency will not occur.

In a public address on February 20, President Eisenhower stated: "We should not assume that if Israel withdraws, Egypt will prevent Israeli shipping from using the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba." This declaration has weighed heavily with my Government in determining its action today.

Israel is now prepared to withdraw its forces from the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran in the confidence that there will be continued freedom of navigation for international and Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran.

We propose that a meeting be held immediately between the Chief-of-Staff of the Israel Defence Army and the Commander of UNEF in order to arrange for the U.N. to take over its responsibilities in the Sharam-el-Sheikh area.

GAZA

The Government of Israel announces that it is making a complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in accordance with the General Assembly's Resolution (I) of February 2, 1957. It makes this announcement on the following assumptions:-

- (a) that on its withdrawal the U.N. Forces will be deployed in Gaza and that the takeover of Gaza from the military and civilian control of Israel will be exclusively by the UNEF;
- (b) it is further Israel's expectation that the U.N. will be the agency to be utilised for carrying out the functions enumerated by the Secretary General in Document APV/659, namely, "safeguarding life and property in the area by providing effective and efficient police protection; as will guarantee good civilian administration; as will assure maximum assistance to the U.N. refugee program; and as will protect and foster the economic development of the territory and its people."
- (c) It is further Israel's expectation that the above mentioned responsibility of the U.N. in the administration of Gaza will be maintained for a transitory period from the takeover until there is a peace settlement, to be sought as rapidly as possible, or a definitive agreement on the future of the Gaza Strip.

It is the position of Israel that if conditions are created in the Gaza Strip which indicate a return to the conditions of deterioration which existed previously, Israel would reserve its freedom to act to defend its rights.

Accordingly, we propose that a meeting be held immediately between the Chief-of-Staff of the Israel Defence Army and the Commander of UNEF in order to arrange for the U.N. to take over its responsibilities in the Gaza area.

For many weeks, amidst great difficulty, my Government has sought to ensure that on the withdrawal from the Sharm-el-Sheikh and the Gaza areas, circumstances would prevail which would prevent the likelihood of belligerent acts. Israel considers that there is no state of war between Israel and Egypt and will refrain, on the basis of reciprocity, from any hostile action against Egypt.

We record with gratitude the sympathetic efforts of many Governments and Delegations to help bring about a situation which would end the insecurity prevailing for Israel and her neighbors these many years. In addition to the considerations to which I have referred, we place our trust in the vigilant resolve of the international community that Israel, equally with all member States, enjoy its basic rights of freedom from fear of attack; freedom to sail the high seas and international waterways in peace; freedom to pursue its national destiny in tranquility without the constant peril which has surrounded it in recent years.

In this reliance we are embarking upon the course which I have announced today

THOS. G. ABERNETHY
FIRST DISTRICT, MISSISSIPPI

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

February 28, 1957

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

ACTION

is assigned to

The Honorable Robert C. Hill
The Assistant Secretary of State
The Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hill:

I am most grateful for your letter delivered yesterday by special messenger.

To me it is unthinkable that the President's position on the Middle East, as outlined in his speech, has so little support on the Hill. None of his own leaders have arisen in defense or in support of his position. This is not said in a spirit of political criticism. It is a simple statement of the facts, and is most discouraging.

If Egypt was an aggressor occupying Israeli soil, I wonder if we on the Hill would be treated to the voluminous statements and speeches comparable to those of the hour. I am too inexperienced to be suggesting a course of action in the field of foreign affairs. On the other hand, I know trouble when I see it, and it requires neither experience nor expertness to detect it. Furthermore, I think I know enough about politics to detect when it is being played for the purpose of currying favor with any individual or group of individuals.

The people of this Nation who are interested in peace first, and the "old country" second, are with the President on this issue. The vast majority is not interested in the politics of the issue. They just want to stay out of war and keep peace in the world. They hope that the President will not yield. I join with them in such hope. If there should be a yielding, then the precedent is set for similar military occupations by would-be aggressor nations.

I am grateful to the President for his position on this issue, and for whatever my meager influence and effort are worth, I stand with him.

Again, my thanks for your letter.

Sincerely,

Tom Abernethy
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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1012, March 1, 9 a.m.

Control: 248

Rec'd: March 1, 1957
6:56 a.m.

All elements press morning February 28 featured reports Mollet to have additional meeting with President "partly" because of Middle East developments. Mollet remarks to National Press Club also stressed to effect he asked guarantees for territorial integrity Israel and free passage Tiran Straits. Only HABOKER comments editorially saying Mollet call for guarantees is "clear hint" France also believes Israel should comply with United States request for withdrawal.

Also featured by morning press are reports Department took "unusual step" of disclosing during course of Meir-Eban meeting with Secretary that latter urged Israel to make "voluntary withdrawal" from Egyptian territory. LAMERHAV (Achdut Avoda) interprets this to mean United States resuming pressure and adopting UNSYG interpretation Egypt's right to Gaza. AL HAMISHMAR (Mapam) and HAMODIA (Agudist) have similar view but other papers less pessimistic. HAARETZ (Independent) sees UNSYG attitude as principle obstacle further progress in United States-Israel talks but still sees possibilities of finding solution if Gaza and Tiran issues can be handled separately. DAVAR (Histadrut) sees efforts to find solution continuing.

All papers report Cabinet held "extraordinary" session night February 27 at 8 p.m. on two hours notice. Meeting lasted "well into night" and concentrated on Gaza question but "it is understood" did not take up United States call for "voluntary withdrawal". Morning press in general carried spate of conflicting rumors and speculation including KOLHAAM (Communist) report General Zionists regard retention of Tiran and Gaza as not vital and only "prestige problem" and therefore they prepared return to Cabinet if Achdut Avoda and MAPAM leave re withdrawal issue.

Afternoon papers headlined statement agreement on withdrawal may be reached within 48 hours. Agreement assertedly to be based on United States-French-Israeli formula with guarantees by United States and other maritime powers on freedom passage Tiran Straits and with guarantee Egypt not to return to Gaza prior final settlement Israel-Egypt dispute.

MAARIV (Independent)

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1012, March 1, 9 a.m., from Tel Aviv

MAARIV (Independent) asserts internal dissension in GOI growing as likelihood acceptance United States-French proposals increases.

Achdut Avoda reportedly took rigid stand at last night's Cabinet meeting and both this party and MAPAM are meeting today to decide positions. According MAARIV, MAPAI Central Committee also met yesterday.

LAWSON

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Despite earlier reports (EMBTel 1007) that Ben Gurion had subdued threatened bolt left-wing parties rumors persist. Achdut Avoda and Mapam may leave coalition rather than acquiesce in settlement they think would give Israel less than minimum requirements Gaza and Tiran Straits.

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While Achdut Avoda in Knesset supported coalition vote which amounted to expression confidence Ben Gurion's position in current discussions with United States and United Nations it now appears that Achdut Avoda member of the Knesset Yigal Alon former Palmach commander and consistent proponent greater "activism" Israeli relations with its Arab neighbors unreconciled and rallying support which may be decisive among younger members this party.

Alon has sent telegram to Knesset demanding early debate on latest stages Israel-United States discussions. Simultaneously other Achdut Avoda leaders have asked for emergency meeting on same issue of Knesset's multi-party security and Foreign Affairs committee.

Mapam taking more passive role in intra-coalition struggles but if generally believed it would follow Achdut Avoda out of coalition because of its own antipathy for Mapai against which Achdut Avoda provides buffer. Several sources inform Embassy Mapam not vitally concerned over Gaza issue being content to follow Achdut Avoda's lead there. However one of its ministries controls Eilat development whose future presumably inextricably linked with fate of Tiran Straits. Accordingly its own party requirements in this specific issue with Mapai would be met with any arrangement which assured freedom of transit.

If left-wing parties defect Ben Gurion will have lost his overall majority except by reliance on five votes of Mapai affiliated Arab parties but non-Communist party can contemplate with

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-2- 1014, March 1, 2 p.m., from Tel Aviv

with equanimity prospect Arabs holding balance of power.

Recurring rumors of General Zionists moving into coalition to replace Achdut Avoda and Mapam again rife. This possibility which has waxed and waned again and again in past year confronts General Zionists with embarrassing dilemma. It generally conceded they want back in coalition but their stand on Sharm El Sheikh and Gaza has been virtually indistinguishable from that of Achdut Avoda. Joining coalition under such circumstances would reveal them as crassly opportunistic which indeed they would be. On other hand many General Zionists think Ben Gurion's slight advances to them may have no other purpose than frighten Achdut Avoda and Mapam into submission accepting coalition discipline as lesser of two evils as compared with sharp swing for government to right implicit in any Mapai-General Zionists federation.

To rumor of coalition difficulties press linked report Ben Gurion had appointment for today with four General Zionists ex-ministers. Embassy however inclined accept report from Prime Minister's office there no connection; that meeting consistent with Ben Gurion's recent practices keeping all parties except Communists abreast of developments in United Nations issue.

1. Foreign Ministry official purely on personal basis informed Embassy Ben Gurion probably could enlist extremely orthodox Agudists who have no firm views on international affairs and whose six members would restore Ben Gurion's overall majority (sans Arabs) and without weakening Ben Gurion's grip on direction of foreign relations. If in government however Agudat uneasy truce on religious issues in Tel Aviv would probably be broken creating host of galling problems and constituting price higher than Ben Gurion might be willing to pay.

Comment: Ben Gurion may expect defections and undoubtedly laying his plans accordingly. However as is so often case in intra-party strife here differences may disappear when terms of settlement if and when reached made known to public and found acceptable by it. Achdut Avoda and Mapam which might leave coalition if they could be certain general election would follow would have serious second thoughts if it appeared Ben Gurion could avoid this by enlisting other parties thus putting Achdut Avoda and Mapam in political wilderness for as

much as

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-3- 1014, March 1, 2 p.m., from Tel Aviv

much as two years which is Knesset's life expectancy barring its own decision dissolve.

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AB:BAG/14

Note: Message delayed in transmission.

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Control: 1409
Rec'd: March 2, 1957
9:15 p.m.

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FROM: Tel
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 101, March 1, 7 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1017, REPEATED INFORMATION USUN 62.

Embassy counselor called on Herzog, Chief of American Section Foreign Ministry, at latter's request morning March 1. Herzog said he wished Embassy to be fully informed of fast-moving development last few days following Eban's talk with Secretary February 24 (DEPTEL 825). He gave full expose GOI thinking on Gulf of Tiran and Gaza Strip (already known to Department) referred to disappointment at Hammarskjold's attitude on various issues and expressed GOI's appreciation for untiring efforts of United States and particularly Secretary's personal interest in attempting hammer out formula permitting GOI to withdraw according United Nations resolutions but with minimal security requirements assured.

He reported Ben Gurion had had "very rough time" in long cabinet meeting on February 27. However he finally successful in extracting approval for instructions to Eban re simultaneous withdrawal Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza if satisfactory assurances obtained from United States that Egyptians would not return to Gaza "before peace settlement." In this connection Herzog stated Ben Gurion anticipated cabinet crisis and prepared for break-up of coalition by withdrawal of Achdut Avoda and Mapam. This would leave Ben Gurion with bare majority of 62 votes in Knesset which not comfortable majority in such important situation. Herzog quoted Ben Gurion as saying he had been for some past weeks waging fight in international arena and he would now turn his efforts to an internal political battle. Herzog thought, however, Ben Gurion could manage public opinion fairly well on his withdrawal decision. Herzog had spoken by phone to Mrs. Meir at 6:30 p.m. local time yesterday (February 28) when she reported meetings about to start with Secretary and others. Since then GOI had no word and eagerly awaiting crucial information resulting from those meetings. Herzog said Ben Gurion had been telephoning Foreign Office at 15 minute intervals since early morning to ask if any news received. At

10:30 a.m.,

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-2- 1017, March 1, 7 p.m. from Tel Aviv

10:30 a.m., while counselor still in Herzog's office, latter informed of receipt of 1800 coded word message. Before message decoded, Ben Gurion immediately notified by phone and he gave instructions to summon Ministers for afternoon cabinet session.

Herzog volunteered to phone Embassy approximately 1:30 p.m. to pass on information contained in telegram. However, as of close of business, nothing heard from Foreign Ministry.

Afternoon papers report extraordinary session of cabinet now being held and state it "expected" Israeli delegate to United Nations will make statement on withdrawal in General Assembly at 11 p.m. Israeli time tonight (DEPCIRTEL 720).

LAWSON

LR:LMB

Note: Passed New York 3/3/57, 1 a.m. AL

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FROM: Damascus

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1987, March 1, 4 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1987, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 226, BAGHDAD 25, BEIRUT 612, CAIRO 265, JIDDA 136.

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JOINT STATE USIA

Syrian press and radio March 1 pummel US for coddling Israel and failing insist on conditional withdrawal in compliance UN resolutions. Lengthy commentary Syrian Broadcasting System declares.

(1) Israeli withdrawal plan to be presented UN today is French-American-Zionist inspired.

(2) Withdrawal will not be unconditional but based on stationing UNEF in Gaza and Sharm al-Shaykh plus US commitment use force if necessary keep Aqaba Gulf open.

(3) Thus plan is violation UN resolutions which UN must enforce in order retain any self respect

SBS and press base interpretation Israeli plan on news story attributed Reuter and claim US failure present compromise resolution was due insistence Afro-Asian bloc put sanction resolution to vote. Hostile headlines and leads take same line as SBS in asserting existence of French-American-Zionist agreement. Communist-line AL NUR states US partisan stand Israel not due merely Zionist influence but firm understanding between Zionists and US statesmen. 3-2, ASRP Rau al Am says (A) US-Israeli withdrawal plan concocted in dark by imperialist aggressors cannot obtain majority UN vote and (B) plan would not help UK and France because Arabs would oppose resumption use APC pipeline and Suez Canal.

Comment: Radio and press appear have waited result Cairo Arab conference before cutting lose on strong criticism US role withdrawal problem.

AB:INK/11

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 822, MARCH 1, 6 PM

Control: 952

Rec'd: MARCH 1, 1957

10 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT DELGA 822 REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 4

REFERENCE: PALESTINE/ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL.

WEST EUROPEANS AND OLD COMMONWEALTH ASKED LODGE MEET WITH THEM AFTER PLENARY TODAY. LODGE SAID NOW THAT ISRAEL HAD MADE ITS DECLARATION, U.S. FELT ISRAEL SHOULD START PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL OVER WEEKEND. THEY WOULD THUS HAVE MADE THEIR RECORD, AND WOULD PROMOTE CHANCE OF GOOD SUPPORTING SPEECHES WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THEY COULD SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE THEIR WITHDRAWAL.

U.S. BELIEVED IT DESIRABLE FOR WESTERN EUROPEANS AND OTHERS WHO HAD INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL TO URGE UPON HER DESIRABILITY OF THIS COURSE OF ACTION. U.S. FOR ITS PART WOULD UNDERTAKE DO SAME.

NO ONE PRESENT AT MEETING DISAGREED WITH THIS IDEA. PEARSON (CANADA) STRONGLY SUPPORTED LODGE SAYING CANADA WOULD UNDERTAKE TO URGE ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL OVER WEEKEND. HE POINTED OUT THAT IF ISRAEL DID NOT MOVE OVER WEEKEND, ON MONDAY, WHEN DEBATE RESUMES, ARABS WILL SAY ISRAEL DECLARATION WAS MERELY NEGOTIATING POSITION OR PRE-CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL, IN SPITE OF WHAT THEY HAD SAID. HE THOUGHT IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO GET ISRAEL STARTED WITHDRAWING AND UNEF ENTERING WHICH WOULD HELP PREVENT CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS WHO HAVE ELEMENTS IN UNEF (I.E., INDIA AND YUGOSLAVIA) FROM TAKING A STAND AGAINST ASSUMPTIONS STATED BY ISRAEL.

GEORGES-PICOT (FRANCE) INDICATED HE FAVORED URGING EARLY ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL IN ORDER PARTICULARLY THAT ASSUMPTIONS STATED BY ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE CHALLENGED PRIOR TO WITHDRAWAL AND THEREBY PREVENT IT. GROUP AGREED IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR PLENARY TO MEET MONDAY AFTERNOON RATHER THAN MONDAY MORNING TO GIVE ISRAEL

SOME ADDITIONAL

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SOME ADDITIONAL TIME.

SUBSEQUENTLY, LODGE CALLED ON SYG AT HIS REQUEST. HAMMARSKJOLD SHOWED LODGE QUOTATIONS FROM ISRAEL PRESS CONFERENCE (SEE DELGA 823) FOLLOWING PLENARY WHICH CAST DOUBT ON WHETHER ISRAELI COMMANDER COULD MEET WITH GENERAL BURNS TOMORROW AS HAMMARSKJOLD HAD INSTRUCTED BURNS TO ARRANGE IN VIEW OF FACT IT WAS SABBATH. THEY ALSO STATED FRENCH SPEECH GAVE STRAIGHT FORWARD SUPPORT; LODGE SPEECH WAS ALL RIGHT ON AQABA BUT AS FAR AS GAZA, THEY WOULD HAVE TO GIVE IT FURTHER STUDY. SPOKESMAN STATED GAZA IS UN RESPONSIBILITY UNTIL DEFINITIVE AND FINAL SETTLEMENT. HE WENT ON TO SAY YOU MAY HAVE NOTICED MRS. MEIR IN HER SPEECH MADE CLEAR ISRAEL WAS GIVING UP GAZA TO UN, NOT TO EGYPT.

LODGE INFORMED SYG OF WHAT HE HAD TOLD EUROPEANS. SYG FELT THIS WAS MOST USEFUL.

SYG SAID HE HAD ASKED FAWZI INFORM CAIRO THAT IF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PROCEEDS, BEGINNING OVER WEEKEND, HAMMARSKJOLD WOULD EXPECT GO OUT TO CAIRO FEW DAYS AFTERWARDS. HE FELT THIS WOULD SERVE AS BRAKE ON EGYPTIANS PUTTING OFF ANY QUESTIONS THEY MAY HAVE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF TAKE-OVER IN GAZA AND HARM EL SHEIKH UNTIL HE GETS TO CAIRO.

HAMMARSKJOLD REPORTED NEXT PLENARY DEFINITELY SET FOR MONDAY AFTER-NOON, SAYING WE MUST GIVE ISRAEL DECENT AMOUNT OF TIME.

HE SHOWED US COPY OF INSTRUCTIONS TO BURNS WHICH INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR BURNS, IF HE COULD MEET WITH GENERAL DAYAN OVER WEEKEND, TO FIX TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL. THIS COULD THEN BE REPORTED TO GA ON MONDAY. IT WOULD ALSO BE POSSIBLE BEGIN MORE ISRAELI UNITS OUT AND UNEF UNITS IN ON SUNDAY. TAKEOVER OF CIVIL-IAN ADMINISTRATION WOULD OBVIOUSLY TAKE A LITTLE MORE TIME.

WITH REGARD TO FUTURE WORK OF ASSEMBLY, HAMMARSKJOLD FELT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR ASSEMBLY RECESS AT CALL OF PRESIDENT IN CONSULTATION WITH 11TH GA GENERAL COMMITTEE. TO CONSULT OR OBTAIN MAJORITY APPROVAL FROM PERMANENT DELEGATIONS FOR RECONVENING SESSION WOULD BE TOO HEAVY AND TIME-CONSUMING OPERATION. GENERAL COMMITTEE WOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT CONTROL IN HIS OPINION. HE SAID GAZA MAY PROVE EXTREMELY EXPENSIVE OPERATION AND IT WOULD THEREFORE BE NECESSARY OBTAIN FINANCIAL AUTHORIZATIONS FROM GA WITH REGARD THIS MATTER AT LATER DATE.

LODGE

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UNITED STATES MISSION

SENT TO: USUN, NEW YORK

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Origin

Info

DELGA 822.

Ref SYG statement takeover civilian administration Gaza may require further financial authorization later date.

Believe it desirable avoid if possible further consideration such matters until next GA meeting.

Appears to us adequate authorizations already exist from management point of view. If for example UN administration Gaza considered as quote Civil Affairs and quote function UNEF, then UNEF budget plus SYG's regular authority use working capital fund for measures related peace and security should carry operation until fall.

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Hester (att.)
for CARTER

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Drafted by:

IO:OIA:RCW:ar: 3/7/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

OIA - John E. Forbes

Electronics:

Mr. Owsley (in substance)

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 823, MARCH 1, 8 P.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT DELGA 823, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 3.

VERBATIM TEXT

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

CORDIER (SECRETARIAT) MADE AVAILABLE FOLLOWING NOTES ON BRIEFING GIVEN BY ISRAELI PRESS OFFICER IN NY AT 5 P.M. FRIDAY:

"WE FIND THE FRENCH SPEECH STRAIGHTFORWARD, AND A CLEAR EXPRESSION OF PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES.

"AS FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE'S STATEMENT, WE FEEL THAT THE QUESTION OF AQABA WAS SATISFACTORILY DEALT WITH. AS TO GAZA, THE AMERICAN POSITION REQUIRES FURTHER STUDY BEFORE WE COMMENT.

"THERE ARE A FEW OTHER POINTS THAT I DUG OUT TO ASSIST YOU AS TO WHAT WE SEE IN THE STATEMENTS TODAY.

"(1) THE UNITED STATES TAKES NOTE OF ALL ISRAEL'S DECLARATIONS NOT ONLY DOES IT NOT EXPRESS ANY RESERVATION, BUT THE UNITED STATES STATEMENT UPHOLDS THE REASONABLE CHARACTER OF ISRAEL'S EXPECTATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS ON THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE GAZA STRIP. (IN THIS RESPECT, HE REFERRED ALSO TO THE STATEMENTS OF FRANCE COSTA RICA AND ARGENTINA.)

"(2) ANOTHER POINT, AS WE SEE IT, IS THAT AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL THERE WILL BE NO ROOM FOR BELLIGERENT ACTS.

"(3) ON THE AQABA QUESTION, WE FEEL THAT IT WAS DEALT WITH SATISFACTORILY FROM THE ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW; NAMELY THERE WAS, FIRSTLY, A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND, SECONDLY, THERE IS

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-2- DELGA 823, MARCH 1, 8 P.M., FROM NEW YORK.

THERE IS THE STATIONING OF UNEF UNTIL PEACEFUL CONDITIONS PREVAIL.

"(4) DUE NOTE WAS TAKEN BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

"(5) THE MOST IMPORTANT FACT IS THE NOTE TAKEN BY SPEAKERS TODAY OF ISRAEL'S STATEMENT, PARTICULARLY ON OUR RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE.

"(6) AS WE SEE IT, THE GAZA STRIP WILL BE A UNITED NATIONS RESPONSIBILITY UNTIL A DEFINITIVE AND FINAL SETTLEMENT IS REACHED. YOU MAY HAVE NOTICED IN THIS RESPECT IN MRS. MEIR'S SPEECH THAT ISRAEL IS GIVING UP GAZA TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NOT TO EGYPT."

ASKED IF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD COMMENCE THIS WEEKEND, THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT, ON A PURELY PERSONAL NOTE, HE DOUBTED WHETHER NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN TOMORROW, SINCE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD ASKED ISRAEL TO NEGOTIATE ON A SABBATH DAY.

LODGE

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 824, MARCH 1, 8 P.M.

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SENT DEPARTMENT DELGA 824; REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 2.

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

LODGE SAW EBAN (ISRAEL) THIS AFTERNOON BEFORE PLENARY CONVENED. EBAN MADE AVAILABLE COPY ISRAELI SPEECH AND INQUIRED AS TO THE PROCEDURE DURING AFTERNOON. LODGE INFORMED HIM THAT WE HAD AND WERE CONTINUING MAKE EFFORTS TO GET SPEAKERS FOR THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETING, BUT WE HAD BEEN RUNNING INTO DIFFICULTIES BECAUSE MANY WERE RELUCTANT TO SPEAK UNTIL THEY HAD ACTUALLY HEARD WHAT ISRAEL AND UNITED STATES HAD TO SAY. LODGE REPORTED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED WORD THAT ARABS WERE PLANNING ON MOVING ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY AFTER U.S. AND ISRAEL HAD SPOKEN. EBAN SAID THAT PART OF THE UNDERSTANDING IN WASHINGTON WAS THAT THERE WOULD BE AN EXPRESSION OF WORLD OPINION IN SUPPORT OF ISRAELI STATEMENT AND THAT HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO NUMBER OF SUPPORTING STATEMENTS BEING MADE THIS AFTERNOON. LODGE ASSURED HIM THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TRY TO GET OTHER TO MAKE STATEMENTS; (A TOTAL OF 9 SPEAKERS WERE HEARD THIS AFTERNOON, INCLUDING U.S., ISRAEL AND FRANCE, THE REST OF WHOM WERE ASKED BY U.S. TO MAKE STATEMENTS).

IN RESPONSE TO LODGE'S INQUIRY AS TO ISRAEL'S PLANS TO WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY, EBAN SAID THAT PROCESS COULD NOT BEGIN "UNTIL THE DEBATE HAD BEEN COMPLETED". LODGE POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS NO ASSURANCE AS TO WHEN SUCH DEBATE COULD BE COMPLETED AND THAT IT COULD RUN A NUMBER OF DAYS. THIS WOULD MEAN MOST SERIOUS DELAY IN WITHDRAWAL. RAFAEL (ISRAEL) AT END CONVERSATION CONFIRMED TO BARCO THAT ISRAELIS DID NOT INTEND BEGIN WITHDRAWALS UNTIL GA DEBATE COMPLETED.

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-2- DELGA 824, MARCH 1, 8 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

IN THIS CONNECTION, AS LODGE-SECRETARY AGREED IN CONVERSATION THIS EVENING, WE ASSUME DEPARTMENT (IN ADDITION TO TELEPHONE CALL FROM SECRETARY TO MRS. MEIR) PRESSING ISRAELIS IN TEL AVIV TO BEGIN WITHDRAWALS OVER WEEKEND.

OUR IMPRESSION IS ARABS IN GA TODAY HELD BACK TO GIVE ISRAEL WEEKEND IN WHICH TO GIVE SERIOUS INDICATION ITS INTENTION BEGIN WITHDRAWALS. SHOULD ISRAELIS FAIL DO SO, ARAB REACTION UNDOUBTEDLY WILL CAUSE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES ON MONDAY.

FOR VIEWS EUROPEANS AND OLD COMMONWEALTH THIS CONNECTION SEE DELGA 822.

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9:29 P.M.

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: DELGA 825, MARCH 1, 8 P.M.

PRIORITY

VERBATIM TEXT

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

AFTER LODGE MADE HIS STATEMENT THIS AFTERNOON, SYG SENT HIM FOLLOWING NOTE:

"I WARMLY APPRECIATE YOUR GENEROUS WORDS. THEY ARE A NEW ENCOURAGING EXPRESSION OF OUR UNITY OF PURPOSE; U.N. OWES MUCH TO YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT."

AFTER LODGE HAD COMPLETED HIS STATEMENT HE RECEIVED PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF TUNISIA, CUBA, PERU, DENMARK, NEW ZEALAND, SYRIA, COLOMBIA.

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 826, MARCH 1, 8 P.M.

PRIORITY

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS

LODGE SAW FAWZI THIS MORNING. FAWZI SAID HE "WAS THOROUGHLY APPRECIATIVE OF U.S. EFFORT" TO GET ISRAELIS OUT. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD COME AS "NO SURPRISE OR PIECE OF SENSATIONAL NEWS" IF EGYPT WOULD HAVE SAY THAT ISRAELI STATEMENT AND "STATEMENT OF OTHERS" COULD NOT BIND EGYPT. FAWZI SAID "NONE OF US SHOULD BE ALARMED BY THIS". FAWZI SAID IF FOUR OR FIVE COUNTRIES, AND IN PARTICULAR FRANCE "GAVE TOO DISTINCT INDICATIONS THEY ARE ADOPTING POSTURE LOOKING TO BACKING THEIR STATEMENTS OF POLICY BY FORCE, THIS WOULD CHANGE PICTURE ENTIRELY". HE SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW "FRANCE HAD LOST ITS GRIP ENTIRELY".

HE SAID THAT ANY THOUGHT OF ACCEPTING OR ACQUIESCING IN ASSUMPTION THAT ISRAEL COULD EXERCISE FORCE IN AQABA WAS IMPOSSIBLE AND THAT ISRAEL HAD NO RIGHT TO USE FORCE IN AQABA.

FAWZI CONFIRMED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS NOT HIS INTENTION "TO GO BACK ON OR TAKE BACK" WORDS OR ASSURANCES GIVEN TO SYG. HE AGREED THAT THIS WOULD WEAKEN EGYPT'S MORAL POSITION IN THE ASSEMBLY AND MIGHT GIVE ISRAEL EXCUSE NOT TO GET OUT. HE SAID "WE SHOULD LET WELL ENOUGH ALONE".

IN COMMENTING ON OUR SANCTIONS RESOLUTION, FAWZI SAID CAIRO WAS NOT AT ALL SATISFIED WITH IT AND THAT EGYPT WOULD PREPARE AND GIVE US DRAFT WITH CHANGES THEY WOULD LIKE SEE MADE. (BY THIS EVENING EGYPTIANS HAD NOT GIVEN US ANY COUNTER-DRAFT.)

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JOINT STATE-USIA MESSAGE

Origin

Info

Following considerations may be useful in clarifying US position on Israeli withdrawal.

Text Israeli and US statements being telegraphed separately.

Important that info output convey following impressions:

Upon Israeli withdrawal will have
(1) UN, with support free nations, ~~has~~ achieved compliance its resolutions on withdrawal. UN effectiveness in safeguarding vital interests independent nations of Middle East thus demonstrated.

(2) Complete withdrawal of forces of those states which invaded Egypt/~~will mark~~ turning point in ~~the~~ long efforts of ~~the~~ UN to bring order and stability to ~~the~~ Middle East.

(3) Persistent firm pressure from US largely responsible for inducing Israel to comply with UN resolutions.

(4) Compliance with UN resolutions obtained within framework UN Charter and in accordance recommendations UNSYG. Israel achieved no reward for its military operation. Israel has been given nothing to which not entitled, after withdrawal, under Charter or international law.

(5) Israel withdrawal demonstrates effectiveness peaceful negotiating efforts to achieve peaceful solutions international disputes.

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Drawn by: NEA/P:TRF:dh 3/1/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary William M. Rountree

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(6) No secret or unpublicized commitments of any kind made by US. US position fully set forth in GA statement_x and in previous public statements notably President's speech February 20. In all efforts by US and other countries to support UN action, greatest care exercised avoid any statement or action prejudicial sovereignty or rights any parties.

(7) Efforts to ^{persuade} ~~force~~ Israel ~~to~~ withdraw did not constitute any negotiation with Israel re Israel's relationship to Egypt. Subject of prolonged discussions was Israel's relationship to UN and Israel's obligations and rights under Charter and international law.

(8) Frequent references to "assurances" given by US not to be interpreted as concessions to Israel, US has merely clarified its position re certain international rights with a view to obtaining Israel's compliance with international obligations.

(9) US will continue support fullest rights of members under Charter and in accordance international law, and will exert strong effort obtain strict compliance with Israel-Egypt Armistice Agreement, which, upon withdrawal Israel forces, should again be fully operative.

NOTE: Secretary's statement after meeting with Arab Chiefs of Mission March 1 should be used to emphasize some of above points.

CAUTION: Essential refute any suggestion Israel has achieved victory_x or the US has made unpublicized arrangements with Israel.

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Repeat statements of Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Lodge and
Israel Foreign Minister Meir from March 1 Wireless Bulletin to
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DULLES

Subject: Israeli Withdrawal

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classification approved by: DC/T - F. E. Dwyall

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Department of State

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00726

157 MAR 1 PM 3 44

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Origin

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
Repeat statements of Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Lodge
Israel Foreign Minister Meir from March 1 Wireless Bulletin to
Luxembourg and The Hague.

*Dulles
(eh)*

" DULLES "

Dist.
Desired
(Offices
Only)

Subject: Israeli Withdrawal



Drafted by:

OSS:DC/S:PALodato 3/1/57

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

DC/T - F. E. Duvall

Clearances:

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674.840

Origin

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telegraphically
Repeat statements of Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Lodge and
Israel Foreign Minister Meir from March 1 Wireless Bulletin to
Canberra and Wellington.

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Dulles
(eh)

DULLES

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Subject: Israeli Withdrawal

Drafted by: OSS:DC/S:PALocato 3/1/57

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**OUTGOING
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1957 MAR 1 PM 8 45

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Origin

Info:

Repeat statements of Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Lodge
Israel Foreign Minister Meir from March 1 Wireless Bulletin
Budapest and Prague.

*Dulles
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DULLES

674.84A/3-157

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Subject: Isreali Withdrawal

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EE - Mr. Freers *Fre*

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1957 MAR 1

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Info

Repeat statements of Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Lodge and
Israel Foreign Minister Meir from March 1 Wireless Bulletin to
Bucharest:


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(eh)*

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Subject: Israeli Withdrawal



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FORM DS-10
4-1-55

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REFERENCE SLIP

DATE

3/2/57

TO:	NAME OR TITLE	ORGAN. SYMBOL	ROOM NO.	BLDG.	INITIALS	DATE
1.	NEA - Mr. Rountree					
2.	S/S					
3.	RM/R-Mrs. Burke, 1167D NS					
4.						
5.						

APPROVAL	NOTE AND FORWARD
AS REQUESTED	NOTE AND RETURN
COMMENT	PER CONVERSATION
FOR YOUR INFORMATION	PREPARE REPLY
INITIAL FOR CLEARANCE	SEE ME
NECESSARY ACTION	SIGNATURE

REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING

RM/R: Pls reproduce attached Memo of Conversation
dated March 1 to:

USUN ~~(10000)~~
Amembassy, CAIRO
Amembassy, TEL AVIV
~~TO:~~

ENVELOPED
BY M. S.

FROM (NAME AND ORGANIZATION)	ROOM NO. AND BLDG.
NEA: S. Rockwell <i>gwn</i>	3213
SIGNATURE	PHONE NO.
<i>S. Rockwell</i>	

CONFIDENTIAL

M-548

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 1, 1957

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal from the Sharm el-Sheikh Area and the Gaza Strip

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Egyptian Ambassador
Dr. Abraham Anis, Sudanese Ambassador
Dr. Victor A. Khouiri, Lebanese Ambassador
Dr. Farid Zeineddine, Syrian Ambassador
Dr. Moussa Al-Shabandar, Iraqi Ambassador
Mr. Faisal Hegelan, Third Secretary, Embassy of Saudi Arabia
Mr. Mahmoud A. Rousan, Embassy of Jordan
Mr. Assayed Ahmad Ali Zabarah, Chargé ad interim, Legation of Yemen
The Secretary
Mr. Mahmud Galbun, Second Secretary, Libyan Embassy
Mr. William M. Rountree; Mr. Fraser Wilkins, NEA
Copies To: S/S(2 cc), G(cc), C(cc), USIN, NEA(2 cc), NE(3 cc), Cairo, Tel Aviv

The Secretary said that he had asked the Chiefs of Mission of the Arab states to call because he thought it might be of interest to them if he were able to report our efforts at the United Nations and directly through diplomatic channels to bring about an Israeli withdrawal from the Sharm el-Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip.

The Secretary said that it was a matter of public record that we had given an Aide Memoire to Israel on February 11 and that President Eisenhower had made a radio-television address on February 20. Meantime, we had pushed forward with a proposed resolution which would condemn Israel and provide for sanctions if it remained obdurate. The Secretary thought the President's statement had had an effect in Israel and on the friends of Israel in this country. He wished to note in passing that the President had been criticized regarding the substance of this statement to a greater extent than on any other he had made. The Government of Israel had endeavored to obtain more extensive commitments from the United States but we had declined to give them. Yesterday afternoon Ambassador Eban had informed the Secretary that, following recent meetings of the Israeli Cabinet, Israel had decided to withdraw promptly and unconditionally. According to the Ambassador, Israel was taking into account developments in the United Nations and the substance of the President's remarks of February 20. The Secretary understood that the Israeli Cabinet was now having another session regarding the matter and, while he could not say for certain what final action Israel would take, he understood Israeli withdrawal would be announced to the General Assembly this afternoon.

CONFIDENTIAL

The/

The Secretary said he understood that rumors were circulating, based on a Tass report, that there was a secret agreement between the United States and Israel under which the United States would receive bases in Israel in return for \$125 million. The Secretary said that absolutely nothing whatsoever had been offered by the United States to Israel which was not a matter of public record. There was not one iota of truth in the rumor. There had been no agreement or understanding, expressed or implied, to induce Israel to withdraw. It was true that Israel had suggested that the United Nations provide more definite assurances but we had replied that they could not expect any prize or reward to result from their invasion of Egypt. It was our view that the arrangements which were being made by the Secretary General, based on action of the General Assembly, provided the assurances which Israel desired and that nothing further could be granted by the United Nations or its individual members, including the United States, until Israel had withdrawn.

The Secretary said that although we did not know what Israel would say this afternoon, we believed matters had advanced sufficiently to discuss it with the Arab representatives, especially with Egypt. We considered the withdrawal as of utmost importance to the United Nations and to the world because, as indicated in Article I of the Charter, acts of aggression should be suppressed. If Israel now withdrew, it would be a great achievement for the United Nations.

The Secretary added that at the United Nations in October he had presented the first resolution calling for Israel's withdrawal. He had indicated at that time that hostilities in the area were the result of unstable conditions, in which there had been breaches of the general Armistice Agreements by the parties. He had hoped that the United Nations could suppress these breaches and could re-establish conditions in accord with justice and international law. There was a heavy responsibility in this respect; peace and justice were two sides of a single coin and were so recognized in the Charter. He hoped that out of the present unhappy experience a new brighter prospect for the nations of the area and for the United Nations would develop.

The Syrian Ambassador thanked the Secretary for the information which he had given and said that each of them would convey it to their governments. He added that they understood that the Israeli agreement to withdraw had not yet been announced but wished to ask questions about it. How quickly would it be effected? The Secretary said that he expected that Israeli withdrawal would commence at once. He assumed that physical arrangements would be made between General Burns of the United Nations and Israeli officials. They would probably meet to work out the details. He hoped the withdrawal would not be dilatory.

The Syrian Ambassador asked what arrangements had been made regarding the UNEF? The Secretary said that we had not discussed this subject with the Government of Israel other than in the terms laid down by the General Assembly and the Secretary General. We did not consider that we had any authority to speak for the United Nations or for Egypt. We understood that Israeli representatives had discussed this question with the Secretary General.

The/

The Syrian Ambassador inquired what arrangements had been made regarding the return of Egypt to Gaza. The Secretary said that this question had arisen in discussions with Israel and we had replied that we had no authority to speak for the United Nations or for Egypt. We considered that any steps taken regarding the Gaza area should be within the framework of the general Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt. We had pointed to the report of the Secretary General of February 22 which dealt with this question and had not expanded upon it in any way.

The Syrian Ambassador observed that the Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Agreement was not a decision of the United Nations but an agreement between two states which could not be changed without the consent of either Egypt or Israel. The Secretary said he assumed that Egypt had consented to what the Secretary General had said in his report.

The Syrian Ambassador suggested that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution providing for sanctions keyed to the pace of Israeli withdrawal. He added that the whole question should be handled through United Nations action rather than through statements of its individual members in the General Assembly. He noted that the Arab states had endeavored to cooperate by not pressing for action in the General Assembly during the past few days.

The Secretary said that if there were a positive pledge from Israel to withdraw it did not seem possible to vote sanctions. On the other hand, if Israel did not carry out its pledge it might then be possible to vote sanctions. Ambassador Lodge had been discussing these possibilities with Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi and with others. The Syrian Ambassador said that they had been so informed but they found their own resolution more acceptable than the proposed American resolution.

The Secretary said that the practical problem of obtaining a majority of two-thirds confronted us. The proposed American resolution had been designed to take into account other views. We believed any vote for sanctions would be very close. If Israel did not withdraw a stronger resolution might then be adopted. However, we have no grounds at this moment for believing that Israel would not withdraw. The Syrian Ambassador hoped that the United States Delegation and the Arab Delegations in New York would keep in close touch.

The Lebanese Ambassador inquired how long Israel would take to withdraw. The Secretary said that he believed withdrawal would commence immediately but he did not know exactly how long it would take. He had the impression from Ambassador Eban that he was anxious to complete withdrawal promptly and fully. The Secretary said we would endeavor to ascertain when the Israeli withdrawal would be completed.

The Syrian Ambassador again referred to the question of the deployment of the UNEF in relation to the exercise of Egyptian rights. The Secretary said that it would be unfortunate if, following Israeli withdrawal, a better situation could not be created than had existed in the past. He did not believe

that/

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

that any one wished a return to conditions of hostilities in violation of the General Armistice Agreement. We would have forces on the demarcation line between Israel and Egypt and a return of peaceful conditions to the area. There would be no change in the juridical situation and nothing would be taken away from Egypt, but there would be a better situation than had existed before.

The Syrian Ambassador observed that the question of Aqaba and Gaza had arisen as a result of the Palestine situation and were inseparable from it. He added that none of the Arab representatives had any new information from their governments except the recent declaration of Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Secretary said that no one wished a return to conditions of warfare but rather desired the establishment of a new peaceful order. If a final peace settlement did not now seem practicable, conditions of tranquillity could at least prevail as had been indicated in the Declaration of the four Arab nations.

The Egyptian Ambassador said that in returning to peaceful conditions Israel should receive no gain in any way from its aggression. The Secretary replied that Israel should not be rewarded but that actions approved by the United Nations as in the general interest should not be rejected. He thought that we should not deny to ourselves forward moves merely for the purpose of denying them to Israel. The Secretary added that we could not repudiate the steps which had already been taken by the United Nations and the Secretary General, such as the establishment of the UNEF and the arrangements worked out by the Secretary General in consultation with the Advisory Committee. The Syrian Ambassador said that the Arab states wished to cooperate with the United States and believed that consultation should take place between them in advance rather than with other countries that were less concerned with the area.

The Secretary continued that the United States had endeavored to persuade Israel to withdraw in accordance with the appeals of the United Nations. We had made no additional commitments. We would welcome further consultation with the Arab states leading to tranquillity in the area. One of the purposes of the Eisenhower Program would be consultations and talks with the individual states. We had considered, however, that it was necessary first to persuade Israel to withdraw; otherwise, there would have been a serious deterioration of the situation which might have resulted in hostilities. It had taken tremendous courage for the President to make his radio-television statement on February 20. This statement had subsequently been bitterly denounced as had the views of the Secretary. Israel was now apparently in the process of deciding to withdraw. The American stand accordingly seemed to deserve a certain respect. In the final analysis this stand should prove to be more effective than sanctions itself. Economic and financial sanctions were exceedingly difficult to formulate and hard to place into effect.

The/

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The Secretary believed that, if Israel withdrew as he thought it would, a real success would have been achieved. He hoped the Arab representatives would agree that adherence to principles had been useful. We had done so because of the importance we attached to the establishment of international peace and justice as spelled out in the Charter of the United Nations, although it had made it necessary for the United States temporarily to split with such old friends as the United Kingdom, France and Israel. If Israel now withdrew, its relations with the United States would return to normal as had United States relations with the United Kingdom and France. If Israel did not withdraw, United States relations with Israel would not be improved. The Secretary thought it essential that the position of the United States be based on principle.

The Syrian Ambassador thanked the Secretary for his remarks and said that the Arab representatives admired the courage with which the President and the Secretary had approached current matters relating to Aqaba and Gaza.

fw *ml*
NEA:NE:Fraser Wilkins:crc:cmt 3/1/57

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 1, 1957
12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Israel

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Israeli Embassy
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State

COPIES TO: S
S/S (2)
NEA - Mr. Rountree
G (2)
IO

Minister Shiloah called on me at his urgent request. He said he wanted the Secretary to know of the extreme difficulties which are facing his Government internally. For example, he said ten minutes ago Golda Meier had been talking with Ben-Gurion on the telephone and the latter was urging that she obtain a delay in the announcement today because the situation of the Government was so delicate. She persuaded Ben-Gurion that this was just not in the cards, according to Shiloah. The latter said that no doubt at least one or two parties will withdraw from the coalition and the crisis may destroy the present coalition.

2. He expressed the urgent hope that the American statement in New York would contain language regarding American recognition of the considerations Israel had advanced regarding Gaza. He said the Secretary had read to Eban language from the U. S. draft statement which they liked and hoped this would not be omitted. *(This seems to refer to the 2d para. Para 2 of our draft)*

3. Shiloah said that while it may be reaching for the moon, they urged that the Secretary proceed to New York to handle the matter in the Assembly personally. He said that this did not mean any lack of confidence in Lodge, but that they believe that the Secretary has so much better feel and understanding of the delicate problems involved that they would be much easier in their minds if he were to handle matters personally in the General Assembly.

I told Mr. Shiloah that this would be conveyed to the Secretary immediately.

G:RM:akh

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APR 30 1957

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of Director S/S

March 1, 1967

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE AMBASSADOR EBAN
9 p.m., Thursday, February 28, 1967
Secretary's Residence

Ambassador Eban called me on the telephone about 8:30 and asked to see me urgently. He came in about 9.

I first took up with him the draft statement to be made by Israel and said I thought this represented a scrupulous effort to conform to our understanding. I suggested, however, that in the fourth paragraph there be introduced "among other things" after "Subject", and that in the first paragraph of page 2 the reference be direct to the UN resolution and not via the US memorandum.

I then showed the Ambassador the draft statement for Ambassador Lodge on Israeli withdrawal, draft 1. He glanced through it and said it seemed to be admirable. I pointed out I had not yet myself read it; undoubtedly there would be some change, but I thought the general tenor would remain unchanged.

He then said that his Government (and I judge particularly Mrs. Meir) felt a grave concern over the danger that the Egyptians might in fact come back into Gaza and that that would be intolerable to them and create a very difficult situation for the Government. He wondered if I could not give him any reassurances on this point and whether I had any unpublicized information as to what were in fact the Egyptian intentions. I gathered that there was a rather sharp difference of opinion between Eban and Mrs. Meir as to whether or not to go through with the withdrawal, that Eban was favoring it, and Mrs. Meir opposing it, and that Eban was seeking some reinforcement of his position. I said to the Ambassador that I had no information whatsoever beyond what was equally available to him in the reports of the Secretary General. We both I think assumed the Secretary General would not have made the statements he had made without having obtained what he thought were assurances from Egypt that they could be carried out, but even so there was of course the risk that Egypt might subsequently repudiate these understandings or disavow them.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

UEA

There

s/s

for

action.



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CODE SECTION

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PEX

PUBLIC SERVICES DIVISION
CHIEF OF DIVISION
MAR 4 - 1957
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SDDL DDLL

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FAX WASHINGTON DC 1 617PME

HON JOHN FOSTER DULLES

DEPT OF STATE WASHDC

WE WIRED PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TODAY AS FOLLOWS:

" WE ARE HEARTENED BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE DEADLOCK OVER
WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELS TROOPS FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND THE SHARMEL
SHEIKH AREA IS RESOLVED. THIS IS A SUBSTANTIVE AND PRINCIPLED
ACHIEVEMENT IN UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY. AT THIS MOMENT
GRATEFUL AMERICANS TURN TO YOU IN THANKSGIVING FOR THIS MAJOR
STEP IN SETTING THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE PATHWAY TO A DURABLE
PEACE. THE UNITED STATES POLICY OF ASSERTING ITS LEADERSHIP AND
NEGOTIATING A SETTLEMENT HAS AVERTED SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES TO THE
UNITED NATIONS AND HAS DISPELLED A THREAT OF A DISASTROUS ARMED
CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WITHIN THE
UNITED NATIONS, AND AS A SOVEREIGN NATION IN HER OWN RIGHT, OUR
COUNTRY HAS SHOWN THE WAY TO A BETTER TOMORROW FOR ALL THE
PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

" AMONG AMERICANS, PRAYING FOR THE BEST AND FEARING THE WORST, THE
PAST FEW WEEKS BROUGHT MANY HOURS OF ANXIETY. IN THE WAKE OF THIS
GREAT TRIAL WE HASTEN TO APPLAUD THE RESULTS ACHIEVED BY THE
ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

" THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE AN EASING OF
POLITICAL TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH, HOWEVER, FOR THE
MOMENT PROMISES NO MORE THAN COEXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AND THE ARAB
STATES IN THE AREA. WHAT LIES AHEAD IS THE LONG-RANGE PROBLEM OF

to 3-Mr. James
JXP 3/3
MAR 4 PM
DEPT OF STATE
PUBLIC SERVICES DIV.

PM
OF PAIR
VICS DIV.
" WE ARE HEARTENED BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE DEADLOCK OVER
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PEACE. THE UNITED STATES POLICY OF ASSERTING ITS LEADERSHIP AND
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MOMENT PROMISES NO MORE THAN COEXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AND THE ARAB
STATES IN THE AREA. WHAT LIES AHEAD IS THE LONG-RANGE PROBLEM OF
CREATING A SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP AND INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN ARABS
AND ISRAELIS-- INCLUDING A JUST AND REALISTIC SETTLEMENT OF THE
REFUGEE PROBLEM-- WHICH IS FUNDAMENTAL TO ANY PROGRAM FOR EXPLOITING
THE VAST ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE MIDDLE EAST. IN THIS
PHASE, AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AND DIPLOMACY MUST CONTINUE TO ASSERT
ITSELF AFFIRMATIVELY.

" WE PLEDGE SUPPORT TO OUR NATION IN HER EFFORT TO AID THE ISRAELI
AND ARAB PEOPLE TO REALIZE THEIR FINEST HOUR OF MODERN TIMES
THROUGH PEACE AND MUTUAL RESPECT

WE KNOW OF THE PERSISTENT ACTIVITY ON YOUR PART, MR SECRETARY
THAT HELPED BRING ABOUT THESE SIGNIFICANT RESULTS. OUR COMPLIMENTS
AND SINCERE GREETINGS TO YOU

PHILIP M. KLUTZNICK, PRESIDENT B'NAI BRITH.

630P.

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FILED
MAR 20 1957

U.S.R.
39
Rev
Cat

March 13 1957

In reply refer to
NEA:NE

Dear Mr. Klutznick:

Before his departure for the SEASO conference, the Secretary asked me to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of March 1 and to express to you his appreciation of the kind sentiments contained therein.

We look forward now to improvement in the atmosphere in the Near East, and we share your hope that it may be possible to make progress toward solution of basic problems in the area.

Sincerely yours,

William M. Brewster
Assistant Secretary

Files

374.84A/3-157

Assigned to

C3/J

Mr. Philip M. Klutznick,
President,
B'nai B'rith,
20 Plaza,
Park Forest, Illinois.

DO/R
Anal 39
Rev
Cat 1411

NEA:NE:RBParker:SWRockwell:rej - 3/7/57

Clearance P -
Mr. Parker to UNP/ROD

S/S-CR

MAR 13 1957 P.M.

674.84A/3-15

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 5, 1957

NEA - Mr. Oulashin

For appropriate reply to be
cleared with P and IO and signed
by Mr. Rountree.

Please send copies to S/S
by March 8.


J. H. Cunningham
S/S-RO

Attachments:

Tel to Pres fm Philip M. Klutznick
re President's stand on the ME dtd
3/1/57 (S/S-1386)

Tel to Secretary fm Philip M.
Klutznick re President's stand on the
ME dtd 3/1/57


NE

Reply
drafted 3-7-56
RB Farber
NEA:NE

amulye
3-6-57

Western

FOUNDRY COMPANY

WESTERN SPECIALTY COMPANY



WESTERN BRASS COMPANY

POST OFFICE BOX 899

TYLER, TEXAS

8645

ACTION
is assigned to

IO

TELEPHONE

2-3000

March 1, 1957

Mr. Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Re: IO:UNP:674.84A/2-1257

Dear Mr. Hill:

Representative Beckworth has forwarded to me your letter of February 26th, in which you express the position of your Department in connection with the matter of sanctions on Israel. I realize that by the time this letter reaches you this particular incident may be moot.

However, your position appears to me, and from all that I can tell, to a great many other citizens of the United States, to be one without principle.

Your letter makes much to do about the high plane that the Department takes and the refusal to compromise principles for the sake of immediate expediency. I realize that this letter, like others, will not mean much to you, but I cannot refrain from commenting on the inconsistency of your position.

Years ago, when Egypt, in defiance of every international law, refused to permit passage of Israeli vessels through the Suez Canal, no furor was raised; no effort for sanctions to enforce the resolutions of the United Nations was made. To multiply the list of compromises that our country has made in order not to irritate the Arabs, would be to lengthen this letter unduly. You know the concessions that we have made as to the religion that our soldiers may follow to serve in Arab Countries, passports of American Citizens of Jewish Faith to Arab Nations, etc., etc. If we are not paying tribute and compromising with principles, then what are we doing?

SOIL PIPE AND FITTINGS — SPECIALTIES — PLUMBERS' BRASS

674.84A/3-157

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674.84A
/3-157

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POST OFFICE BOX 899

TYLER, TEXAS

TELEPHONE
2-3815

March 1, 1957

Mr. Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

I have never read or heard of any justification or explanation by the Department as to our failure to speak up on the above matters. Would you care to comment on this?

Very respectfully yours,

Israel Smith
Israel Smith

IS:wm

cc: Hon. Lyndon B. Johnson
U. S. Senate
Washington, D. C.

Hon. Lindley Beckworth
U. S. Congress
Washington, D. C.

SOIL PIPE AND FITTINGS — SPECIALTIES — PLUMBERS' BRASS

March 28 1957

RM/R
Central
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CJ/J

674.842/3-157

Dear Mr. Smith:

I have received your letter of March 1, 1957, commenting on the letter I had addressed to Representative Beckworth on February 26, 1957, concerning the possible application of sanctions against Israel in the United Nations. You express the feeling that the position of the United States Government, as set forth in my letter, is one without principle and refer, in this connection, to a number of instances in which you allege the United States Government has made compromises in order not to irritate the Arabs.

In particular, you state that "no furor was raised" when Egypt refused to permit passage of Israeli vessels through the Suez Canal. While it is true that sanctions against Egypt have not been invoked by the United Nations, the position of the United States in opposing the Egyptian refusal to permit the passage of Israeli shipping through the Canal has been made abundantly clear. In 1951, when the Security Council considered an Israeli complaint against Egypt for blockading Suez Canal traffic destined for Israel, the United States co-sponsored a draft resolution which found the Egyptian practices to be inconsistent with the establishment of a permanent peace in the area as envisaged by the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement, determined that they were an abuse of the right of visit, search and seizure, and were not justified on the grounds of self-defense, and called upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions. This position has since been maintained by the United States Government. In 1954, the Security Council considered another Israeli complaint against Egyptian restrictive measures. At that time the United States Delegation supported a draft resolution introduced by the Delegation of New Zealand which noted that Egypt had not complied with the 1951 resolution and called upon Egypt, in accordance with its obligations under the Charter, to comply. Unfortunately, this resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union.

In October, 1956, when the Security Council was considering the situation created by the unilateral action of the Egyptian Government in bringing to an end a system of international operation of the Suez Canal, Secretary Dulles said: "The Suez Canal, to be sure, goes through

what is

Mr. Israel Smith,
Western Foundry Company,
Post Office Box 677,
Tyler, Texas.

DO/R
68
Rev
Cat

what is now Egypt, and in this sense the Canal is Egyptian. But the Canal is not, and never has been, a purely internal affair of Egypt, with which Egypt could do what it wanted. The Canal has always been, from the very day of its opening, an international waterway dedicated to the free passage of the vessels of all nations. Its character as an international right-of-way was guaranteed for all time by the 1863 Convention. Egypt cannot rightfully stop any vessel or cargo from going through the Canal. And for those who use that right-of-way to combine to secure the observance of their rights is no violation of Egyptian sovereignty, but a clear exercise of their rights accorded by international law, namely, by the Convention of 1863. More recently, when the President addressed the American people on February 20, 1957, on the problems related by the refusal of Israel to withdraw behind the Armistice Line, he said: "He should not assume that if Israel withdraws, Egypt will prevent Israeli shipping from using the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba. If, unhappily, Egypt does hereafter violate the Armistice Agreement or other international obligations, then this should be dealt with firmly by the society of nations."

These statements and the policy to which they give expression should leave no doubt that the Government of Egypt is fully aware of the attitude of the United States concerning the operation of the Canal.

I believe that what you feel to be the inconsistency of the United States position can be explained by reference to the following statement made by the President during the course of his address on February 20, 1957:

"We do, however, believe that upon the suppression of the present act of aggression and breach of the peace, there should be a greater effort by the United Nations and its members to secure justice and conformity with international law. Peace and justice are two sides of the same coin."

"Perhaps the world community has been at fault in not having paid enough attention to this truth. The United States, for its part, will vigorously seek solutions of the problems of the area in accordance with justice and international law. And we shall, in this great effort, seek the association of other like-minded nations which realize, as we do, that peace and justice are in the long-run inseparable."

In your letter you also refer to what you interpret as United States concessions to Arab countries in religious matters as the payment of tribute to them and compensating with petroleum. The American Government is aware of the problem of various kinds of discrimination which the Arab states have brought to bear on Americans on the basis of religion. On many occasions, both in the United States and abroad, American representatives have explained that the United States cannot accept discrimination based on religious affiliations. It must be recognized,

however,

however, that these Arab states are sovereign nations and have the right, as such, to prescribe their own rules and regulations concerning what goes on within their own borders, regardless of how unpalatable these may be to the American sense of justice. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the Arab restrictive measures of the type to which you refer are frequently manifestations of the tensions arising from the Arab-Israeli conflict.

I have read your letter with close attention and have given considerable thought to the points that you have raised. I hope that the explanations of the position of the United States Government which I have given above may help you in the matter that is giving you concern.

As you have forwarded copies of your letter of March 1 to Senator Lyndon B. Johnson and Representative Lindley B. Beckworth, I am furnishing each of them a copy of this letter to you.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

CLEARED with NEA - Mr. Ludlow (in draft) *RV*

Low
IO - Mr. Wilcox

IO:UNP:DLGamon:lmr 3/21/57 *H Plm*

S/S-CR

Ky
MAR 22 1957 P.M.

MAR 26 1957

MAR 28 1957

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674.34A/3-157 (REC'D)

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JUN 21 1957

674.34A/3-157
R.D.

① Is the Jaga strip, some under ~~stand~~
gone. What was its legal status,
prior to Brazil invasion

② What was legal status of Gulf of
Acagaba - before Brazil invasion.

Thanks for explanation on these two points
Very truly yours,

52

June 17 1957

Dear Mr. Blechstein:

I am replying to your February postal card to this Department inquiring about the legal status of the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba before the invasion of Egypt by Israel forces last autumn. Please accept my apologies for the long delay in this response.

Although the Gaza Strip is not considered a part of the State of Egypt, by virtue of the Armistice Agreement concluded between Israel and Egypt in 1949 the latter country has the rights of occupation and administration. These rights were not altered by the Israel invasion.

The position of the United States is that the Gulf of Aqaba comprehends international waters, with the exception, of course, of the territorial waters which "belong" to the nations bordering the Gulf. The United States is among those states which recognizes as "territorial" those waters which lie within three miles of the shoreline of the bordering states.

The status of the Gulf of Aqaba is complicated by questions concerning the status of the Straits of Tiran. I am enclosing a marked copy of Secretary Dulles' news conference of March 5, 1957 in which this latter question is discussed. I am also enclosing a copy of a statement by Ambassador Lodge at the United Nations which explains the nature of the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force along the armistice line in the Gaza Strip.

Sincerely yours,

John P. Neagher
Chief
Public Services Division

Enclosures:

As stated.

Mr. Jacob Blechstein,
Roselare, Illinois.

P:SFV:GERushing:GAI:cf

L/NEA

6/11/57

100 674:84013157

JUN 17 1957

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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42-47

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Action
NEAControl: 1389
Rec'd: MARCH 2, 1957
5:29 P.M.Info
RMRFROM: CAIRO
TO: Secretary of StateSS
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NO: 2778, MARCH 2

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2778 REPEATED INFO USUN 96, AMMAN BAGHDAD
BEIRUT BENGHAZI DAMASCUS JIDDA KHARTOUM LONDON PARIS
NEW DELHI TEL AVIV TRIPOLI UNNUMBEREDUSIA
CIA
OFD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
OCBANNOUNCEMENT WITHDRAWAL BANNER HEADLINED AND ISRAEL ONCE
AGAIN BECOMES TOP STORY. ALL PAPERS FRONTPAGE DULLES MEET-
ING WITH ARAB REPRESENTATIVES AND HIS DENIAL ACCUSATION US
HAS SECRET AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND PLAY PROMINENTLY MEIR,
LODGE, FAWZI AND MENON STATEMENTS RUMANIAN DENUNCIATION US
INCLUDED IN ACCOUNT UN DEBATE.

DCL

AKHBAR OPINES "WITH WITHDRAWAL ISRAEL, UK AND FRANCE HAVE
NOW LOST ALL THEY HOPED TO GAIN BY TRIPARTITE AGRESSION".
AHRAM DECLARES "UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL WAS ONLY POSSIBLE
OUTCOME SINCE EGYPT WAS DETERMINED EXPEL ISRAELIS BY FORCE
HAD EFFORTS SEIRETARY GENERAL AND FRIENDLY NATIONS FAILED,
AND WARNS IN TWO EDITORIALS "IF US HAS REACHED AGREEMENT
WITH ISRAEL EMBODYING CERTAIN CONDITIONS, PROVISOS ARE
BINDING ONLY ON US AND NOT AT ALL ON EGYPT". NOTING "FAITH
PATIENCE AND STUBBORNNESS HAVE FORCED AGGRESSORS OUT",
AKHBAR CALLS ON EGYPTIANS STAND FIRM, OBSERVING "IF YOU
REMAIN STEADFAST AND PATIENT, CANAL PROBLEM WILL BE SOLVED
TO YOUR SATISFACTION AND ECONOMIC BLOCKADE WILL BE BROKEN".
GOMHOURIYA, COMMENTING ON EISENHOWER-MOLLET, MENTION "RIGHT
ALL NATIONS USE CANAL" DECLARES "CANAL IS OPEN TO SHIPPING
OF ALL WORLD, BUT ISRAEL IS NOT STATE OR AT BEST AN ENEMY
STATE. SHE MAY TRY USE CANAL BUT SHE WILL NEVER PASS"
ADDING "1888 CONVENTION ANTEDATES CREATION ISRAEL" AND
"HAD ISRAEL EXISTED THEN, WE WOULD HAVE REFUSED DIG CANAL".

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-2- 2778, MARCH 2. FROM CAIRO.

PROMINENT PLAY GIVEN REPORTS WORLD REACTION TO ARAB LEADERS CONFERENCE, REASSERTIONS BY HUSEIN AND QUWATLEY OF ARAB UNITY AND NEUTRALITY POLICY, AND HASSOUNA RECOMMENDATION AQABA BE SENT WORLD COURT.

MAJORITY EDITORIALS ARE DEVOTED TO PRAISING POLICY POSITIVE NEUTRALITY GOMHOURIYA REITERATION "ARABS WHO SIDED WITH WEST DURING TWO WORLD WARS ONLY TO LOSE EVERYTHING NOW REALIZE POSITIVE NEUTRALITY IS THEIR SALVATION" IS SECONDED BY SHAAB WHICH ADDS "INDIA AND YUGOSLAVIA ARE SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLES WHICH PROVE NEUTRALITY IS POSSIBLE". KASIM GUDA EXPLAINS POSITIVE NEUTRALITY IS NOT "NEUTRALISM OR ISOLATIONISM" NOTING ARABS "CANNOT DISREGARD FRENCH ACTION IN ALGERIA OR NURIS FORCING IRAQ INTO BAGHDAD PACT" BUT THEY HAVE NO INTENTION BECOMING "SATELLITES UK, USSR OR US". KALID MOHIEDDINE CONTRASTS "JUBILANT ARAB REACTION TO ARAB LEADERS' COMMUNIQUE" AND "WELCOME GIVEN IT BY PEACE LOVING NATIONS" TO "LONG FACES OF WESTERN IMPERIALISTS". SHAAB DECLARES "EVENTS WILL TELL WHICH STATES ARE UNDER INFLUENCE ZIONISM AND IMPERIALISM AND WHICH ARE FRIENDLY STATES". MUSTAFA AMIN REASSERTS "COMMUNIQUE IS SEVERE BLOW TO FOREIGN PROPAGANDA WHICH CLAIMED ARABS WERE DIVIDED".

COMMENTING ON RICHARDS MISSION MASAA RECALLS "OUR ECONOMIC LIFE USED TO BE FIRMLY IN WESTERN HANDS" AND OPINES "WHILE WESTERNERS ARE TRYING BE FRIENDLY, PROVE THEIR GOOD INTENTIONS, AND ADVERTISE THEIR POLICY, OUR PEOPLE HAVE FINALLY WAKED UP". HEIKAL DESCRIBING "WAR OF NERVES BEING WAGED AGAINST EGYPT" NOTES "STREAM CABLES WHICH POURED IN WHILE SAUD WAS IN US DESIGNED PROVOKE SPLIT BETWEEN EGYPT AND SAUD" AND REITERATION CLANDESTINE RADIOS' ACCUSATION "EGYPT HAS MORTGAGED HER COTTON TO SOVIETS FOR SEVERAL YEARS TO PAY FOR ARMS" WHICH HEIKAL SAYS IS FALSE AND DESIGNED ONLY "ASCERTAIN HOW MUCH EGYPT PAID SOVIETS".

HARE

MEH

1957 9 17

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FROM: DAMASCUS

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MARCH 3, 1957

8:47 AM

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2003, MARCH 2, 6 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2003, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 228, BAGHDAD 253, BEIRUT 621, CAIRO 268, JIDDA 139.

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NAVY

AIR

DAMASCUS DAILIES MARCH 2 CONTINUE SYRIAN PRESS LINE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BASED ON US-ISRAELI SCHEME BUT SYRIAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM COMMENTARY CONSIDERABLY LESS VIOLENT THAN YESTERDAY.

PRO-SOVIET AL JUMHUR HEADLINES GO FOR MIN MEIR ANNOUNCEMENT WITH "US CALMED ISRAEL" BUT ASKS WHETHER ISRAEL REALLY WILL WITHDRAW AND WHAT IS BEHIND SCHEME. ALSO CARRIES EXCLUSIVE COMPANION ARTICLE ALLEGING NATO WILL SUPPLY ARMS ISRAEL THROUGH TURKEY BOTH PUBLICLY AND SECRETLY. ERRATIC SAWT UL ARAA# DECLARES IN HEADLINES "MEIR REVEAL US-ISRAELI AGREEMENT GUARANTEE FREEDOM NAVIGATION" (ALTHOUGH NEGLECTING SPECIFY WHERE).

SBS COMMENTATRY SAYS (1) MEIRS "TORTUOUS" STATEMENT ON SURFACE APPEARS FOLLOW UN RESOLUTIONS BUT MAY CONCEAL ADDITIONAL AIMS (2) GOE FOR MIN PREVIOUSLY SPECIFIED GOS APPROVES STATIONING UNEF ON BORDERS (3) ISRAEL SIGNIFICANTLY SELECTED FEBRUARY 2 UN RESOLUTIONS FOR REFERENCE AND IGNORED OTHER RESOLUTIONS SO AS RETAIN CHANGE SEEK FURTHER GAINS. GENERAL TONE COMMENTARY WAS GRUDGING APPRECIATION ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PLAN BUT WARNING ARABS MUST BE ON GUARD PROTECT RIGHTS.

MOOSE

JS

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Control: 1203
Rec'd: March 2, 1957
9:48 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Baghdad

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1467, March 2, Noon

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During call I made on Foreign Minister Bashayan this morning, Bashayan expressed deep appreciation of all President and Secretary did to bring about Israeli decision to withdraw from Sharm El Sheikh and Gaza.

GALLMAN

CWD:JCK.1

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1957 MAR 5 AM 11 15

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SENT TO: Amembassy, BAGHDAD

1485

Your
1467

Israel - Withdrawing

On appropriate occasion express gratitude USG for Bashayan's

sympathetic appreciation efforts of President and Secretary.

*Rull
(RULLER'S)*

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NEA:NE:RKSherrwood:md 3/4/57

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NE - Stuart W. Rockwell

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 831, MARCH 2, NOON

FOR WILCOX FROM LODGE

RE PALESTINE - ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

THIS EVENING I ATTENDED THE FRENCH RECEPTION WHERE I SAW MOLLET AND PINEAU. I REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISRAELIS BEGINNING THEIR WITHDRAWAL THIS WEEKEND AND URGED THE FRENCH TO ADVISE THE ISRAELIS AS WE WERE DOING. MOLLET SAID NOTHING, BUT PINEAU SPOKE UP IN A FRIGID VOICE AND SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO. HE SAID THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE TO BE PHASED AND THAT UNEF WAS NOT READY TO MOVE IN. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD UNEF WAS IN A POSITION TO MOVE IN BUT THAT IN ANY CASE PLANS SHOULD BE SET IN MOTION FOR WITHDRAWALS AND ARRIVALS. PINEAU SAID THAT HE DIDNT THINK SO.

I LEFT MOLLET AND PINEAU AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER PINEAU CAME UP TO ME AND SAID THAT MY SPEECH THIS AFTERNOON WAS DIFFERENT FROM WHAT THEY EXPECTED. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS THE KIND OF THING WHICH MADE FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS BAD.

I ASKED IF HE HAD BEEN SHOWN A COPY OF MY SPEECH. HE SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN A COPY IN WASHINGTON AND THEN JUST BEFORE THE MEETNG A TELETYPE COPY OF MY SPEECH HAD BEEN SENT TO HIM FROM WASHINGTON AND HE WAS FOLLOWING IT AS I SPOKE. HE SAID HE WAS WITH OTHERS AND WAS EMBARRASSED HAVING SHOWN THEM WHAT HAD BEEN PURPORTED TO BE THE US STATEMENT AND THEN HAD FOUND IT WAS DIFFERENT ON DELIVERY.

I SAID I THOUGHT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGES IN MEANING. IF ANYTHING HAD CHANGED IT WAS MERELY A MATTER OF TONE. ALPHAND, WHO WAS PRESENT, AGREED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGES IN

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-2- DELGA 831, MARCH 2, NOON FROM NEW YORK

MEANING, BUT THE CHANGES THAT HAD OCCURRED HAD UPSET MRS. MEIR CONSIDERABLY. PINEAU AND ALPHAND BOTH SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD OF COURSE THAT THE CHANGES IN THE TEXT HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED IN WASHINGTON.

BY THIS TIME THE FRENCH SEEMED TO HAVE GOT THEIR FEELINGS WORKED OUT AND I SAID THAT I STILL THOUGHT THEY OUGHT TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO BEGIN WITHDRAWAL THIS WEEKEND, SINCE IN THE ABSENCE OF SOME MOVE ON THE ISRAELIS PART, A VERY BAD SITUATION COULD DEVELOP AND MAKE DIFFICULT ALL THAT WE HAD HOPED TO ACCOMPLISH.

ALPHAND THEN TALKED TO EBAN AND AFTER HIS CONVERSATION TOLD ME HE BELIEVED THAT EBAN WOULD TRY TO GET SOMETHING DONE.

THIS INCIDENT DEMONSTRATES HOW UNDESIRABLE IT IS TO CIRCULATE ADVANCE TEXTS OF STATEMENTS TO BE DELIVERED HERE PARTICULARLY BEFORE MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE DEPT CONCERNING THE TEXT HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED. IT HAS BEEN STANDARD PROCEDURE FOR 4 YEARS FOR ALL TEXTS TO BE GIVEN A LAST MINUTE REVISION IN THE LIGHT OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION HERE. TO SHOW A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT A TEXT WHICH IN FACT IS NOT FINAL MAKES A GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLE AND ACCOMPLISHES NOTHING THAT IS GOOD. I HOPE DEPT WILL AVOID THIS IN THE FUTURE.

LODGE

JS

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MAR 11 1957

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1957 MAR 2 PM 6 08

SENT TO: Amembassy Tel Aviv NIACT 835

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

VERBATIME TEXT

67484a

Origin

Info:

Please deliver immediately to Prime Minister following message
from President. Pursuant arrangements made with Ambassador Eban, text
will be released midnight Washington time March 2:

Begin Verbatime Text

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I was indeed deeply gratified at the decision of your Government to
withdraw promptly and fully behind the Armistice lines as set out by your
Foreign Minister in her address of yesterday to the General Assembly. I
venture to express the hope that the carrying out of these withdrawals will go
forward with the utmost speed.

I know that this decision was not an easy one. I believe, however, that
Israel will have no cause to regret having thus conformed to the strong
sentiment of the world community as expressed in the various United Nations
Resolutions relating to withdrawal.

It has always been the view of this Government that after the withdrawal
there should be a united effort by all of the nations to bring about conditions

~~In the event of a breakdown in the armistice, the Government of the United States will continue to support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about a permanent and just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.~~

Drafted by: S JFDulles:ma

3/2/57

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S JFDulles

Clearances:

U Herter
L Phleger

NEA Rountree

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
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in the area more stable, more tranquil, and more conducive to the general welfare than those which existed heretofore. Already the United Nations ~~General~~ General Assembly has adopted Resolutions which presage such a better future. Hopes and expectations based thereon were voiced by your Foreign Minister and others. I believe that it is reasonable to entertain such hopes and expectations and I want you to know that the United States, as a friend of all of the countries of the area and as a loyal member of the United Nations, will seek that such hopes prove not to be vain.

I am, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower END VERBATIM TEXT



" DULLES "

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March 2, 1957

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1/30/59

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#10 S/S Presidential File

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3/18/57

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Mr. Harold L. Skean

(Date)

(Top Secret Control Officer)

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6/15/59

Barbara Carnahan

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1957 MAR 4 11 9 32

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FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

Following is the message from the President to
Prime Minister Ben Gurion of March 2:

QUOTE

(Code Room: Please repeat 835 to Tel
Aviv, Control 1007)

UNQUOTE

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DULLES

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S/S:FHowe:jmr

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IO ✓ Copy # 1

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NEA ✓ #2

U/OP (Higgs)

(Richards)

Re: *Ben Harrison*
on *Suez*

Category B
Aw

President

Stassen

Jackson

CIA

2-10 *Ins. Testimony*
1/30/59
RHaw

ICA

USIA

USUN-Lodge

SEC DEFENSE

ISA

JCS

OTHER: *48 Ins file*

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M-545

Number 4 of 4

6 pages

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET

Memorandum of Conversation

1442

DATE: March 2, 1957
Secretary's Home
2:25 p.m.

1443
1444

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Israeli Minister

The Secretary
U - Christian A. Herter
L - Herman Phleger

COPIES TO: NEA - William M. Rountree

COPIES TO: S/S, NEA(2), NE(2), IO, C, G, L, R, USUN, Amembassies TEL AVIV, CAIRO

Ambassador Eban said he had been in touch with Jerusalem at 3 a.m. and again had telephoned from the airport just before the meeting. The text of the United States statement at the United Nations had been misunderstood, and there was something of a political crisis going on in Israel. He had therefore come to see how to remove this misunderstanding. It was the feeling of his Government that Mrs. Meir's statement of Friday had taken into account every American suggestion, the text having passed through the closest scrutiny by the Secretary and his associates. Israel thought it had had reason to believe that speech would evoke a corresponding American statement. The first point of concern to his government with respect to Ambassador Lodge's speech was fundamental. It had been hoped that our endorsement of the legitimacy of the assumptions stated by Israel would be wholehearted, and Ambassador Lodge's indication only that the hopes and expectations expressed by Mrs. Meir were "for the most part not unreasonable" had caused considerable difficulty. He cited the positive statement of the French as being more in line with what the Israelis had expected.

Continuing, the Ambassador said that from the Israeli viewpoint the crux of the proposal, in defining the United Nations' functions, was to extract from the Secretary General's report of February 22 only certain portions and omit that part which said or implied the arrangement would depend upon the sufferance of Egypt. They had intentionally refrained from speaking of the dependency upon Egypt of the arrangement, and that was extremely important to Israel. In Ambassador Lodge's speech, however, this had lost its value since he had enlarged the quotation and had placed the United Nations function in the context of Egyptian consent. This, the Ambassador felt, had taken the crux out of the whole plan, since it had put forth Egypt as the source of authority.

The Ambassador recognized that there was a controversy between Israel and the United States regarding the Armistice Agreement. His government was disturbed, however, that in his speech Ambassador Lodge had referred to the Armistice Agreement as the context within which the arrangement should be made. Also, he said,

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it had been understood that the United States would make it clear that if, after Israel had withdrawn, a situation should arise which threatened peace and tranquility, the United States would take action "within and without the United Nations". Ambassador Lodge had stated only that the United States would act within the United Nations. The Ambassador complained that this represented a change which, if the Israelis had known was planned, they would have resisted.

The Secretary interjected that what Mr. Lodge had said in lieu of the phrase "within and without the United Nations" ^{was} reported incorrectly in the New York Times, and that Ambassador Eban's comments apparently were based on that inaccurate version. Mr. Lodge had in fact altered the wording somewhat to get away from a phrase used in the Tripartite Declaration, but there had been no change in substance. He quoted the text correctly, which made it clear that under the circumstances mentioned the United States would consult with other members of the United Nations to determine what action they or the United Nations should take.

Summing up, the Ambassador said that his Government had been disturbed by the lack of forthrightness in the American endorsement of the Israeli position; by divergences regarding Gaza between what had been said by Ambassador Lodge and what had been agreed; by wording which had involved Egypt in the responsibility for the administration of Gaza; and by the fact that Ambassador Lodge brought in the Armistice Agreement in connection with a Gaza settlement. He felt the sensitive balance for his Government had been adversely affected. He might have been wrong in not having asked for more assurances regarding United States' support for the Israeli speech. He had subjected the text of the Israeli speech to scrupulous United States review. From what we had told him, he had gained the impression that there was nothing in the Israeli speech which would not have a United States counterpart, and he had assumed that the American statement would not take up any subjects which had not been discussed. He felt the situation might endanger what had been accomplished, and proposed that the United States try to help overcome the problem thus created.

Responding the Secretary stated that Ambassador Lodge's speech was basically what he had shown Ambassador Eban on the evening of February 28. Mr. Eban had glanced through it and had thought it was all right. He had a copy of the draft which the Ambassador had seen and had checked it carefully against the text delivered by Ambassador Lodge and against the memorandum discussed among the Israeli, French and American officials. There was not in this early draft an expression regarding the hopes and expectations stated by Israel. In his letter delivered after the Ambassador had seen the text, Mr. Eban had asked that something be said to the effect that the hopes and expectations in the Israeli statement were legitimate, or reasonable, or something of that sort. Certainly what Ambassador Lodge said was "something of that sort". The phrase "for the most part" in Ambassador Lodge's statement did not qualify the "not unreasonable". While the negative might have been avoided, the Secretary felt that Mr. Lodge's statement had adequately met Ambassador Eban's request. The Secretary repeated that we had not omitted the substance of the wording which had been agreed upon regarding United States consultation with other Nations as to action to be taken if the situation should break down following the Israeli withdrawal. The only reason for any change was to get away from the wording of the Tripartite Declaration.

Concerning

Concerning Ambassador Eban's complaint that the Armistice Agreement was mentioned in Ambassador Lodge's speech, the Secretary pointed out that such a reference had been included in the draft which the Ambassador had seen. The Secretary had written in pencil "within the framework of the Armistice Agreement" as something to be picked up in the next draft. The Ambassador knew, the Secretary said, our view with respect to the Armistice Agreement, and recognized that there was a difference of opinion between us. We believed that the Armistice Agreement, unless formally removed, provided the legal framework for any action, and without the Armistice Agreement we could not call for the non-belligerency of the parties and endorse the Israeli right of free passage through the Straits as a non-belligerent. The Secretary could not accept the proposition that Ambassador Lodge's statement was a derogation of what he thought was the understanding. Perhaps Ambassador Eban should have gone over the draft more completely. Ambassador Lodge, he commented, has had difficulties of a slightly different character from those of the Secretary, since Mr. Lodge was working largely with the Arabs and the Secretary was carrying out close consultation with Israel. He thought that perhaps one of the reasons for the Israeli concern might have been that Ambassador Lodge, in delivering his speech, spoke more emphatically regarding points which would satisfy the Arabs; that, however, was a matter of inflection and represented no departure from the text. Only at the end of the speech did Ambassador Lodge add anything not in the text, which otherwise conformed with what was prepared in Washington. The Secretary repeated that the only change of importance was related to the phrase "within or without the United Nations", and he did not feel that was an important change. He considered it was a matter of extreme importance that Israel go forward with the implementation of the decision announced on Friday, and said he would be pleased to receive the Ambassador's present views on that subject.

The Ambassador commented, in connection with the Secretary's reference to his having seen a draft of Mr. Lodge's speech, that he had not understood he was being invited carefully to study the text, and of course he did not have time to consult his Government. The Secretary responded that he had not thought there was anything in the text not in harmony with what had been discussed.

Ambassador Eban stated that in view of the detailed discussions which had been held, he recognized that Israel was not entitled to anything beyond that already agreed. The question was what could be done within that context. He wondered whether some way might be found to express the thought that the United States welcomed Israeli assurances regarding full and prompt withdrawal, and to state our understanding that Israel intended to implement this decision forthwith through a meeting with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations forces. The statement might then recall the efforts of the United States, notably the dispatch of the Aide Memoire of February 11, to the end that prompt withdrawal would be carried out; refer to the Israeli assumptions; and state positively that those assumptions were reasonable and valid in the light of previous actions by the General Assembly. It might be said specifically that the United States believed that ships of all nations, including Israel, had the right of free passage through the Straits, and that in the United States view the United Nations should carry out the responsibility for the administration of Gaza until a settlement was reached. The statement might point out that this view appeared to be shared by others, and that Israel should place its faith in the United Nations and the determination of friends of justice in implementing with great speed its decision to withdraw.

to withdraw. Two points would be extremely valuable: an affirmative rather than a negative statement with respect to Israel's hopes and expectations, and a definitive statement of the United States view that the United Nations should administer Gaza until there was a settlement.

The Ambassador referred again to the fact that the Secretary General in his statement of February 22 had referred to the Egyptian element with respect to the responsibility for Gaza, and this appeared to have been endorsed by the United States in Ambassador Lodge's statement. Inclusion of the whole quotation from the Secretary General's report had weakened the Israeli position.

The Secretary said he did not see how the arrangement for the United Nations forces and administration could be made without Egyptian acquiescence, and he did not want to give the impression that he thought otherwise. He had grounds to hope that the prior consent given by Egypt to the Secretary General would not be withdrawn, but of course he had no assurance that Egypt's consent would go on indefinitely. He did not know how we could destroy the Armistice Agreement in that respect, and he did not want to imply that we could. He had considerable doubts concerning the desirability of trying to rewrite Ambassador Lodge's speech. He did not feel that we could or should give any unpublicized assurances to Israel. We had found a very great deal of suspicion that there had been secret understandings and our influence in the United Nations in this matter and our ability to be helpful to Israel depended upon our being able to dissipate suspicions of this sort. The Arabs would be furious, and others would sympathize with them, if it were thought that secret arrangements had been made. What we both wanted was, in fact, to bring about the conditions which Ambassador Eban had described with respect to passage through the Straits and de facto United Nations presence in Gaza. The best way to do this, he thought, was to have Egypt realize that we could not challenge its rights under the Armistice Agreement but that we sought an arrangement whereby Egypt would waive those rights in favor of the United Nations. If we should try to override what we believed to be Egyptian rights, then any acquiescence would disappear. We thought certain aspects of Ambassador Lodge's speech which Ambassador Eban did not like were in fact aspects which would do most to give the Israelis what they wanted, if what they wanted was to have peace. If Israel desired the arrangement to collapse-- and there was suspicion on the part of some, not including ourselves, that either Israel or the Arabs or both desired this -- the best way to cause a collapse would be to insist upon the proposition that Egypt had no rights in the Gaza area. Some people thought that what Israel was endeavoring to do was to obtain a General Assembly adjournment on the basis of undertaking to withdraw, and then delay that withdrawal without the disadvantages of the General Assembly being in session to invoke sanctions. The Secretary felt that if Israel did not move with the greatest urgency, and was not prepared on Monday to demonstrate that concrete progress had been made, great trouble would arise. He felt that the Assembly would not adjourn until the Israelis had in fact moved out, since some delegations feared that what was involved was a "stalling operation". The Secretary thought that the matter could be worked out satisfactorily but, as he had already said, Israel must take some risks. The United States would do all it could to see that the United Nations continued in Gaza, but there could be no guarantees in this regard.

The Ambassador commented that he would not suggest a secret arrangement, and that whatever was done must conform to what had been said between the two governments. It might be possible to find some way of saying publicly that the Israeli hopes and expectations were reasonable, rather than "not unreasonable".

While the Secretary did not himself see any difference between the two, he was willing to consider this. Mr. Shiloah said he did not suggest rewriting Ambassador Lodge's speech, but perhaps a statement might be made saying in different words some of the things in that speech.

At this point the Secretary and his associates withdrew so that Ambassador Eban and Mr. Shiloah might consider the type of statement which they felt would be helpful. When the discussion was resumed, Ambassador Eban showed the Secretary the draft. The Secretary expressed doubt regarding the wisdom of issuing such a statement. He said the President had in mind sending to Prime Minister Ben Gurion today an expression of his gratification that Israel had decided to withdraw. That might be an occasion to express in general terms our hopes for the area and our belief that Israel was not unjustified in relying on the resoluteness of the friends of justice, using words similar to those employed in previous statements. This would, of course, be very general but it might be helpful.

Ambassador Eban thought that the framework for a further American expression would be very good. He wondered whether the President might make some reference to Mrs. Meir's speech, and say that the President considered her statements reasonable and just in the light of prior action by the General Assembly. The President would not be bound in such a letter to use the same terms as those employed by Ambassador Lodge.

At this point the Secretary left the group to draft the text of the proposed communication from the President. Upon his return he showed the text to Ambassador Eban and Mr. Shiloah. After minor modifications were agreed, Ambassador Eban expressed the view that the proposed letter would be extremely helpful. It was arranged that the Ambassador would telegraph the text informally prior to its formal delivery by Ambassador Lawson. Arrangements were made for its release to the press with an embargo until 12 midnight. The Secretary said that if the letter were sent he did not want to make a statement along the lines proposed by Ambassador Eban.

Ambassador Eban asked if the Secretary had given any thought as to what would happen Monday at the General Assembly. He had hoped that the session would end, and expressed concern regarding the prospects for a continuation of the debate.

The Secretary replied that the principal question was whether the Israelis would in fact withdraw. Today there were rumors that the government would reverse its decision of Friday, and such rumors were of course not helpful. He felt that the United Nations members must have an indication of irrevocable steps being taken by Israel to withdraw before adjournment of the General Assembly. The Secretary had himself no doubt that Israel would carry out its commitment; however most delegations did not share that confidence. Their doubts were to a considerable degree based upon mistrust of Israel's motives.

The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador had heard of the current Tass reports purporting to set forth secret agreements made between Israel and the United States. The communists were saying that the United States had agreed to give Israel \$125 million, and Israel had agreed to provide American military bases in that country. That was why the Secretary had arranged a meeting with the Arab Ambassadors, during the course of which he had denied that any unpublicized arrangements had been made. It was obvious that the Soviet Union was playing a vicious game, and did not want a settlement since it believed that

by keeping the waters troubled it could gain in the area.

The Ambassador expressed the view that the Soviets did not want a war in the Middle East, but at the same time did not want peace. Mr. Shiloah felt that the Soviets sought an equal position in the area and would settle for arrangements such as USSR-US control over a Suez board. The Secretary had no doubt that the Soviets had some such an arrangement in mind, at least as a possibility. He said that in London Shepilov had sought something like a US-Soviet condominium over the area. He referred to the great and historical ambitions of the Soviets with respect to the Middle East.

Reverting to the President's letter to Prime Minister Ben Gurion, Ambassador Eban expressed the hope that Ambassador Lawson could, in delivering the message, say orally in reply to a question from Ben Gurion, that the United States accepted the Israeli formulation regarding its rights to act in self defense.

Mr. Phleger thought it important that any discussions of this matter should be between Ambassador Eban and the Department in Washington rather than by Ambassador Lawson with the Government of Israel. The Secretary agreed and said if Ambassador Eban wished to write a letter stating what he proposed we would be glad to reply.

Concluding the discussion, Ambassador Eban thanked the Secretary for his continued efforts and said that he would press for prompt action on withdrawal. Mr. Shiloah observed that it would take time actually to effect a withdrawal, particularly from the Sharm el-Sheikh area, which was a long distance from Israel or the UNEF. The Secretary pointed out that UNEF forces were in the general vicinity, and he thought they could be placed in the area without substantial delay. Ambassador Eban expressed the hope that he would be able to announce on Monday that there had been a firm agreement on the schedule for the withdrawal and the United Nations takeover.

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Department of State

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Control: 1803
Rec'd: March 4, 1957
10:12 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1019, March 3, 1 p.m.

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1

PRIORITY

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

DEPTEL 835 received here at 8:10 a.m. local time today March 3.
Foreign Ministry immediately informed and I have appointment
to deliver communication to Ben Gurion at 4:30 this afternoon.

Full text of President's letter published in this morning's
JERUSALEM POST.

LAWSON

CWD

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

4/3/

Mr. Howe

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sent to the White House?

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jmr

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6/15/59 Harold L. Skean

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Department of State

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Control: 1519
Rec'd: March 3, 1957
4:44 p.m.

Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1021, March 3, 9 p.m.

1

NIACT

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

Re DEPTTEL 835.

I delivered President's letter to Ben Gurion at his Jerusalem residence at 4:30 local time this afternoon. He told me that on basis of his previous knowledge of contents he had already instructed Eban to request one more appointment with Secretary tonight and hoped that conversation, if appointment granted, would give him basis for decision and reply to President well before GA reconvenes Monday.

He said he very much wanted "little more on Gaza"; something that would give him confidence to face his Cabinet tomorrow and Israel at large later in day. It would not matter, he said, if he could not make it public; if it were just something that would reassure him in taking step that was very critical one for Israel. "Will we have right", he asked, "if there is renewal of trouble originating in Gaza to defend ourselves according to charter or will we be blamed as in past?"

We talked about 30 minutes in what was largely his review of GA proceedings. Ambassador Lodge's speech he said had been very bitter surprise. "It was not as we had reason to expect -- there were surprises of omission and commission. Certainly something in it had been changed at last minute and it was French who said what I had hoped to hear from you. I don't know what was changed but let us hope it can be cleared up in time".

He said his troubles would have been great enough even if Lodge had said what GOI had every reason to hope he would. Public which is emotionally greatly exercised about withdrawal would have been upset at decision to withdraw even if Assembly proceedings had gone as Ben Gurion had anticipated. But he thought he could have defended decision and public disgruntlement would have

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Tel Aviv 1021

674.842/3-357

-2- 1021, March 3, 9 p.m., from Tel Aviv

would have dissolved as ships began to move through Aqaba and tranquility Gaza border settlements had enjoyed since Sinai continued. "Gaza is not political issue, but deeply human question. I cannot persuade my people I am making right decision if Lodge's reference to armistice agreements, which means simply Egypt can come back, is last word on subject".

I expressed appreciation of difficulty persuading his people that this decision was wise one. I told him that whole act was based on confidence and assured him such confidence was justified. He could be certain that Secretary meant whatever he had told Eban, even if it had not been announced in that form at UN. He agreed but added, "under most favorable reading of our circumstances, it is still wholly matter of confidence on our part. We would have had no real guarantees even if Lodge's speech had been as we hoped".

Ben Gurion plans to see his Cabinet early Monday, hoping at that time to have encouraging report from Eban. In afternoon he will announce his decision to Knesset which generally meets Monday afternoon in any case, but which tomorrow of course will devote session to this matter.

He was obviously very pleased with President's intervention at this stage and said with sincerity I found convincing that he "shares President's hope we will be able to withdraw and that things will be better in future. His words that he believes 'Israel will have no cause to regret' mean a very great deal to us".

Comment: Ben Gurion and I talked in completely relaxed atmosphere. He was in calm, philosophical mood but nevertheless fully expected lively battle with his Cabinet tomorrow. He is, I believe, prepared to see Achdut Avod and Mapam bolt (EMBTel 1020) and not concerned if anything Secretary may tell Eban is sufficient to reassure him he is not making bad mistake. It would not even be necessary to divulge such reassurance to others. I think he wants to withdraw without further delay but feels that Ambassador Lodge's speech should not stand on record as our last word on Gaza.

LAWSON

AB:BAG/8

Note: Mr. Blood (SS-DO) notified 5:10 p.m., 3/3/57

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TEL AVIV

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address by

Ben Muriel's views
~~on~~ re Pres. message
on Suez

Category C

Day

1021

March 3, 1957

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Autograph 2/2/57

Pitole

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#10 S/S Presidential File

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 4, 1957

THE SECRETARY

I recommend that the White House receive a copy.

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Fisher Howe

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7

SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

1444

VR 1442

DATE: March 3, 1957 1443
Secretary's Home
6:40 p.m.

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal

MAR 8 1957

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Israeli MinisterThe Secretary
U - Christian A. Herter
NEA - William M. Rountree

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13-15

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Ambassador Eban said he could describe the position of his Government more definitively than yesterday. The Prime Minister would like tomorrow to complete the arrangements for withdrawal. He planned to carry the matter through the Government and Parliament in the morning, to arrange a meeting between the Israeli Chief of Staff and General Burns "to finalize everything during the early part of the day, and to be prepared for the Israeli representatives to make an announcement in the General Assembly during the afternoon, New York time. The Prime Minister had asked whether, on this basis, the United States would be willing to help in one more respect. Carrying the program through the Government and Parliament would be very difficult. The Prime Minister would, however, be able to overcome these difficulties if he had an "inner-conviction" regarding the American attitude in certain respects. He wanted to know, in order to facilitate his efforts, whether we understood each other fully with respect to Gaza. If Egypt, while in a state of war with Israel, were to return to Gaza and thus recreate conditions set forth in Mrs. Meir's statement, Israel would be prepared to act in defense of its rights. The Ambassador hoped that we would be able to understand this position. This would not involve a public statement on our part. The Secretary had indicated last night that if the Ambassador wrote a letter setting forth Israel's position regarding its intentions to act under Article 51 to defend its right of transit of the Straits, he would consider replying to the letter. Perhaps, the Ambassador said, a similar arrangement could be made with the United States taking full cognizance of what the Israelis said with respect to Gaza. In her speech Mrs. Meir had said, on the basis of the arrangements worked out with Mr. Pineau and the Secretary, that Israel reserved its right to act under Article 51 if conditions in Gaza should impose a threat. The problem was whether we

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understood

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understood each other regarding the circumstances in which Israel would act. His Government believed that such a situation calling for Israeli action would be created if the United Nations abandoned Gaza and Egypt should return. His Government would like to say to us that in such a case of a premature breakdown of the United Nations in Gaza, and a return of a belligerent Egypt, Israel would be justified in considering that rights of defense would become operative. He did not know how exactly Israel would protect its rights, but it would expect to be able to act effectively. This matter had been discussed with Mr. Mollet in Canada by the Israeli Ambassador there. Mr. Mollet had suggested a text which in his opinion would be consistent with the original suggestion discussed in Washington.

The Ambassador showed the Secretary the text of the Mollet proposal. He said it is not intended that the statement be public and that it would not necessarily be formally submitted, but a similar statement from the United States on an informal and personal basis would give the Prime Minister the feeling that we had not misunderstood each other.

As to the form, the Ambassador said he might address himself to the Secretary concerning the statements made by Mrs. Meir and state the determination of the Israeli Government to protect its rights regarding shipping through the Straits of Aqaba. He might go on with regard to Gaza and spell out that the occupation by Egypt of Gaza would place into operation Israel's rights to act. He would request the United States to take cognizance of that policy declaration. The basis of the proposal was that there was not a feeling, especially after the Friday General Assembly session, that Israel was producing a situation in which Egypt would not move back, and the Israeli Government would like to make it clear that in fact such a situation preventing the Egyptian return had been created. The Prime Minister's feeling was that the Aqaba problem was of greater importance to Israel in the future, and he believed that the arrangements made with respect to Aqaba were adequate. On the other hand, although the Gaza problem was of less importance in the long run, it evoked much stronger feelings particularly among the people in the general area. It was therefore urgent to obtain some recognition of Israeli rights of self-defense in the Gaza, even though this might be on a confidential basis. His Government hoped that it would be possible to effect a speedy withdrawal. If things went well it was the expectation that arrangements would be completed before the Monday General Assembly meeting.

The Secretary observed that the United Nations already had assumed that the departure would be prompt, based upon what Mrs. Meir said on Friday. Unless there were a concrete move, the situation would deteriorate very rapidly. Mrs. Meir had stated her Government proposed that a meeting be held immediately with the United Nations Commander with regard to withdrawals from both Aqaba and Gaza.

The Ambassador said that four members of the Cabinet had voted against the plan, which had created a considerable problem. If the parties which they represented took a strong position in the Parliament, a real difficulty might be involved, and that could bring about new elections.

The Secretary

The Secretary observed that if he understood the Ambassador clearly he was suggesting that we acquiesce at least in the Israeli position that termination of the United Nations' exclusive control in Gaza, both civil and military, would in itself be a cause for action by Israel. The Ambassador interposed that this would be true only if it were at a time, as at present, when Egypt considered itself to be at war with Israel. Continuing, the Secretary said that while it might be said that if Egypt should return that would involve threats to Israel such as those which existed before, he did not think we would from a juridical standpoint be entitled to make such an assumption. What Mrs. Meir had said was that if conditions were created which would threaten Israel, then Israel would be entitled to act. It would not be our view that Israel would have such rights merely because Egypt occupied territory which under the Armistice Agreement Egypt was entitled to occupy. One might consider that to be a threat, but he did not as a legal proposition agree that the mere fact of occupation would give rise to a claim that Israel was threatened to the extent that it was entitled to take action. We of course did not want Egypt to exercise its legal rights and move back in the Gaza. We had said that we would try to obtain a continuation of a situation in which the United Nations would carry responsibility for the administration of Gaza. We had some influence in the matter, and there were various ways in which that influence might be exerted. We did not think, however, that our influence would be effective if we should maintain that merely because Egypt exercised certain rights it has under the agreement that would give rise to the use of force to oust Egypt. This, the Secretary said, involved a difficult problem of determining how long Israel would have to wait after the return of Egypt, and of how imminent the danger must be, before there was the right of defense. Israel took the view that any Egyptian participation in Gaza would carry a threat. On the basis of past experience that was not surprising, but it was not a conclusion to which we would come.

Mr. Shiloah said the Secretary had previously stated that Egypt, for various reasons, was not keen on returning to Gaza. For all practical purposes they might not be keen, although there were perhaps political and prestige reasons why they might feel that they should go back. If they did make an effort to restore their position in Gaza, he would assume that their motives would be evil. The Secretary responded that while they might be evil, they probably would be motivated first by questions of national prestige, which any of us were prone to be.

The Ambassador said perhaps a new formulation could be agreed. He asked whether the Secretary would regard the Israeli safeguards as coming into effect not only upon the return of Egypt but upon the recreation of conditions which would threaten Israel's security, using the words in Mrs. Meir's statement. The Secretary said that even that would be an over-simplification.

There were

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- 4 -

There were many variations, and it would be difficult to say exactly what our position would be in the many contingencies which might arise. It might be, for example, that an Egyptian return to Gaza would be accompanied by so many bellicose statements that Israel might feel justified in acting without waiting to be struck first. We would not want to set ourselves up as arbiters to say how long Israel should wait before taking action. On the other hand if the Egyptian return were merely for prestige reasons, and involved no large numbers of Egyptians, clearly there would be no such rights on the part of Israel. This situation simply did not lend itself to an expression of opinion in advance. He thought that Israel would be much better off to let the matter stand as at present. He thought it essential to the integrity of the United States position that we be able to state that we had not given any secret assurances or guarantees to Israel. We could honestly state that now, and must keep it that way. He did not think that any public statement which we could make would make it easier for Israel to withdraw, and perhaps with the qualifications which we have to impose it would make it more difficult. The United States could not assume the position of being the guardian of Israel's right and he did not think Israel wished to put us in that position. Any statement which we made would lack any binding effect and would serve to confuse rather than clarify the situation. The matter should be left to stand as it was. If, after completion of the withdrawal, Israel wished to ask us questions about any such matters, we would consider making replies, although even then we would not want to work too much on a hypothetical basis. We knew what the Israelis wanted and they knew what we wanted. Surely we both understood that there was no guarantee that things would happen as we would like. We would try, but if the situation should not develop according to our wishes and Israel should feel itself threatened, Israel had unilaterally reserved its freedom of action. He did not think that Israel could be any better off than that in the circumstances.

The Ambassador said he would of course have to accept the Secretary's position. He wondered whether the situation might be looked at in this broader context? The Israeli representative had made a statement in the General Assembly; the American representative said he had taken note and commented that the Israeli hopes and expectations were not unreasonable. The Ambassador wondered whether he could address a letter to the Secretary saying that he attached great importance to two specified aspects of Mrs. Meir's statement, which would be quoted along with parts of Ambassador Lodge's statement. The Secretary would reply that he had taken note of what Mrs. Meir had said in this specific regard.

In response to the Secretary's question as to what he thought about the suggestion, Mr. Mountree said he was concerned with the implications of a further exchange along these lines. The fact that part of the statements

made by

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- 5 -

made by Mrs. Meir and Ambassador Loeb had been extracted from their total context and were the subject of a special exchange between the Israeli and United States Governments would undoubtedly lead to widespread speculation as to their import.

The Secretary told Ambassador Eban that he would consider the matter. He felt that no time should be lost in this respect, however. He was afraid that if the withdrawal was not well underway before the General Assembly met on Monday, Arab representatives would make statements to the effect that the Israeli assumptions were unjustified and unacceptable. If that should happen, the Israeli position would be much weaker than if they proceeded with the withdrawal program under the assumptions which had not been knocked down. The Israeli position would be stronger if they could proceed on the basis of the statements made and which up to the time of the announced withdrawal had not been denounced.

It was agreed that the Ambassador would immediately prepare the text of the letter which he would like to send to the Secretary asking that the United States take note of the specific statements made by Mrs. Meir. He would then consider whether he felt it would be possible or useful to reply along the lines requested. The Ambassador said he would return to the Embassy and send back a draft promptly for the Secretary's consideration.

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Control:

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NEA

Rec'd:

March 4, 1957

Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

7:28 a.m.

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1022, March 4, 2 p.m.

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Foreign Ministry official telephoned Embassy at 1:00 p.m. local time to say Ben Gurion has decided to withdraw, and Dayan has been instructed meet Burns earliest opportunity to discuss details. He has already cabled Burns asking for meeting.

Official added that while decision will be announced this afternoon, Ben Gurion's address to Knesset, earlier scheduled for today, has been postponed until tomorrow.

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CWD:DMB

Note: Miss Aldrich (NEA) notified 3/4/8:13 a.m. EMB (CWO)

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1025, March 4, 6 p.m.

PRIORITY

Re EMBTEL 1022.

Foreign Ministry held press conference at 2:00 p.m. to inform them that Chief of Staff Dayan had been ordered "to launch a full and prompt withdrawal from Gaza and Sharm E-Sheikh" and to work out technicalities with Burns as soon as possible.

Press was also informed that Prime Minister had been motivated by encouragement contained in President's letter and "an act of faith in international community".

Reliable press sources told Embassy that Cabinet crisis was deepening this afternoon with Achdut Avoda and MAPAM determined to throw every obstacle to favorable consideration government's position Knesset debate tomorrow.

Dayan hoped to meet Burns at Lydia airport 4:30 p.m. local time but he was "somewhere in Sinai" and it was not (repeat not) certain he would be reached in time.

Following items supplied about 1:30 p.m. local time on informal basis by Foreign Ministry official who has not (repeat not) yet called back to verify them:

1. Ben Gurion's decision to withdraw was taken by him without Cabinet unanimity. There are rumors of some dissent even in ranks of MAPAI Cabinet Members. It is speculated that to preserve coalition Ben Gurion might permit left-wing partners to abstain from supporting vote on statement to Knesset but would force them out of coalition if they tried to abstain on no-confidence motion by opposition parties.

2. Ben Gurion's postponement of presentation decision to Knesset until Tuesday was because he is "greatly fatigued" and

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2:58 p.m.

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- 1025, March 4, 6 p.m., from Tel Aviv

and needs additional time to prepare his statement.

3. However, GOI UNDEL will present it fully to GA today.

4. Herut is pressing hard for Knesset debate and there was outside possibility government would yield to demands before end of day (which in Knesset affairs means midnight local time).

5. Official assessed secretary's reply to Eban on Gaza (details of which not (repeat not) yet known to Embassy) as "a little something" but much less than Ben Gurion had hoped for.

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MEJ:BAG/14

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58-52
Action

Control: 2677

Rec'd: March 5, 1957
10:49 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1026, March 4, 11 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1026 REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 175. CAIRO 177, BEIRUT 159, DAMASCUS 124, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

Over weekend press reported six separate infiltrator incidents in Negev with six infiltrators killed by Israeli security forces. Three incidents occurred in western Negev.

1. Midnight February 28 Israeli patrol intercepted two infiltrators near Nahal Oz coming from Jordan and "heading for Gaza strip." One infiltrator killed; one escaped.

2. IDF patrol same night met five armed infiltrators southeast Ofakim CFV also reportedly moving from Jordan to Gaza strip. All five infiltrators killed after refusing stop. Submachine gun, rifle, and donkey-load ammunition recovered.

3. February 28 and barley fields harvested near Kishufim by infiltrators from Gaza area.

In eastern Negev incidents reported include.

1. February 28 tractor driver and field workers near Ein Gedi attacked by infiltrators from Jordan. Three camels belonging to tractor driver killed in fire fight.

2. Armed Israeli youth on hiking trip near Ein Gedi March 3 attacked by three marauders whom he successfully fought off.

3. Truck driver attacked March 3 between Mitzpe Ramon and Beer Menuha by infiltrators from Jordan. Truck damaged but driver escaped.

Comment: Sudden rash of infiltrator reports would in normal times attract considerable press comment and concern. Straight factual treatment accorded these incidents can only be attributed to overwhelming preoccupation press and public with Israel withdrawal from Sharm E-Sheikh and Gaza.

Embassy Attache was told this morning by IDF intelligence officers

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-2- 1026, March 4, 11 p.m. from Tel Aviv

that they see increasing movement of Arab infiltrators to and from Gaza -- possibly in anticipation Israel withdrawal (activity reported Damascus 1980 to Department may be indirectly related).

Although press does not (repeat not) emphasize them, there are reports of continuing protest meetings in Negev border settlements against withdrawal from Gaza area, and this activity is no (repeat no) doubt reinforced by continuing infiltration reports.

LAWSON

MS:GEV/3

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2024

March 4, 1957

2:52 p.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1027, March 4, 8 p.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 1027, USUN 63

At 7 p.m. Herzog of Foreign Ministry informed Embassy General Burns had been reached in Sinai (EMBTel 1022) and had flown to Lydda for meeting at 5 o'clock with General Dayan. After one-hour meeting they had emerged and told press they had reached "complete agreement" re Israeli withdrawal from Sharm El Sheikh and Gaza.

Herzog further stated attempts being made and will continue to be made during night to hold coalition together but that "it looked very doubtful". Ben Gurion will present policy statement he said when Knesset convenes tomorrow at 4 p.m. He added he hoped this marked "beginning of a new and happier era".

LAWSON.

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Control: 2514

Rec'd: MARCH 5, 1957
8:24 AM

FROM: DAMASCUS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2009, MARCH 4 5 P.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2009, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN
BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, JIDDA UNNUMBERED.

JOINT STATE USIA.

ALL LEADING NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHED SECRETARY DULLES DECLARATION NO SECRET PROMISES TO ISRAEL (REFERENCE 133, MARCH 1) BUT PRESS MARCH 3 AND 4 CONTINUES (1) THEME US INVOLVED HIDDEN AGREEMENT ZIONISTS AND (2) ATTACKING US FOR CLAIM AQABA WATERS INTERNATIONAL. ALTHOUGH ANNOUNCING CERTAINTY ISRAEL WILL WITHDRAW MOST EDITORS CALL ON US FORCE ISRAEL STOP STALLING. G-2, ASRP RAI AL AM REPORTS US SUPPORT ISRAELI NAVY USE AQABA WILL RESULT UNPRECEDENTED STRAIN US-SAUDI RELATIONS SINCE KING SAUD TOLD CAIRO CONFERENCE ARAB LEADERS THIS MATTER LIFE AND DEATH. SAUDI-SUBSIDIZED AL AYYAM SAYS US MUST COMPEL ISRAEL WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY IN ORDER DISPEL RUMORS SECRET UNDERSTANDING MOSLEM EL MANAR BELIEVES AQABA WATERS BELONG EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA ALONE BUT HOPES US HAS NOT MADE PRIVATE PROMISES ISRAEL AND PUTS TRUST IN PRESIDENT EISENHOWER. AL NASR AND OTHER PRO-SOVIET PAPERS DEPLORE APPARENT US-ISRAELI BARGAIN WHICH ARABS WILL NOT ACCEPT.

ALL PRESS PUBLISHES (1) PRIME MINISTER ASALI ASSERTIONS ARABS INSIST ISRAEL LEAVE GAZA AND SHARM AL-SHAYKH WITHOUT CONDITIONS AND ARE DETERMINED END ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE IF UN FAILS DO SO AND (2) FOREIGN MINISTER BITAR DECLARATION ARABS REFUSE BARGAIN ON SCHEME OF SEPARATING GAZA FROM EGYPT WHICH WOULD MEAN ENDORSEMENT ISRAELI AGGRESSION.

BG BROADCASTING SYSTEM COMMENTARY MARCH 4 DECLARES ANGLO-FRENCH-ISRAELI-US INTRIGUES DO NOT HIDE FACT THAT AQABA AND GAZA ARE ARAB TERRITORIES AND IN STRANGE NON SEQUITUR ASKS APPROVES INTERNATIONALIZATION GULF MEXICO.

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 834, MARCH 4, 8 PM

PRIORITY

RE PALESTINE/ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL

Control: 2229

Rec'd: MARCH 4, 1957
9:01 PM

FAWZI (EGYPT) CALLED ON LODGE AT HIS REQUEST REGARDING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN GA. FAWZI SAID IT WAS "NATURAL" EXPECT TO HAVE FURTHER MEETING TO SEE WHAT HAD HAPPENED ON WITHDRAWALS. HE DID NOT SAY HOW SOON HE "EXPECTED" SUCH MEETING.

FAWZI ALSO STATED THAT TODAY HE AND ARAB COLLEAGUES WOULD AVOID SAYING ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT PREVENT FORWARD MOVEMENT. THIS NOT ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON ARABS, HOWEVER. THERE WAS OBVIOUSLY CERTAIN LIMIT BEYOND WHICH THEY WOULD NOT GO IN ALLOWING STATEMENTS TO GO UNANSWERED. IN THIS CONNECTION HE NOTED THERE WAS "SOMETHING IN THE AIR" WHICH HE WAS CONFIDENT DID NOT EXIST EXCEPT AS RUMOR IN SUSPICIOUS MINDS; NAMELY, THAT US HAD GIVEN PROMISES OR COMMITTED ITSELF TO ACTIONS NOT KNOWN TO OTHERS.

LODGE INTERRUPTED FAWZI TO SAY THERE WAS NOTHING HIDDEN, THAT FAWZI KNEW EVERYTHING THERE WAS TO KNOW. ALL THAT EXISTED WAS LODGE'S SPEECH AND PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO BEN-GURION OVER WEEK-END. THAT WAS ALL.

FAWZI SAID HE ASSUMED US POSITION REMAINED AS STATED LAST FRIDAY I.E., THAT WHEREAS US HAD EXPRESSED ITS VIEW RE AQABA, THAT DID NOT AMOUNT TO "LEGISLATION" OR A "RECOMMENDATION"; NOR WAS IT PART OF US POLICY TO USE FORCE TO PUT ACROSS THAT POLICY. LODGE SAID THAT WAS CORRECT. RE GAZA FAWZI UNDERSTOOD US TO MAINTAIN THAT EGYPT'S POSITION WAS ABSOLUTELY ACCORDING TO ARMISTICE AGREEMENT -- NOTHING MORE AND NOTHING LESS. LODGE REPLIED THAT THIS TOO WAS US STAND.

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-2- DELGA 834, MARCH 4, 8 PM FROM NEW YORK

FAWZI ASSUMED THAT WHAT US CLAIMED FOR ITSELF, I.E. TO STATE OWN POINT OF VIEW, IT WOULD CONCEDE TO OTHERS. HE THEREFORE WANTED MAKE CLEAR WHERE EGYPT STOOD. EGYPT BELIEVED, HE SAID, CHARTER CLEARLY SET OUT WAYS AND MEANS FOR RESOLVING DIFFERENCES.

EGYPT "QUITE WILLING" SETTLE ITS DISPUTES, ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS "ACCORDING TO PROCESSES SET OUT IN CHARTER". BEYOND THIS, EGYPT NOT READY, NOR SHOULD UN BE, TO SUBSCRIBE TO IDEA THAT AGGRESSOR BE REWARDED FOR ITS AGGRESSION. AFTER ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL EGYPT WILLING FOLLOW CHARTER PROCESSES. "IT WOULD NOT SAY ASSEMBLY NOT COMPETENT TAKE UP OTHER MATTERS. EGYPT WOULD IN FACT APPROVE THEIR INSCRIPTION ON AGENDA." (THIS PRESUMABLY REFERS TO BASIC PALESTINE SETTLEMENT ISSUES.)

ON GAZA, EGYPT SAW SITUATION AS SIMILAR ALTHOUGH NOT IDENTICAL TO ONE IN CANAL ZONE WHERE UN FORCES HAD FIRST TAKEN OVER AND THEN EGYPTIAN FORCES HAD COME IN. TAKE OVER WOULD BE THEORETICALLY IDENTICAL, BUT ACTUALLY ONLY SIMILAR SINCE IN GAZA UNEF WOULD REMAIN ALONG DEMARCATION LINE "FOR A WHILE". OTHERWISE, EVERYTHING WOULD BE STRICTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

WHEN FAWZI HAD CONCLUDED, LODGE SAID HE HAD LISTENED CAREFULLY TO EVERYTHING FAWZI HAD SAID AND HE HAD DETECTED NO CHANGE IN EGYPT'S POLICY FROM WHAT IT HAD ALREADY BEEN STATED TO BE. FAWZI REPLIED IN AFFIRMATIVE, SAYING THAT HE HAD MERELY SUMMARIZED HIS GOVT'S POSITION IN ORDER BE COMPLETELY FAIR TO UN AND TO US.

LODGE STATED IT HAD, FROM BEGINNING, BEEN US POLICY TO END WAR THROUGH CEASE-FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL, WITHOUT BRIBES OR REWARDS. AT SAME TIME US WANTED WORK FOR BETTER STATE OF AFFAIRS. WE HAD SAID THIS FROM BEGINNING, AND IT WAS STILL OUR HOPE. INDISPENSABLE FIRST STEP, HOWEVER, WAS PROMPT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. FAWZI BROKE IN TO SAY THIS WOULD BE IN ISRAEL'S OWN BEST INTERESTS, TOO. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING AS ISRAEL WITHDRAWS SOME OF OTHER DIFFICULTIES WILL GRADUALLY DISAPPEAR.

LODGE

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 835, MARCH 4, 8 PM

PRIORITY

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

CORDIER (SECRETARIAT) REPORTED THIS AFTERNOON HE HAD JUST RECEIVED CABLE FROM BURNS SAYING THAT ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES AND CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL WOULD BE OUT OF GAZA BY 1600 HOURS, MARCH 7. BURNS ALSO REPORTED THAT ISRAELIS WOULD BE OUT OF SHARM EL-WHEIKH (EXCEPT FOR A SMALL GROUP TO HAVE CHARGE OF SOME ISRAELI EQUIPMENT TO BE SHIPPED OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE) BY MARCH 8. BURNS REQUESTED THESE DATES NOT BE DIVULGED BEFORE ACTUAL TURNOVER WAS COMPLETED IN ORDER AVOID RIOTS, ETC. CORDIER EXPRESSED DOUBT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE AVOID LEAKS. HE SAID RIOTING WOULD BE PREVENTED BY UNEF MOVING IN BEFORE ISRAELIS WITHDREW.

CORDIER SAID SECRETARIAT THINKING WAS THERE SHOULD BE NO MORE GA MEETINGS AFTER TODAY UNTIL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL COMPLETED. HE REITERATED SYG WOULD GO TO CAIRO AFTER, BUT NOT BEFORE, ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. CORDIER SAID, BASED ON BURNS TELEGRAM, GA MEETING COULD BE HELD SATURDAY, MARCH 9 TO ANNOUNCE HAMMARSKJOLD'S PLANS FOR CAIRO TRIP (WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE MONDAY OR TUESDAY NEXT WEEK), AND TO RECESS. CORDIER ADDED THERE MIGHT BE SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING UN ADMINISTRATION IN GAZA AND FINANCES WHICH GA WOULD HAVE TAKE UP BEFORE RECESS.

SGC



LODGE

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 836, MARCH 4, 9 P.M.

VERBATIM TEXT

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

TOV (ISRAEL) SPOKE TO LODGE DURING PLENARY MEETING THIS AFTERNOON. HE SAID THEY FELT IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL FOR LODGE TO MAKE CLOSING SPEECH AT END OF DEBATE. THEY ALSO HOPED FOR ASSEMBLY TO CONCLUDE DEBATE BY HAVING NIGHT MEETING, IF NECESSARY. LODGE AGREED TO SUPPORT HOLDING NIGHT MEETING BUT SAID HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE ATTEND BECAUSE OF ANOTHER ENGAGEMENT. LODGE ADDED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING HE WANTED TO SAY, SINCE US POSITION STOOD FULLY REVEALED ON THE RECORD.

SHORTLY THEREAFTER FOLLOWING INFORMAL NOTE PASSED TO LODGE BY EBAN:

"I WOULD AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO FINISH TODAY. I THINK THAT THE ACTUAL WITHDRAWALS WILL NOW BE SOLELY FOR ASSEMBLY WILL BE CONTENT; ANY NEW ELEMENT MIGHT DISTURB A PRECARIOUS BALANCE.

"WE ARE NOT KEEN ON THE CANADIAN HINT OF AN EARLY MEETING. WE NEED A QUIETENING PERIOD.

"I AM GRATEFUL FOR WHAT YOU HAVE DONE TO MAKE THE DEBATE OPEN TO US BOTH ON FRIDAY AND TODAY...AND FOR WHAT YOU DID FOR US TO GIVE US THIS CHANCE.

"WHAT I HAVE WRITTEN HERE (AND NOT THE OTHER SPECULATIONS) IS OUR TRUE ATTITUDE."

HSO

LODGE

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Number 1 of 2 copies, Series 690

M-616

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 4, 1957

SUBJECT: Situation in the Middle East

U. S. SIDE

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary of State
Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
Senator George
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Elbrick

Mr. Timmons
Mr. Reinstein
Mr. Creel
Mr. Parker
Mr. Sullivan (Defense)

GERMAN SIDE

COPIES TO: Mr. von Brentano, German Foreign Minister
Dr. Krefeler, German Ambassador
Professor Grewe, German Foreign Office
Baron von Welck, German Foreign Office
Mr. von Kessel, Minister, German Embassy
Mr. Harkort, German Foreign Office
Mr. Limbourg, " "
Mr. von Lilienfeld " "
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Senator George - 3 S/P - Mr. Bowie - 7 P Amer. Embassy Bonn
G - Mr. Murphy - 4 RA - Mr. Timmons - 8 Defense (2) - 11 OLI - (2) - 15-26

The Secretary opened the meeting by saying we were very happy to have Mr. von Brentano here. He was sorry that his visit could not coincide with that of President O. Heuss as originally scheduled and regretted that the latter's indisposition had prevented him from coming at this time. The Secretary referred briefly to his plans for leaving Washington on March 6 for the SEATO Conference in Australia and thereafter going to Bermuda for a meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan.

Turning to the first item on the agenda, the Middle East, the Secretary said he would be interested in hearing the German views on this subject but he understood the Germans were primarily interested in hearing his own appraisal. Brentano indicated assent.

The Secretary said he had had some discussion of the Middle East with Mr. von Brentano at the NATO Meeting last December and that he would proceed from that point. The United States had taken the position from the outset in the Middle East dispute that in accordance with the provision of the United Nations Charter disputes must be settled by peaceful means and force should not be used against the territorial integrity of another state. The Secretary said that most countries' attitudes and positions in their international relations reflect their natural affinities rather than principles. The United States, however, felt that its position in the world today was such that it must base its policy on certain fundamental principles rather than let our position be governed by what countries we liked or by historic friendships. This was not an easy position to take and it was possibly the first time in history such a position had in fact been taken.

The United States had therefore supported the UN resolutions calling for withdrawal of the attacking forces. The British and French had complied but Israel had not yet

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done so, and there was feeling that pressure would have to be exerted on the Israelis. We had thought it might be easier for the Israelis to withdraw if the United States made a statement as to the position it would take on some of the fundamental issues, not in the nature of any promise or inducement, or by way of giving Israel anything to which it was not entitled in the event of Israeli withdrawal. We therefore had given a memorandum to the Israeli Government on February 11 setting forth our views on the international status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran. There was nothing new in our position and the Egyptian Government had itself taken the same position some six years ago. With regard to the Gaza Strip, it was under Egyptian administration pursuant to the armistice agreement but was not a part of Egypt. The Secretary pointed out that the area had no natural resources, not even water. The population consisted predominantly of the refugees who were being supported by the United Nations, with most of the money being furnished by the U. S. He drew the conclusion that there was a considerable reason, in view of these facts, for the United Nations to exercise responsibility in the Gaza area. The Secretary said he felt that our statement of these views to the Israeli Government had partly been responsible for the announcement last Friday of the Israeli decision to withdraw its troops.

At the moment Premier Ben Gurion had run into political difficulties at home and the present situation was obscure. The Israeli Government had requested further assurances from us, but we had replied we could give no assurances beyond what had already been announced publicly. He hoped that the Israeli Government would take a favorable decision today.

274-7201 The Secretary said that if the Israelis did withdraw the focus of attention would shift to the Arab countries, particularly Egypt, and the Suez Canal. Egypt had not allowed the clearing of the Canal to be completed. In his own mind, there was no doubt that they were dragging their feet and using the Canal as a means for trying to bring about the withdrawal of Israeli forces. He spoke at some length on the adverse consequences, particularly to the countries of the Middle East and South Asia, if the Canal were not opened. He said that the Texas Railway Commission had authorized an increase in Texas production of 200,000 barrels a day and that, with the approach of summer, the immediate situation did not involve an intolerable burden on Europe, although the purchase of oil in the United States and Venezuela involved higher costs and a foreign exchange burden.

We therefore believed we should do all we could to get the Israelis to withdraw. Otherwise fighting might break out again and Soviet penetration of the Middle East would be facilitated. The Secretary felt our two countries were in the best position to influence Israel. He had had a talk with Ambassador Krekeler the other day and was pleased to learn that the German Government had made representations to the Government of Israel to induce withdrawal.

The Secretary then discussed briefly the matter of Canal tolls. A proposal had been put forward to the UN Secretary General that these tolls should be paid to some international institution such as the International Bank, with Egypt to get half the total amount and the other half to be impounded pending a final settlement. Fifty per cent of the Canal tolls could considerably more than meet Egypt's out-of-pocket expenses for maintaining and operating the Canal.

The Secretary

The Secretary said that Egypt had taken an equivocal position regarding the Six Principles agreed on last October and now claimed these were no longer applicable. He regarded this position as untenable, since the Six Principles were an expression of the application of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and therefore had permanent and universal significance for all countries. Whatever the rights and the wrongs of the British-French action, there was no reason why other countries should be penalized for it. He pointed out that the Six Principles were all right as far as they go but they call for further implementation. Steps toward that end had been taken as reflected by the Hammarskjold report on his talks with the British, French and Egyptians. Whether it would be possible to pick the matter up at that stage, he did not know. The time might not be ripe to attempt to bring the three governments together in the same room and Hammarskjold might have to negotiate with them separately. The Secretary said that Egypt should be disposed to reach a settlement since it was in a bad economic position, but hints have come out that they don't want to.

The Secretary said that there was a real danger that the Canal would be opened without a settlement. This would mean that there would be a de facto situation in which Egypt would get whatever it wanted. He expressed concern that everyone would be so eager to use the Canal that we might lose the possibility of safeguarding the longer-run interests of the user nations. He particularly was concerned that there be assurances against the use of the Canal as an instrument of national policy. The Secretary said there was no doubt in his mind that the Egyptians were using the Canal in this manner. He said we could not be acquiescent in this situation. Some machinery was necessary to prevent Egypt from blackmailing us in the future. He said that Hammarskjold was hopeful that after the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, the Egyptians would be reasonable and flexible. He said this was the position which Fawzi was taking in New York but he was not sure that what Fawzi said was all backed up by Nasser.

Mr. von Brentano thanked the Secretary for his appraisal. He said that as far as basic principles were concerned there seemed to be complete agreement between the two Governments regarding the assessment of the situation and of the measures to be taken. While Germany had no direct interest in the Middle East dispute, it did have three rather important indirect interests.

In the first place Germany had been an important user of the Canal and had a vital interest in the reopening of the waterway. He had made a statement on this subject at the London Conference, to which he felt it was unnecessary to add.

Secondly, there was a problem with regard to the Federal Republic's relations with the Arab States. At the moment these relations were good and quite correct despite the fact Germany was making reparations payments to Israel. The Federal Republic was anxious to prevent any deterioration of the relations, owing to the problem of preventing the recognition of the so-called German Democratic Republic. There was a danger that if these relations should worsen the GDR might try to move into the vacuum in the interest of securing recognition or building up its own trade relations. The situation involved elements of blackmail. As for the British and French action in Suez, the Federal Republic had acted with restraint, although it regretted this development because it enabled the Soviet Union to pursue a policy of diversion in Eastern Europe.

Thirdly, there was the matter of the Federal Republic's relations with Israel. The Federal Republic wished to do nothing to upset reparations deliveries to Israel. He

understood

SECRET

-4-

understood Ambassador Krekeler had made clear to us the Germans did not wish to suspend these deliveries even if a sanctions resolution should be voted in the United Nations. The German Parliament and people regarded this matter as a moral obligation rather than a political one. Any change in this policy would involve great difficulties and Brentano hoped that such a question would never be put to them. The Germans had informed the Israeli Government that in view of their desire to maintain reparations deliveries they hoped they would not be confronted with a problem in this regard. He said he believed that the Israeli Government understood the viewpoint which had been expressed to them.

Brentano then referred to the memorandum he had given to the Secretary in Paris on the overall situation in the Middle East. As that memorandum had indicated, the Federal Republic was prepared to participate in any settlement of the problems of the area both because of its own interests in the area and the fact that such a settlement would help promote peace and stability in the world. The Federal Republic had welcomed the "bold and courageous" statement by President Eisenhower in setting forth his plan for the Middle East and was prepared to participate fully in this plan both from a political and economic standpoint.

Brentano said he wished to give one illustration of the Federal Republic's difficulties in the face of the Suez dispute. For over a year the Germans had planned to participate in a trade exhibition in Cairo which was to open very shortly. The Egyptians had proposed that the German Minister for Economic Affairs, Mr. Erhard, should go to Cairo to open the German exhibit. The German Cabinet had decided that this would not be a good time for Erhard to go but there was some fear that the Egyptians might make this a question of prestige. While Brentano felt himself that someone else should go, he would be glad to learn the Secretary's views on this point.

In conclusion, Brentano said the Federal Republic was quite aware of the difficult position of Israel and would be glad to make any contribution it could toward an overall settlement in the Middle East which would help this small country to acquire a feeling of security. He suggested that perhaps some guarantee with regard to the Gulf of Aqaba could be worked into the Suez settlement. He wondered whether the Arabs themselves did not feel that such an overall settlement was necessary for their own economic and political purposes.

The Secretary said he was glad to notice Brentano's reference to the Eisenhower doctrine, since he himself felt it would be a constructive step to counter Soviet activities in the Middle East. He pointed out that the United States cannot carry alone the responsibility of developing relations with countries in this area advantageous to the West and that we looked forward to useful participation by the Federal Republic in this effort. He felt that the Federal Republic could play an important role in helping to develop the economy of the Middle East.

As for the Erhard visit to Cairo, he agreed that this was not an appropriate time to send a high-ranking Cabinet Minister to Egypt, since Nasser could play up this move as an indication of support for his viewpoint.

Regarding an overall settlement in the area, we foresaw difficulties in proceeding quickly, in view of the high feeling between Israel and the Arab States. The United States was prepared to contribute in important ways to a settlement both economically and politically, as had been indicated in our statement in 1955, but it appeared doubtful whether an overall settlement could be reached within the next few months.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 4, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Honorable William M. Rountree
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

FROM: Maxwell M. Rabb *mmr*
THROUGH: Mr. Fisher Howe
Director, Executive Secretariat

Attached hereto is a wire from Mr. Philip M. Klutznick,
President of B'nai B'rith.

① Ordinarily, this kind of communication would be acknowl-
edged over the signature of a member of the White House
staff. In this instance, however, it occurs to me that it
might be desirable to have the President himself acknowl-
edge the telegram. Mr. Klutznick was one of the group
of Jewish leaders who were called in to visit with the
Secretary of State. He is very helpful, and recognition
in the form of a note from the President would be worth-
while, especially in view of the fact that Middle East
deliberations are beginning to take a good turn.

I would appreciate your views on this as well as a suggested
response to be signed either by the President or by a mem-
ber of the staff.

DC/R
Anal <i>6</i>
Rev <i>7</i>
Cat <i>Class</i>
<i>Sheet</i>

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674.84A/3-457

MAR 7 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MAXWELL M. RABB
THE WHITE HOUSE

Through: Brig. Gen. A. J. Goodpaster

Subject: Message from Mr. Philip Klutznick,
B'mai B'rith

I refer to your memorandum of March 4 concerning the message received by you from Mr. Philip Klutznick.

The Department agrees that a personal acknowledgment by the President of Mr. Klutznick's March 1 wire might be desirable. A brief suggested reply is enclosed, and Mr. Klutznick's wire of March 1 to you is returned.

FISHER HOWE

Fisher Howe
Director
Executive Secretariat

674.84A/3-457

Enclosures:

1. Suggested reply to Mr. Klutznick.

2. Mr. Klutznick's wire to Mr. Rabb,
March 1, 1957.

(Mr. Klutznick's wire to the President
returned to White House separately)

S/S-RO

A true copy of
not original

Clearance
P- J. Parker

NEA:NE:RE Parker:rej - 3/6/57
NEA:Liberry
Retyped in S/S-RO 3/6/57

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mr. Klutznick:

Thank you very much for your kind telegram of March 2 regarding the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba. It is my sincere hope that the reduction of tension which should follow this constructive development will provide an atmosphere favorable to the strengthening of peace and security in the area and to the resolution of outstanding problems.

Sincerely,

Mr. Philip M. Klutznick,
President,
B'nai B'rith,
30 Plaza,
Park Forest, Illinois.

NEA:NE:RBParker:rej - 3/6/57

1430
1386

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MAXWELL M. RABE
THE WHITE HOUSE**

Through Brig. Gen. A. J. Goodpastor

Subject: Message from Mr. Philip Klutznick, B'nai B'rith

We refer to your memorandum of March 4 concerning the message received by you from Mr. Philip Klutznick.

We agree that a personal acknowledgment by the President of Mr. Klutznick's March 1 wire might be desirable. A brief suggested reply is enclosed. Mr. Klutznick's wire of March 1 to you is also enclosed.

**Fisher Howe
Director
Executive Secretariat**

Enclosures:

1. Suggested reply to Mr. Klutznick.
2. Mr. Klutznick's wire to Mr. Rabe, March 1, 1957.

NEA:NE:RParker:rej - 3/6/57

P. Parker
T.P.

ACTION
is assigned to

8902

10

HINDLEY BECKWORTH
30 DISTRICT, TEXAS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

March 28 1951

3/4/56

Dear Bill:

Please call me when
this is received.

Sincerely,

Kindley Beckworth

Love Smith

674.84A/3-457

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
RELATIONS

1957 MAR 5 PM 4 52

Encl. att.
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Beckworth

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enclosures, 11
records

March 1, 1957

Mr. Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Re: IO:UNP:674.844/2-1257

Dear Mr. Hill:

Representative Beckworth has forwarded to me your letter of February 26th, in which you express the position of your Department in connection with the matter of sanctions on Israel. I realize that by the time this letter reaches you this particular incident may be moot.

However, your position appears to me, and from all that I can tell, to a great many other citizens of the United States, to be one without principle.

Your letter makes much to do about the high plane that the Department takes and the refusal to compromise principles for the sake of immediate expediency. I realize that this letter, like others, will not mean much to you, but I cannot refrain from commenting on the inconsistency of your position.

Years ago, when Egypt, in defiance of every international law, refused to permit passage of Israeli vessels through the Suez Canal, no furor was raised; no effort for sanctions to enforce the resolutions of the United Nations was made. To multiply the list of compromises that our country has made in order not to irritate the Arabs, would be to lengthen this letter unduly. You know the concessions that we have made as to the religion that our soldiers may follow to serve in Arab Countries, passports of American Citizens of Jewish Faith to Arab Nations, etc., etc. If we are not paying tribute and compromising with principles, then what are we doing?

March 1, 1957

Mr. Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

I have never read or heard of any justification or explanation by the Department as to our failure to speak up on the above matters. Would you care to comment on this?

Very respectfully yours,


Israel Smith

IS:wm

cc: Hon. Lyndon B. Johnson
U. S. Senate
Washington, D. C.

Hon. Lindley Beckworth
U. S. Congress
Washington, D. C.

VIA AIR MAIL

Hon. Lindley Beckworth
U. S. Congress
Washington, D. C.

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Files
Must Be Returned to

In reply refer to
IO:UNP 674.84A/3-257

March 28 1957

Dear Senator Johnson:

I refer to a letter concerning the Middle East addressed to me on March 1, 1957, by Mr. Israel Smith of Tyler, Texas, a copy of which Mr. Smith had sent to you.

There is enclosed a copy of my response to Mr. Smith that may be of interest to you.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

The Honorable
Lyndon B. Johnson,
United States Senate.

68
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IO:UNP:DLGamon:lmr 3/20/57

MAR 21 1957

MAR 26 1957
MAR 28 1957

674.84A/3-457
674.84A/3-457
CS/R
674.84A/3-457

Document Must Be Returned to

In reply refer to
IO:UNP 674.84A/3-457

March 28 1957

Dear Mr. Beckworth:

As acknowledged by telephone on March 18, 1957,
I have received your letter of March 4 with which you
transmitted a copy of a letter dated March 1 addressed to me
Smith of Tyler, Texas, of the Middle East.
concerning the Middle East.

There is enclosed a copy of my reply to Mr. Smith
that may be of interest to you.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

The Honorable
Lindley Beckworth,
House of Representatives.

IO:UNP:DLGannon:lmr 3/20/57

DO/E

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MAR 21 1957 P.M.
MAR 26 1957
MAR 28 1957

674.84A/3-457

CS/R

674.84A/3-457

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 8, 1957

NEA - Mr. Oulashin

For appropriate reply and
signature within NEA.

Please send copies of the
reply to S/S by March 15.

J. H. Cunningham
S/S-RO

Attachment:

Ltr to Sec. fm I. Edward Tonkin
of Dallas, Texas dtd 3/4/57 re
Israeli withdrawal (S/S-1510)

*Reply drafted
RPA/Hunter
WE 3-12-57*

1510
ACTION
is assigned to

I. EDWARD TONKON
2107 McKINNEY AVENUE
DALLAS 1, TEXAS

March 4, 1957

My dear Mr. Secretary:

For some time now since your return as the first Secretary of State to make a trip through the Middle East, and then the President's announced policy of impartiality in that area, I have been individually and as a member of the American Council for Judaism, strongly in support of your efforts to implement that policy. I have at various times taken note of your various efforts and have so written you.

It is in this spirit that I write to inquire whether you or the President invited the group of so-called non-Zionists Americans of the Jewish faith headed by Mr. Barney Balban and whether it was for the purposes as some indicated, to pressure Israel into compliance of withdrawing from the Gaza Strip and Aquacaba or whether the request for such a meeting with you came from them.

With many thanks for an early reply and renewed assurance of my high esteem, I am

Cordially yours,
I. Edward Tonkon

Honorable John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

674.84A/3-457

MAR 22 1957

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DC/R
Anal. 32
Rev. P
Ext. 200

325345

March 15 1957

In reply refer to
HRA:NE

Dear Mr. Tonken:

I have for reply your letter of March 4, 1957 to the Secretary in which you inquire about a recent conversation between a number of American Jewish leaders and the Secretary. From time to time, the Secretary of State has received groups of American citizens interested in the Middle East for discussions of problems affecting the area and the United States policies and interests involved. The meeting to which you refer, which took place at the initiative of the Government, was one of these.

Sincerely yours,

Sm

Stuart W. Rockwell
Deputy Director
Office of Near Eastern Affairs

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-10-2001 BY 60322 UCBAW
674.844/3-457

Mr. I. Edward Tonken,
2157 McKinney Avenue,
Dallas 1, Texas.

HRA:NE:RFA:re:ej - 3/13/57

9/5/57
MAR 15 1957 P.M.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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AIR

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2803, MARCH 5, 7 PM

PRIORITY

Control:
Rec'd:

3052

MARCH 5 1957

9:06 PM

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MARCH 6 AM 6 49

SENT DEPARTMENT 2803, REPEATED INFORMATION BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, BENGHAZI, TRIPOLI, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KHARTOUM, LONDON, PARIS, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV, USUN 99.

PRESS MARCH THREE-FIVE HAS REFLECTED SHORTAGE HARD INFORMATION IN ITS TREATMENT WITHDRAWAL DEVELOPMENTS. GENERALLY NEWSPLAY (WIRE AGENCY STORIES) HAS BEEN POSITIVE TO EXTENT HEADLINES MARCH FIVE INDICATED WITHDRAWAL HAD ALREADY BEGUN. WHILE REPORTS OPPOSITION BEN GURION'S DECISION PLAYED PROMINENTLY THEY GENERALLY DISMISSED AS WINDOW-DRESSING FOR LAST MINUTE ISRAELI EFFORTS BARGAIN AND PRESS ASSUMES BEN GURION WILL HAVE NO (REPEAT NO) DIFFICULTY IMPOSING WITHDRAWAL ON KNESSET (ALTHOUGH EXPECTING ULTIMATE LIFE PRESENT GOVERNMENT MAY BE SHORT). SOME GLOATING NOTED (BEN GURION'S WEEPING CONFIRMS ISRAELIS HAVE GAINED NOTHING FROM ADVENTURE) BUT THIS BALANCE BY SPECULATION ESPECIALLY IN LEFTIST PRESS AS TO WHAT SORT OF "DEAL" ISRAELIS MADE WITH UNITED STATES AT LAST MOMENT. HOWEVER, MOST PAPERS FRONT-PAGED MARCH FIVE WHITE'S DENIAL THIS RESPECT.

LITTLE COMMENT AS TO NEXT PHASE GAZA-AQABA PROBLEMS. SADAT (TAHRIR) WELCOMES UNITED STATES PRESSURE ON ISRAEL BUT NOTES UNITED STATES NOT (REPEAT NOT) DOING EGYPT FAVOR, MERELY SAVING ISRAEL FROM BEING "SWEPT AWAY" AND "CORRECTING RESULT ACT AGGRESSION IN INTEREST PEACE". HE THEN ARGUES WITH SOME CONFIDENCE THAT ARMISTICE AGREEMENT APPLIES TO GULF OF AQABA, THAT ISRAELI TRANSITS WOULD BE VIOLATING IT AND THAT UNITED STATES SHOULD THEREFORE REFRAIN FROM SUPPORTING ISRAELI TRANSIT CLAIM OR "BE ACCUSED OF DISTURBING PEACE".

AS EDITORIALS CONTINUE DISCUSS NEUTRALITY, SHAAB

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HBS

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-2- 2803, MARCH 5, 7 PM, FROM CAIRO

CONTRASTS EGYPT'S SUCCESS THROUGH "POSITIVE NEUTRALITY WHICH WON SUPPORT ALL PEACE-LOVING STATES" WITH "ACTIVE COOPERATION" WHICH MERELY INVITATION TO "POSITIVE SLAVERY". AMONG EXAMPLES IMPERIALIST ACTIVITY CITED ARE INDONESIAN REVOLT AND STATEMENT ADMIRAL BROWN REGARDING SIXTH FLEET'S ROLE WHICH EVOKED COMMENT THAT "WE SHALL NEVER ALLOW ANY ATTEMPT MAKE MEDITERRANEAN AMERICAN OR BRITISH LAKE THROUGH CONTROL OF IT'S ENTRANCES".

HARE

CC

MAR 11 1957

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

16 Department of State

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Control:
Rec'd:2635
MARCH 5, 1957
10:04 AM

Action

NEA

FROM: TEL AVIV

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1031, MARCH 5, 4 PM

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AT NOON TODAY FOREIGN OFFICE INFORMED EMBASSY KNESSET MEETING SCHEDULED FOR FOUR O'CLOCK THIS AFTERNOON (EMBTel 1027) POSTPONED UNTIL EIGHT O'CLOCK AND THAT IT WILL BE PRECEDED BY CABINET MEETING AT SEVEN O'CLOCK.

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL STATED EFFORTS WERE BEING CONTINUED THROUGHOUT TODAY TO SAVE COALITION BUT THAT PICTURE WAS STILL FAR FROM CLEAR. HE ALSO SAID THAT PRIME MINISTER WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY REQUEST AMBASSADOR TO CALL ON HIM TOMORROW, RATHER THAN AFTER TODAY'S KNESSET MEETING AS RUMORED IN PRESS.

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AIR

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1033, March 5, 11 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1033; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 164, LONDON 198, AMMAN 176, BEIRUT 161, CAIRO 178, DAMASCUS 125.

This is first of running accounts of developments next few days in terms of politico-official and public reactions to Ben Gurion's decision withdraw.

Ben Gurion's decision yesterday afternoon to order General Dayan make arrangements with General Burns for Israel's withdrawal from Sharm E-Sheikh and Gaza has ended local suspense as to course Israel would take this important question. However, animated debate continues in all quarters as to wisdom decision taken and its meaning for Israel. Decision is widely accepted as final and no (repeat no) suggestion made that "retreat from retreat" is now possible.

This decision largely "one man decision". Ben Gurion apparently took it without formal Cabinet approval but it is believed he had Cabinet majority in support his action. Final Cabinet meeting later today will be followed by Knesset meeting at which Ben Gurion will present policy statement.

Various newspapers and other sources have indicated surprise at "high handed" manner in which Ben Gurion made decision to withdraw without obtaining firm Cabinet and Knesset approval.

Opposition to withdrawal, both within and without coalition, continues but Embassy believes moderate public opinion, upon which Ben Gurion no (repeat no) doubt depending at this critical moment will give him support. This view also taken by JERUSALEM POST article this morning headlined "status quo ante impossible". Article says gamble of withdrawal has more complicated background than mere yielding to pressure since political atmosphere has so changed in past four months that return to pre-Sinai state of affairs is impossible. Thus, article indicates, Egyptian attacks "would no (repeat no) longer be tolerated" by world opinion. Article concludes that Russian intrigue or Egyptian insistence on

maintaining

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 1033, March 5, 11 p.m. (Section 1 of 2) from Tel Aviv

maintaining belligerency may prove Israel hopes for future mistaken but in circumstance "wait and see" attitude is indicated.

Most sources (except those in right and left opposition) agree that stable government during this crisis is desirable and some belief is expressed that strong efforts will be made to find formula permitting Ben Gurion's left wing coalition partners (Mapam and Achdut Avoda) to remain in government. Press and public sources indicate formula will involve following:

1. No (repeat no) formal Cabinet decision approving withdrawal.
2. No (repeat no) government resolution approving withdrawal policy will be presented to Knesset.
3. Mapam and Achdut Avoda will vote with government against no-confidence motions already tabled by Herut, General Zionists and Communists. This idea would permit Mapam and Achdut Avoda not (repeat not) to go on record as favoring withdrawal policy of government of which they are part. Opposition to this procedure was voiced by HAARETZ editorial today which says situation demands government obtain "expression of confidence" clearly confirming withdrawal. HATZOFEH says "concessions contemplated will destroy internal discipline and government will find itself losing authority".

Embassy believes Mapam and Achdut Avoda at Cabinet session this afternoon may succumb to Ben Gurion's insistence they support positive government solution. This would avoid dissolution government but final outcome still unclear. Ben Gurion is known to have felt positive support from coalition partners was required of them and this attitude would appear reinforced by reports Progressive Minister Justice Rosen told Ben Gurion last night Progressive Party would leave coalition if abstention others is permitted. It is also known that Mizrahi Knesset faction wanted right abstain if this granted Mapam and Achdut Avoda.

LAWSON

MS:CHS/8

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 11 1954

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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AIR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1033, March 5, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1033 REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 164, LONDON 19, AMMAN 176, BEIRUT 161, CAIRO 178, DAMASCUS 125.

Activities of opposition parties continue along predictable lines. Herut, whose leader Menachem Begin is scheduled return from US tomorrow, calls government decision withdraw "operation deception" and demands resignation government. Herut demonstration is scheduled this afternoon in Jerusalem to protest government policy. Jerusalem Labor Council has called on all Histadrut members to be on alert lest "rabid fascist forces run amok in the streets." Student demonstration in Jerusalem yesterday ended in riot with 12 persons detained by police. Demonstration was apparently insignificant with, according press, only 250 students and others present and only 30 of these involved in March on Knesset resisted by police.

Communist objections to government decision are based on assertion it is sellout to American imperialism.

The situation in general Zionist Party is complex with party (and many members) still committed to no (repeat no) withdrawal but with other members privately convinced Ben-Gurion has done masterful job in difficult situation.

Although there has been no (repeat no) press comment on yesterday's statement on Lodge speech by Lincoln White at press conference, various private comments have indicated concern over assertion Israeli representatives fully informed substance Lodge speech and no (repeat no) subsequent deviation from substance had occurred. These persons point to alleged assurances in local political circles that government decision was based on belief Lodge would say more than he did.

Full strength of public reaction to withdrawal not (repeat not) yet evident but high emotional pitch to which public raised during past three weeks, through natural and artificial stimulation, continues at somewhat reduced level. There are some of more moderate segment who obviously breathing more easily now that sanction threat removed. However feeling of public (and political party exploitation

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-2- 1033, March 5, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Tel Aviv

exploitation of that feeling) presents a currently difficult problem for Ben-Gurion.

Tension in Israel will no (repeat no) doubt remain at fairly high level until coalition crisis is effectively resolved and effects of withdrawal decision upon security of country become apparent. While many Israelis undoubtedly feel surprise and resentment at decision to withdraw without guarantees described but short time ago as "minimal" there is no (repeat no) significant evidence to date of increase in anti-American sentiment though US is generally held responsible for Israel's withdrawal. Embassy suspects there will be gradual return to normal in Israel's views toward US. But serious Egyptian or Jordanian incursions against Israel's security or what might appear to its people as seriously ineffective UN administration of Gaza (or one not (repeat not) in moral spirit Israeli's assumptions in handing over to UNEF) could jeopardize improvement in Israel's attitude toward US.

In summary, Embassy finds local public less exercised over final decision withdraw than might have been expected from all fury and incrimination filling press past week. Feeling appears to be that Israel has successfully extricated itself from difficult situation without suffering serious consequences which seemed inherent in events. Sanctions have not (repeat not) been imposed and resumption more normal activities appears imminent. While Israelis disappointed at not (repeat not) receiving guarantees believed so vital to security of state, public at large probably holds that guarantees good enough for Ben-Gurion are good enough for all Israelis. Implicit in such a situation, of course, is fact that resumption Fedayeen raids or interference with shipping through Tiran Straits in near future could utterly destroy present attitude of disillusioned but hopeful waiting.

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MAR 15 1967

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Control: 2371
Rec'd: MARCH 5, 1957
4:53 A.M.

NEA FROM: BEIRUT
Info RMR TO: Secretary of State
SS NO: 2113, MARCH 5

SS NO: 2113, MARCH 5
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EUR SENT. DEPARTMENT 2113; RE
L 204, CAIRO 264, DAMASCUS
IO UNNUMBERED.
E
P
DCB JOINT STATE-USIA MESSAGE

SENT DEPARTMENT 2113; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 172, BAGHDAD 204, CAIRO 264, DAMASCUS 300, JIDDA 90, LONDON, PARIS, TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED.

JOINT STATE-USIA MESSAGE

BEIRUT MAR 4 AND WEEKEND PRESS EDITORIALY REGARDED ISRAELI
POSTPONEMENT WITHDRAWAL AS MEANS GAIN GUARANTEES ON FREE
PASSAGE SHIPPING GULF AQABA AND SUEZ CANAL. NEWS COVERAGE TIED
THIS THEME TO REPORTED OPPOSITION WITHIN ISRAEL TO BEN-GURION'S
ACCEPTANCE OF WITHDRAWAL. ALL NEWSPAPERS CONTINUED DEMAND UN-
CONDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

LODGE ADDRESS MAR 1 ATTACKED BY SEVERAL FOR REFERENCES FREEDOM NAVIGATION. MODERATE MOSLEM BEIRUT SAID THIS AND ISRAELI DEMAND FOR GUARANTEES "IS FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF U.N. RESOLUTION OF FEB 2." PRO-EGYPT AS SIYASAH WHILE PAYING TRIBUTE PRES EISENHOWER'S EFFORTS ALSO COMMENTED ISRAELI LAYING TRAP WHEREIN REAL AIM IS TO TURN TRUCE AGREEMENTS INTO PERMANENT PEACE TREATIES WITH ARAB STATES. INDEPENDENT AL JARIDA SAID THAT WHILE U.S. WITHDRAWAL PLEDGE FROM ISRAEL, IT DID NOT WIN CONFIDENCE OF ALL MIDDLE EAST STATES, ATTRIBUTING THIS FAILURE TO ALLEGED "UNSTABLE" U.S. STAND TOWARD ISRAEL WHICH WEAKENED U.S. POSITION. PAPER FURTHER SAID SAUD WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE SELL EISENHOWER PROGRAM AT CAIRO IF EVENTS HAD BEEN OTHERWISE.

POSSIBLE INDICATOR NEW ARAB NATIONALIST LINE APPEARED IN EXTREME MOSLEM BEIRUT EL MASSA WHICH ARGUED 1) BRITAIN GOT 500 MILLION DOLLARS AS PRICE HER WITHDRAWAL; 2) FRANCE IS AFTER SAME AMOUNT WHILE ISRAEL SEEKING 200 MILLION? 3) EISENHOWER PLAN THUS MEANS OVER BILLION DOLLARS TO FRANCO-BRITISH-ZIONIST AGGRESSORS AND 200 MILLION TO BE DIVIDED AMONG ALL ARAB STATES; AND 4) POSITIVE

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-2- 2113, MARCH 5, FROM BEIRUT

ARAB NEUTRALITY IS ANSWER TO THIS PLOT.

AN NAHAR'S MICHEL ABU JAUDEH WHO HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF U.S. DELAY IN FORCING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TODAY SAID "GREAT DEEDS ARE ACCOMPLISHED BY GREAT MEN. PRES EISENHOWER'S SUCCESS IN GETTING ISRAEL TO EVACUATE THE EGYPTIAN TERRITORY WILL INTRODUCE HIM INTO THE HISTORY OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION AS THE FIRST MAN IN THE U.S., BRITAIN OR FRANCE WHO WAS NOT STOPPED BY ZIONIST INFLUENCE. HE IS THE FIRST WESTERN LEADER TO BE THANKED BY THE ARABS. TRUE, AMERICA DID NOT GIVE US PALESTINE BACK, BUT WHAT EISENHOWER DID IN THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL QUESTION CAN BE CONSIDERED A TURNING POINT IN AMERICA'S STAND.

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16 Department of State

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Control: 3250

Rec'd: MARCH 6, 1957
6:29 AM

FROM: DAMASCUS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2021, MARCH 5, 5 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 2021, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN, BAGHDAD,
BEIRUT, CAIRO, JIDDA UNNUMBERED.

JOINT STATE-USIA.

PRESS MARCH 5 GREETES BEN GURION WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT AS VICTORY ARAB LIBERATIVE POLICY OVER FORCES IMPERIALISM BUT WARNS POSSIBLE IMPERIALIST PLOTS TIED TO WITHDRAWAL OPERATION. G-2, ASRP RAI AL AM POINTS OUT UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATE UN LAST NIGHT URGED GAZA BE PLACED INTERNATIONAL CONTROL AND STRAITS TIRAN BE CLASSIFIED INTERNATIONAL WATERS. PRO-SOVIET AL JUMHUR CLAIMS WITHDRAWAL NOT VICTORY AMERICAN PRESSURE ISRAEL SINCE LATTER UNITED STATES CREATION. COMMUNIST AL NUR REMINDS ARABS NOT FORGET UNITED STATES COMPLICITY GIVING ISRAEL PROMISES. PRO-EGYPTIAN AL FAYHA ASKS ARABS PROMPTLY ALLEVIATE SUFFERINGS GAZA PEOPLE BUT AVOIDS DISCUSSION UNITED STATES ROLE WITHDRAWAL. PRO-SOVIET AL NASR REPORTS OFFICIAL UNITED STATES CIRCLES STATE SECRETARY DULLES PROMISED AMBASSADOR EBAN TO OP OSE EGYPT RETURN GAZA, BUT ALSO LIKE MOST PRESS PUBLISHED DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN REITERATION NO PRIVATE UNITED STATES-ISRAELI AGREEMENTS. SAUDI-SUBSIDIZED AL AYYAM ONLY PAPER PRAISING UNITED STATES PROOF HER STAND AGAINST ISRAEL GENUINE ALTHOUGH ALSO WARNING NEED FOR ALERTNESS ANGLO-FRENCH EFFORTS INTERNATIONALIZE GAZA.

SYRIAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM CONFINED COMMENT TO (1) STRAIGHT NEWS WITHDRAWAL STORY (2) REPORT POLISH UN DELEGATE ASKED UN FILL GAZA-AQABA VACUUM AND RECOGNIZE AQABA WATERS INTERNATIONAL LAND (3) USSR DELEGATE ATTACK ON UNITED STATES FOR PLAYING REFEREE AND IGNORING UN BY GIVING ISRAEL GUARANTEES COMMENT: IF (2) ABOVE CORRECT POLISH DELEGATE SEEMS UNAWARE POLISH-SYRIAN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS.

JB

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44-48
Action

Control: 3139
Rec'd: March 6, 1957
4:06 a.m.

NEA FROM: Damascus
Info
RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 2022, March 5
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SENT DEPARTMENT 2022, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 1, USUN 2.

IO Syrian press radio announced March 5 Israeli patrol opened fire
P intermittently on Tel Qasr border stations south Jisr Banat
UOP Yacub for approximately 15 minutes 2030 hours March 3; no re-
ND turn fire or casualties.
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RM/R 12:14

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58-52

Action

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Control: 2812

Rec'd: March 5, 1957
1:35 p.m.

Info

RMR

FROM: Amman

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1034, March 5.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1034, REPEATED INFORMATION BAGHDAD 192, BEIRUT 242,
CAIRO 214, DAMASCUS 212, JIDDA 74, LONDON 187, TEL AVIV 114

Anti-climactic announcement Israel withdrawal Gaza Aqaba Gulf produces rash of pronouncement and editorials today's press. General Nuwwar in statement to P asserts US losing prestige battle in ME to Soviets as result wavering support unconditional withdrawal Israel. Interprets US Israeli talks as attempt appease Israel and says war inevitable unless Big Powers act to preserve and protect rights Palestine Arabs. Belittles as propaganda that Syria becoming unduly influenced by Soviets and states Jordan ready accept military assistance either from West or Soviet bloc as Egypt and Syria are doing. Concludes with overworked theme defense of Arabs must emanate from the area; as result Anglo-French Israeli aggression Arabs have no confidence Big Powers will defend them.

Minister State for Foreign Affairs Abdullah Rimawi in UP interview says any attempt internationalize Aqaba Gulf will be opposed by Arab countries "... internationalization Gulf Aqaba exactly similar to demanding internationalization Gulf of Mexico ...". Says Communist danger in ME "legend which Arabs reject emphatically; real danger imperiling Arab nationalism comes from imperialism and Zionism".

Editorials give some kudos Eisenhower stand against Israel pointing bitterly to other nations and US congressional leaders as having delayed Israeli withdrawal, but then usurp credit by glorifying determination Nasser and Arabs as being primary influence in Eisenhower's stand against "Jewish mutiny". Most editorials express hope that true picture Israel now revealed to world "continuously deceived by Jews". Pro-palace AL JIHAD emphasizes "terror and oppressive rule" which existed Gaza and hopes for investigation "Jewish crimes committed during occupation". All papers call for early handing over Gaza administration to Egyptians.

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FROM: NEW YORK

Control: 3068

Rec'd: MARCH 5, 1957
10:45 PM

Info
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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: DELGA 847, MARCH 5, 10 PM

NIACT

FOR THE SECRETARY AND WILCOX

RE: ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.



HAMMARSKJOLD REQUESTED FURTHER URGENT MEETING THIS EVENING. (FOR PREVIOUS MEETING SEE DELGA 848). HE HAD JUST HAD LONG AND DISTURBING TALK WITH MRS. MEIR IN WHICH SHE HAD STATED ISRAEL POSITION TO BE AS FOLLOWS:

(1) ISRAEL WILL EXERCISE RIGHT TO GO THROUGH STRAITS OF TIRAN NEXT WEEK AND WILL USE WARSHIPS IF NECESSARY. INNOCENT PASSAGE MEANT CONDUCT NOT CHARACTER OF SHIPPING.

(2) RETURN OF EGYPT "IN ANY WAY, SHAPE OR FORM" TO GAZA WOULD BRING INTO ACTION ISRAEL'S RIGHT OF RETURN TO GAZA. THIS APPLIED NOT ONLY TO INITIAL TAKEOVER PERIOD WHICH ISRAEL WISHED EXTEND AS LONG AS POSSIBLE BUT FOR FUTURE AS WELL. ISRAEL WISHED SECRETARY-GENERAL CONSULT IN JERUSALEM BEFORE END OF INITIAL TAKEOVER IN ORDER TO WORK OUT ISRAEL'S PARTICIPATION IN LONG-RANGE GAZA ADMINISTRATION.

(3) MRS. MEIR STATED THAT ISRAELI POSITION AS SET FORTH ABOVE HAD BEEN ENDORSED BY ALL THOSE WHO STATED IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE THAT ISRAEL'S ASSUMPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS WERE REASONABLE. IN FACT, MRS. MEIR STATED THAT EVERY SINGLE WORD OF HER STATEMENT OF MARCH 1 HAD BEEN SO ENDORSED, INCLUDING THE REFERENCE TO ISRAEL'S RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 51. SHE SAID, MOREOVER, THAT HER STATEMENT HAD BEEN WRITTEN NOT BY ISRAEL BUT BY THOSE WITH WHOM ISRAEL HAD CONSULTED.

HAMMARSKJOLD

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-2- DELGA 847, MARCH 5, 10 PM, FROM NEW YORK

HAMMARSKJOLD ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHETHER SECY DULLES HAD ENDORSED THE ISRAELI POSITION AS MRS. MEIR HAD GIVEN IT. HER ANSWER WAS YES.

HAMMARSKJOLD STATED HE HAD CAREFULLY AVOIDED TAKING ANY POSITION ON SUBSTANCE OF MRS. MEIR'S STATEMENT BECAUSE HE WISHED AVOID ANY EXCUSE FOR STOPPING WITHDRAWAL. HE COULD NOT, HOWEVER, IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES NEGOTIATE IN CAIRO EITHER ON SUEZ OR ARRANGEMENTS FOR GAZA. ISRAEL'S POSITION AND THAT OF EGYPT AND REST OF ASSEMBLY, EXCEPT FRANCE, WERE TOTALLY IRRECONCILABLE. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT ISRAELI STATEMENT TO HIM TODAY PUT CLASH CLEARLY ON THE RECORD, AND PRECLUDED FURTHER ACTION BY HIM. IF HE WERE TO NEGOTIATE WITH EGYPT RE GAZA, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ON THE BASIS OF EGYPT'S COMING IN IN SOME WAY. THAT WOULD BRING ISRAELIS IN, AS THEY HAVE NOW CLEARLY ANNOUNCED, AND FIGHTING WOULD BE RESUMED. UNEF MEANWHILE WOULD COLLAPSE. HE COULD NOT ALONE TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE CONSEQUENCES.

ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE FOR HIM TO ACCEPT THE ISRAELI THESIS, BUT THIS WOULD LEAD EGYPTIANS TO DEMAND WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF AND CONSEQUENTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF UNITS BY PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES. THE RESULT IN THIS CASE ALSO COULD BE A RESUMPTION OF THE FIGHTING.

IN EITHER EVENT, IF THIS ISSUE NOW CAME TO THE ASSEMBLY, AS IT MIGHT WELL DO, ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE JEOPARDIZED, IF NOT TOTALLY STOPPED.

AT END OF MEETING, ENGEN (NORWAY) WHO HAD BEEN PRESENT THROUGHOUT, REPORTED CONVERSATION WITH EBAN THIS AFTERNOON WHICH SUBSTANTIATED ALL OF ABOVE. IN ADDITION, ENGEN SAID EBAN SHOWED HIM TEXT OF FRENCH NOTE TO JERUSALEM IN WHICH FRANCE EXPLICITLY GUARANTEED ISRAEL'S POSITION REGARDING RIGHT OF ACTION IF EGYPT WERE RE-ESTABLISHED IN GAZA. HAMMARSKJOLD INTERPRETED FRENCH GUARANTEE, TOGETHER WITH OTHER INDICATIONS OF FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN PRESENT SITUATION, AS INDICATING FRANCE MIGHT BE LAYING GROUNDWORK FOR RENEWED MILITARY INTERVENTION ON ISRAEL'S SIDE.

HAMMARSKJOLD'S CONCLUSION WAS THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO.

HE WAS

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-3- DELGA 847, MARCH 5, 10 PM, FROM NEW YORK

HE WAS AWARE OF THE SECRETARY'S IMMINENT DEPARTURE AND
ASKED THAT THIS SITUATION BE BROUGHT TO HIS IMMEDIATE
ATTENTION.

LODGE

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Department of State

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Handwritten signature

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12:34 A.M.

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Info
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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: DELGA 849, MARCH 5, 11 P.M.

PRIORITY

FOR WILCOX

RE ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL



CROSTHWAITE (UK) CALLED AT HIS REQUEST CONCERNING THE ISSUE OF EGYPTIAN AUTHORITY AND PRESENCE IN GAZA. HE SAID THAT UKDEL WAS UNCERTAIN AS TO WHERE U.S. NOW STOOD AND WAS CONCERNED THAT ISRAELI'S CONTINUED INSISTENCE THAT EGYPT COULD NOT RETURN TO GAZA WOULD RESULT IN CHARGES OF BAD FAITH FROM ALL SIDES. SPECIFICALLY, HE REQUESTED INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER FOLLOWING MRS. MEIR'S STATEMENT IN GA ON FRIDAY, U.S. AND ISRAEL OVER WEEK-END RE-EXAMINED QUESTION OF EGYPTIAN RIGHTS IN GAZA, OR DID U.S. STILL REGARD ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AS GOVERNING.

HE SAID UK WAS ANXIOUS NOT BE OUT OF STEP WITH US AND THEREFORE CONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT TO KNOW EXACTLY WHERE U.S. STOOD ON THIS ISSUE. WE AGREED REQUEST CLARIFICATION FROM DEPARTMENT AND INFORM UKDEL AS SOON AS RECEIVED.

LODGE

MAM

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Department of State

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☐ CHARGE TO

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107 MAR 5 PM 6 30

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SENT TO: Amembassy, CAIRO 2936
Amembassy, TEL AVIV 845
USUN, NEW YORK (POUCH)

Jem

Origin

Info:

In talk with Secretary afternoon March 2, Israel Ambassador reported that of Lodge UNGA statement of March 1 had been misunderstood in Israel where there was something of political crisis going on. Israelis felt that US endorsement of legitimacy of assumptions stated by Israel as basis for withdrawal had been less than wholehearted. Israel disturbed that Lodge had used wording which involved Egypt in responsibility for administration of Gaza and had mentioned Armistice Agreement in connection with Gaza settlement. Eban recognized that there was disagreement between Israel and US regarding Armistice Agreement. Secretary expressed view that Lodge's statement had adequately expressed US position as stated to Israelis. He considered it matter of extreme importance that Israel go forward with implementation of withdrawal decision announced March 1.

Eban wondered whether some way might be found within context what US had already set forth for US to make more affirmative statement with respect to Israel's hopes and expectations, and a definitive statement of US view that UN should administer Gaza until settlement. Secretary said he did not see how arrangement for UN forces and administration could be made without Egyptian acquiescence. He did not feel we could or should give unpublishable

assurances

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 3/5/55

Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - William M. Romm

202 S/S-CR
MAR 5 - 1957 P.M.

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assurances to Israel. What we both wanted was to bring about conditions which Israelis had described with respect to passage through Straits and de facto UN presence in Gaza. Best way do this was have Egypt realize that we could not challenge its rights under Armistice Agreement but we sought arrangement whereby Egypt would waive those rights in favor of UN.

After brief recess, Eban presented draft statement which he thought would be helpful to Israelis if US issued it. Secretary doubted wisdom of issuing such a statement. Secretary said President had in mind sending to Israel Primin an expression of his gratification that Israel had decided withdraw. That might be occasion express in general terms our hopes for area and our belief that Israel was not unjustified in relying on resoluteness of friends of justice, using words employed in previous statements. Eban thought that such framework for further US expression would be very good. Presidential statement was later sent to Tel Aviv for delivery by Ambassador Lawson and released to US press that midnight.

On afternoon March 3 Eban again met with Secretary. Eban recounted difficulties Ben Gurion was facing in obtaining acceptance in Israel Govt and Parliament of his decision withdraw. Eban felt Ben Gurion's task would be made easier if there could be further exchange correspondence between US and Israel particularly with respect Gaza. Israel Govt would like to say that in case of premature breakdown of UN in Gaza, and return of a belligerent Egypt, Israel would be justified in considering that its rights defense became operative. US could then note Israel statement. In responding, Secretary made it clear that US would not feel itself entitled from juridical standpoint make assumption that mere Egyptian occupation of territory which under

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[which under Armistice Agreement it was entitled occupy would give Israel right to act.] Eban pressed Israel request at considerable length and asked whether Secretary would regard Israel safeguards as coming into effect not only upon return of Egypt but upon recreation of conditions which would threaten Israel's security. Secretary said even that would be over-simplification. There were many variations and it would be difficult say exactly what our position would be in many contingencies which might arise. He thought Israel would be much better off to let matter stand as at present. He thought it essential to integrity of US position that we be able state we had not given any secret assurances or guarantees to Israel.

Eban said he would have accept Secretary's position. He wondered whether ~~1957~~ ¹⁹⁵⁶ he could address letter to Secretary saying he attached great importance to two specified aspects of Israel Fonmin's UNGA statement: 1) Israel intention defend free passage its shipping in Gulf Aqaba under Article 51 of Charter; 2) Israel reservation of freedom act defend its rights if conditions created in Gaza indicating return to previous deterioration. Secretary could then reply that he had taken note of Fonmin's statements. In reply to question from Secretary, Rountree expressed concern at implications of exchange communications along these lines. Secretary said he would consider matter. Urged Israel be in position state that withdrawal plans well underway by time UNGA met next morning.

Eban returned to his Embassy, prepared draft letter from Israel Fonmin which was sent to Secretary for study. After studying draft Secretary telephoned Eban at 1025 PM March 3 to state he had come to conclusion we should not proceed with

exchange

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exchange of letters but that US should stand on President's March 2 letter to Ben Gurion. Secretary said we did in fact have difference of opinion re Gaza and he saw no use of spreading that difference on record. If Ambassador wished write letter re Israel position re transit of Straits, US would be glad answer, setting forth our views. However, he thought exchange should not be handled on crisis basis but should take place after Israelis proceeded with withdrawal.

COMMENT: Telephone conversation was final exchange of views between Secretary and Israelis prior to Israel withdrawal announcement of March 4 in UNGA.

Foregoing based on uncleared memos of understanding ^{and} ~~are~~ are FYI only.

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AIR POUCH

PRIORITY

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(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : EMBASSY OTTAWA

718

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

March 5, 1957

REF :

50 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	IN F O OTHER
	NEA-4	RM/R-2 EUR-5 ONI-8 P-1 USUN-1 IO-4
	3-11	CIA-15 USIA-10 OCB-1 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3

SUBJECT: CANADIAN PRESS REACTION TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S MIDDLE EAST SPEECH ON FEBRUARY 20, 1957

President Eisenhower's address to the American people on February 20, 1957 regarding the Middle East situation was widely reported by the Canadian press. Editorially, it received a cool reception.

Evidence of United States Support for Sanctions. Many editors regarded the speech as a clear indication that the United States would support United Nations sanctions against Israel if that country refused to withdraw from the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip. A number of them reiterated the general view of the Canadian press during the past weeks that it would be unjust to impose sanctions against Israel without first offering the "reasonable" guarantees Israel requests.

In a sample editorial, the Winnipeg Free Press (Lib.), one of Canada's most influential dailies, said:

"President Eisenhower has given strong encouragement to the Arab nations who are now pressing for sanctions that the United States would agree, albeit reluctantly, to this method of coercion if the United Nations so willed. The President has now told them that the United Nations had 'no choice'; as a matter of duty it must take such action unless Israel withdraws from the occupied positions. This is a message to fortify vindictive souls and to harden Arab governments in their determination to yield not a jot in affirming the rights of Egypt."

The Toronto Telegram (Con.), in an editorial entitled, "This Means Sanctions", added, "President Eisenhower left no doubt with his listeners last night that he is now in favor of applying penalties or sanctions to Israel for its slowness in withdrawing its forces from disputed Middle East areas."

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Writing from the United Nations in New York, I. Norman Smith, Associate Editor of the Ottawa Journal (Con.) was less categorical in his interpretation of the address. He said:

"It seems, at the moment, that the United States feels that Israel must be shown a lesson that it cannot ignore a UN directive; but it also seems, at the moment, that the United States government has no desire whatever to carry out the lesson to the extent of inflicting harmful sanctions. The U.S. might vote for sanctions but it would be a reluctant dragon that would come out of Washington to carry their fire."

Double Moral Standard. A number of papers, principally supporters of the Progressive Conservative Party, criticized the President's speech for what they termed its double moral standard. These editors alleged that the United States was prepared to coerce a little country, Israel, into obeying a United Nations resolution, but was unwilling to urge similar action when large nations like the Soviet Union and India were involved.

In a typical editorial, the Vancouver Province (Con.) said:

"The high moral tone of the Eisenhower speech to the American people on the question of Israel's withdrawing from Egypt will be heavily discounted for a number of reasons.

The President criticizes Israel bitterly for disobeying the UN directive of Feb. 2 to withdraw from the Gaza strip and the Gulf of Aqaba.

But what about Russia. Who disobeyed the UN directive to withdraw troops from Hungary? What about India, who has refused to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir as directed by the Security Council? What about Egypt, who has been ignoring the UN armistice directive of 1949 for all these years?

His high-sounding morality applies only to little Israel, for whom it is a matter of life and death to get security guarantees against future attacks by Arab states, especially by Egypt, a long-standing offender.

It does not apply to Russia, because Russia is too big and powerful. It does not apply to India and Egypt because the Eisenhower administration wants to be friends with them. These reservations just about demolish the President's moral position."

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Page 3 of
Desp. No. 718
From Embassy Ottawa

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Page _____ of
Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. _____
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The consistently anti-United States Toronto Globe and Mail (Con.) Canada's third largest daily newspaper, stated, "The President admitted, accepted and liberally illustrated the fact that the United Nations had a double standard of morality, one law for the weak and one for the strong. . . . small weak nations like Israel have to obey UN rulings. Big strong nations, like Russia, do not have to obey UN rulings; they can do as they please."

Miscellaneous. In miscellaneous comment on the speech, the Victoria Daily Times (Lib.) termed the President's speech "not merely a moral lecture but a grave decision of American foreign policy." The Times continued that the President has "based American foreign policy fully on the United Nations because he regards it, for all its disabilities, as the world's best hope for peace." The paper concluded by saying that "to defy the United Nations is to defy not a debating society in New York but the world's most powerful nation and its allies."

For the Ambassador:

P. Wesley Kriebel
P. Wesley Kriebel
Second Secretary of Embassy

CC: USUN
BNA

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

990
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

REF :

March 5, 1957

MAR - 6 1957

EUR INDEX

18 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	EUR-5	RM/R-2, OLI-8, IO-4, USIA-1, NEA-4 P-1
	3/8	CIA-12, OSD-4, ARMY-4, NAVY-3, AIR-3, USIA-10

SUBJECT: Possible Time Limit on Swedish Participation in UNEF

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

The Swedish press has given a moderate amount of publicity to a statement by the Minister of Defense indicating a possible time limit on continued Swedish participation in the United Nations Expeditionary Force in the Middle East (UNEF). While visiting Oslo on February 28, in connection with a meeting of Nordic Defense Ministers to discuss economic problems connected with Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and Finnish participation in the stationing of UN forces in the Middle East, the Swedish Defense Minister, Torsten NILSSON, informed the press that Sweden might retain her UN troops in the Middle East for another six months, from next May, "but longer". After that, he explained, other UN member states would have to take over. Nilsson concluded by stating that he had reason to believe that his colleagues in the other Nordic countries were of the same opinion with regard to the maintenance of their troops in the Middle East.

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In discussing this statement by Defense Minister Nilsson, the Foreign Office Bureau Chief responsible for political affairs in the Middle East, Harald EDELSTAM, stated that he understood this was an accurate statement. However, it would not be imposed without considering all pertinent factors at the time. He explained this to mean that Sweden wanted to do its share in solving the Middle East problem, but that it also felt that other UN states should also do their share. By and large, it was the Swedish Government's policy to urge a rotation of national contingents in the UNEF (this follows the same line given by the Director of the Political Section to the Deputy Chief of Mission). When the time came for Sweden to complete its maintenance of troops it would want to cooperate in an amicable arrangement to permit satisfactory replacements. This meant Sweden

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Page 2 of

Encl. No.

Desp. No. 990

From Stockholm

did not intend to leave any vacuum. He noted that the Egyptian leader, Nasser, had apparently refused to allow Brazilian troops into Egypt. Edelstam did not know the reason for this refusal but pointed out that if one of the parties refused to have a certain country's troops replace Swedish troops Sweden would try to maintain its forces until a satisfactory replacement could be obtained. Furthermore, Edelstam pointed out, the maintenance of the Swedish UNEF contingent was very costly to Sweden and no satisfactory arrangement for recompense had yet been worked out in the UN.

For the Ambassador:

Joseph Sweeney

Joseph Sweeney
First Secretary of Embassy

Copies sent to:

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Amembassy Helsinki
Amembassy Oslo
Army Attaché Stockholm

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FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM
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984
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March 5, 1957
DATE

18 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION NEA-4 EUR-5	DEPT. RM/R-2, OLI-8, IO-4, P-1, USUN-1
	REC'D 3/8	OTHER CIA-15, OSD-4, ARMY-4, NAVY-3, AIR-3, USIA-70

SUBJECT: Anti-Israeli Comments Attributed to Swedish Member of UN Truce Supervision Team

A report in Stockholms Tidningen (Labor) on February 21 featured anti-Israeli comments reportedly made by a Swedish officer attached to the UN Truce Supervision Team. The feature article has attracted a considerable amount of attention in Sweden and is in marked contrast to the predominantly pro-Israeli tone of the majority of the Swedish press accounts of current Middle Eastern developments. A copy of the pertinent portion of this report has been translated and attached as Enclosure No. 1.

Stockholms Tidningen's special correspondent in the Gaza area, K. A. LARSSON, a reputable Swedish journalist, authored this feature article quoting statements which he attributed to two unnamed Swedish army officers, both Majors, at present serving in this area. One of these Swedish Majors was attached to the UN Emergency Force and the other has been attached since 1955 to the UN Truce Supervision Team. While Major No. 1, who came with the Swedish UNEF contingent, expressed only the feeling of having "landed on the wrong side in the war", and compared Egyptian ineffectiveness to Israeli effectiveness, Major No. 2, with two years of experience in the area, expressed anti-Israeli and pro-Egyptian sentiments. He blamed the Israelis for provoking the Egyptians and ended up with the prophecy that disturbances by Israelis are now likely to occur on the Jordan border.

For the Ambassador:

Joseph Sweeney

Joseph Sweeney

First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure: *1/1*

Translated excerpts.

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Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 984
From Stockholm

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TRANSLATED EXCERPTS FROM STOCKHOLMS TIDNINGEN (LABOR) FEBRUARY 21
CONCERNING SWEDISH ARMY OFFICER'S COMMENTS ON ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN
ACTIVITY IN THE GAZA AREA

Major No. 2's tale, in part:

"You see the hill over there behind the mine fields. It is situated on the Israeli side of the demarcation line but within an area which by an earlier UN decision was to have been demilitarized. Up until 1950 a Bedouin tribe of about 15,000 people lived there, but by suitable means the Israeli had them leave. In the vacuum the Israeli installed a military post which, however, the UN observers forced them to withdraw. Instead came presently a so-called Kibbutz, claimed to be a civil settlement. There were some civilians there all right, but no women or children. Instead there was built a huge radio station. Some time went by, and the Israeli were granted permission to establish police posts within the demilitarized area. This proved a dangerous permission which caused great difficulties to the UN observers.

"Things finally went so far that we who served there were kept confined to our quarters. Not officially, of course; the Israeli only explained, politely and firmly, that for security reasons we would have to be accompanied by our Israeli contact man if we wished to leave our quarters, but the latter was seldom to be found. Instead, a sentry was placed outside and stood there all the time fingering his machinegun.

"However, it could be concealed neither to us nor to the Egyptians that a military build-up was in progress in this strategically important area. Presently, the Egyptians attempted a counter-move. They crossed into the Israeli, but officially demilitarized, area and took three prisoners. Apparently, they wished to prove that these were not policemen but military in disguise. But this was not all. The Egyptians also established a post some 200 meters beyond the wrong side of the demarcation line, which was clearly marked in the desert sand. This was a clear provocation, but for a purpose unknown. Perhaps the Egyptians figured in this way to force the affair to be taken up before the UN so that they could be given an opportunity to disclose the Israeli violation of the demilitarization provisions.

"The Israeli, however, were smarter and more resolute than that. They gathered about a brigade, entered Egyptian territory by a wide turn movement, attacked the Egyptian frontier force from the rear and annihilated or dispersed a whole battalion.

"The defeat was so smarting to the Egyptians that they did not wish to give full publicity to the affair, and it is therefore not

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Page 2 of

Encl. No. 1

Desp. No. 984

From Stockholm

known just how heavy their losses were.

"In the Gaza area it was also the Israeli who as a rule took the initiative in the incidents and who dealt the heaviest blows and yet succeeded in having world opinion look upon the Egyptians as being at least equally aggressive. In addition to this there is the fact that the Israeli actions were carried out by regular troops, while the opposite side employed groups of armed Palestine refugees. There are well over 200,000 such refugees packed together near Gaza, and even though most of them are rather apathetic there are of course elements who refuse to keep quiet. It is rather natural that the Egyptians untightened the safety valve more and more and equipped these refugees with arms and finally supported them openly.

"The Israeli for their part did not confine themselves to patrolling within their own territory, as insisted by us UN observers, but preferred to move about along the demarcation line proper, crawled in the ditch separating the two areas, and sneaked up to Egyptian sentry posts to cast insults at them.

"Presently, the incidents came under way. Among other things, the Egyptians opened fire at a fortified 'kibbutz' from which shots had been fired on several occasions. A small number of civilians were killed, which gave the Israeli cause for launching a major action. Parts of Gaza were shelled with 12 cm mortars and some 50 civilians were killed. The Egyptians now had a splendid opportunity to show the world proof of Israeli aggressiveness, but with astounding foolishness and under reference to the agitated atmosphere the international press was barred from the area. Instead, the Palestine suicide patrols were let loose.

"The Israeli knew just as well as we UN observers just where these patrols used to pass by, but the strange thing happened that not even an attempt was made to stop them. Nor was the Israeli population warned. The result was that the Palestine patrols were allowed to ravage rather undisturbed and caused much damage. The world press was invited to inspect the dead bodies and the burnt-down houses, and the bombardment of Gaza thereby came to be pushed more or less in the background.

"Things have since been going on in this fashion. Both sides have erred, but the toll of victims on the Arab side is eight times as heavy as on the Israeli side.

"I am now only waiting to see where it will take fire next time. During the last year the activity has been almost wholly concentrated on the Egyptian frontier. During the immediately preceding stage the main disturbances were on the Jordan frontier. I would not at all be surprised if there should now come a period of relative calm on the Egyptian side while Jordan takes the next beating."

Translation:

NMöller

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THE SECRETARY

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3/18/57

Dr

March 5, 1957

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: NEA - Mr. Rountree

I am sending over to the President the messages from Saud, Dahran's cables #416 and #417.

11R
880.181
Should we not have the President reply, expressing his satisfaction that we have been able finally at long last to get Israel to withdraw and that as far as the Gulf of Aqaba is concerned, we have constantly, in all our statements, made clear our sharing of King Saud's preoccupation that there be no possible Israeli interference with the pilgrims on their travels to and from the holy places.

JFD cm
John Foster Dulles

S:JFD:cjp

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FROM

D. L. Gamon - 6106

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 5, 1957

SUBJECT: 1. Gaza.
2. General Assembly Schedule.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Shimshon Arad, First Secretary, Embassy of Israel
UNP - Samuel DePalma
UNP - David L. Camon

COPIES TO: 1 ~~UNP~~
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13
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UNP cc (3)
NEA cc
USUN cc
Amembassy Tel Aviv cc

1. Gaza: Mr. Arad said that it was most important that careful thought be given to the details of the transfer of administrative authority during the first few days that UNEF takes over from Israel in the Gaza Strip. He said that much could be achieved by continuing the present pattern under which Israel supplies the Strip with certain services. If these were continued, he explained, the inhabitants of the Strip might in time come to think of Israel as something on which they could depend for their welfare. If the help that Israel has been able to give to the strip were summarily broken off and reliance placed on Egyptian assistance instead, it would be much easier, he explained, for the inhabitants to accept the Egyptian idea that Israel is an enemy.

Mr. DePalma said that, while it is easy enough to discuss the general idea of a United Nations administration of the Gaza Strip, it is much more difficult to translate such discussions into action. He ventured the opinion that it might be helpful if anyone who had good ideas on the subject were to get these to the Secretary General. Mr. DePalma, in response to a point made by Mr. Arad, expressed the opinion that the next report of the Secretary General, which the Secretary General had intimated he would make shortly, would be concerned mostly with reporting on the status of withdrawal and would not address itself very much to the future of the Gaza Strip.

Mr. DePalma said that it would be of use to have any ideas that Israel might have on how services now being supplied to the Gaza Strip might be continued under the UN administration there. He also asked Mr. Arad if the psychological change envisaged by Mr. Arad might not be furthered by having UNEF operate on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line in the Gaza area. Mr. Arad answered that he saw no necessity for UNEF's operating on both sides

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of the Line and that UNEF was a completely different matter which had no bearing on the issue under discussion. Moreover, he added, after Prime Minister Ben Gurion's decision to withdraw, it would be very imprudent for the Government of Israel to consider the deployment of UNEF on Israel's soil.

Mr. DePalma recalled that Israel had made an offer regarding the refugees in the Gaza Strip and asked what had become of that offer. Mr. Arad answered that he did not know, but pointed out that the offer had been made under different conditions, while Israel was in possession of the Gaza Strip. Mr. Arad ventured that much would depend in this respect on what would happen in the Strip over the next few months.

2. General Assembly Schedule: Mr. Arad asked what the thinking was in the Department with regard to the schedule for the General Assembly. Mr. DePalma answered that thinking was along the line that, after the Secretary General's report will have been presented in a few days, the General Assembly might recess, subject to call by the Secretary General or the President, and upon the concurrence of the majority of Members or some other group. He asked if Israel would be agreeable to such a schedule. Mr. Arad said that he thought so, provided the procedural resolution on the recess would refer to the conditions under which the General Assembly might reconvene in as broad terms as possible, so as to anticipate situations other than any possible complaints against Israel under which action might be considered necessary.

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FROM: TEL AVIV
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1038, MARCH 6

KNESSET LATE LAST NIGHT MET TO HEAR BEN GURION EXPLAIN DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM SHARM E-SHEIKH AND GAZA WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY AND WITH ONLY PRESENT ASSURANCES "THEY ARE NOT GUARANTEES." HIS 90-MINUTE SPEECH WHICH, ACCORDING PRESS, WAS DELIVERED WITH "CHEERFUL CONFIDENCE AND DETERMINATION," WAS INTERRUPTED BY CONTINUOUS HECKLING FROM HERUT PARTY MEMBERS WANTING KNOW WHY HE HAD NOT ASKED PEOPLE BEFORE ORDERING WITHDRAWAL. AFTER SPEECH HERUT MK BADER OPENED DEBATE ON GOVERNMENT DECISION, BITTERLY CONDEMNING WITHDRAWAL AND ASSERTING GOVERNMENT "HAD NO MORAL RIGHT REFUSE HERUT DEMAND FOR NEW ELECTIONS." DEBATE THEN ADJOURNED UNTIL 9:00 A.M. THIS MORNING.

BEN GURION'S SPEECH BEGAN WITH REVIEW OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO SINAI CAMPAIGN LAST OCTOBER. HE SAID SINAI OPERATION "ESSENTIAL, JUSTIFIED AND WORTHWHILE" IF ONLY BECAUSE IT SAVED ISRAEL FROM DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE DANGER, CRIPPLED ENEMIES' MILITARY CAPACITY FOR NO SHORT PERIOD AND INFLICTED HEAVY BLOW ON PRESTIGE NASSER. REVIEWING EVENTS SINCE OCTOBER, BEN GURION CREDITED PAST FOUR MONTHS WITH ACHIEVEMENT WORLD UNDERSTANDING ISRAEL'S RIGHTS IN REGARD TIRAN STRAITS AND IN REGARD DANGERS POSED TO ISRAEL BY FEDAYEEN GANGS SENT BY EGYPT FROM GAZA AND SINAI AS WELL AS HORDAN, SYRIA, AND LEBANON. CONFLICT WITH UN OVER WITHDRAWAL BEFORE ADEQUATE GUARANTEES ISRAEL'S SECURITY OBTAINED THEN DESCRIBED BY BEN GURION AS WELL AS COURSE SECRETARY EFFORTS OBTAIN ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL. REFERRING TO DELAY FOLLOWING MARCH 1 ANNOUNCEMENT OF IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL, BEN GURION NOTED CONCERN RAISED BY LODGE SPEECH AND QUOTED BRIEFLY FROM PRESIDENT'S LETTER MARCH 2, ALTHOUGH HE NOTED "I SHOULD NOT LIKE, HOWEVER, TO GIVE IMPRESSION THAT PRESIDENT'S WORDS HAVE ENTIRELY ERASED THE IMPRESSION OF MR. LODGE'S REMARKS."

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-2- 1038, MARCH 6, FROM TEL AVIV

ON COALITION CRISIS CREATED BY DECISION, BEN GURION SAID "I WILL NOT HIDE FROM YOU THAT GOVERNMENT'S DECISION WAS NOT LIGHTLY TAKEN NOR THAT IT WAS NOT ON THIS OCCASION UN-ANIMOUS. IT IS SELF-UNDERSTOOD THAT EVERY GOVERNMENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS DECISIONS. THIS INCLUDES THOSE WHO HOLD CONTRARY OPINION SO LONG AS THEY REMAIN IN GOVERNMENT AND THEREFORE WHOLE GOVERNMENT IS RESPONSIBLE BEFORE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL AND BEFORE HISTORY FOR DECISIONS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN."

REMAINDER SPEECH DEVOTED TO EXPLANATION BEN GURION'S PERSONAL REASONS FOR ADVOCATING WITHDRAWAL. HE STRESSED LACK OF "CERTAINTY" AND "CLEAR AND AUTHORATIVE UNDERTAKING" EGYPT WILL NOT RETURN GAZA AND LACK "EXPRESS UN DECISION" THAT UNEF WILL REMAIN IN TIRAN STRAITS AREA. BUT, HE NOTED (1) DECLARATIONS BY PRINCIPAL MARITIME STATES THAT GULF OF AQABA AND TIRAN STRAITS ARE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY, (2) ISRAEL RIGHT DEFEND FREEDOM OF PASSAGE UNDER ARTICLE 51 UN CHARTER, (3) IMPOSSIBILITY ACHIEVING JOINT UN-ISRAEL ADMINISTRATION IN GAZA STRIP UNDER PRESENT COMPOSITION UN; AND CONCLUDED THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT TREAT LIGHTLY WORLD MORAL CLAIM IN VIEW OF PRESENT UNDERSTANDING ABROAD ISRAEL'S PROBLEMS. HE ADDED "THE SETTLEMENT REACHED AT END OF LAST WEEK IS, IN OPINION OUR FRIENDS ABROAD, ONLY POSSIBLE ONE" WHICH THUS MAKES PROBLEM ISRAEL'S SECURITY QUESTION OF CONSCIENCE "FOR VERY MANY STATES."

SUMMARIZING, BEN GURION RAISED THREE "CENTRAL AND DIFFICULT TASKS OF GOI: IMMIGRATION, SECURITY, AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE. EXAMINING THESE, HE CONSIDERED THAT ALL WERE MORE LIKELY OF ACHIEVEMENT AS RESULT WITHDRAWAL THAN OTHERWISE. ON SECURITY HE MENTIONED ISRAEL'S NEED FOR DEFENSIVE ARMAMENTS AND SAID "PRESIDENT OF US HAS ASSUMED MORAL RESPONSIBILITY TOWARD ISRAEL, AND MANY OTHER STATES HAVE MADE STATEMENTS WHICH INVOLVE MORAL COMMITMENT. WE MUST APPRECIATE TRUE VALUE OF SUCH UNDERTAKINGS." HE CONCLUDED "WHAT WAS DECISIVE FOR ME WAS NEEDS FOR SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION AND HOPE OF DEVELOPMENT OF NEGEV AND FREE OUTLET TO THE RED SEA AND INDIAN OCEAN, THOUGH I AM KEENLY AWARE OF THE DANGERS AND DRAWBACKS INVOLVED IN SETTLEMENT WE HAVE MADE. FOR THIS REASON I DID NOT HESITATE TO ADVISE MY COLLEAGUES IN GOVERN-

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-3- 1038, MARCH 6, FROM TEL AVIV

MENT, AND I DO NOT HESITATE TO ADVISE MEMBERS OF KNESSET
AND PEOPLE OF ISRAEL TO ACCEPT THIS SETTLEMENT."

LAWSON

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AIR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1043, March 6, 5 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1043, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 179, PARIS 166, USUN 64, DAMASCUS 126, LONDON 199, AMMAN 177, BEIRUT 165.

Confirming report we received earlier today from non-official sources, GOI has released to press information anti-Israeli rioting occurred in Gaza Strip last night with one IDF soldier killed and at least two others wounded. Some material damage.

Press source, believed reliable, says GOI decided late this morning delay "indefinitely" Gaza withdrawal and scheduled Cabinet meeting 3:00 p.m. today to discuss situation. Afternoon newspaper MAARIV reports "unexpected delay" in IDF withdrawal and indicates new meeting between Dayan and Burns will be arranged to discuss withdrawal date. Confidential source confirmed efforts arrange such meeting, probably at Lydda Airport, being made.

Embassy has been unable obtain as of 3:00 p.m. (Israel time) confirmation nature of delay and GOI intentions from official sources. IDF liaison officer refused comment on MAARIV report and indicated belief only technical difficulties of minor importance are delaying withdrawal.

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AIR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1044, March 6, 6 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1044, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 201, PARIS
167, AMMAN 178, USUN 65, BEIRUT 167, CAIRO 181, DAMASCUS 128.

Re EMBTEL 1043

American CARE representative visited Gaza town from 8 to 10 this morning. He confirms reports rioting occurred last night with at least one IDF soldier killed and unknown number Arabs. He was told trouble started last night when Arabs, encouraged by obvious Israeli preparations for quick withdrawal (loading office furniture, etc.) began attacking isolated vehicles despite complete curfew imposed by IDF. Up to time he left Gaza, IDF was still engaged in clean up operations with firing going on throughout town. During his visit volume of fire noticeably increased. Source suggested IDF appeared engaged against numerous individual snipers.

Source reported rumors in Gaza IDF withdrawal to be delayed. Explanation given was that General Burns had asked for delay since he was unwilling to bring UNEF into existing hostile situation.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

Rec'd: March 6, 1957

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TO: Secretary of State

FMR

NO: 1045 March 6, 6 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1045, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 166, LONDON 200
AMMAN 178, BEIRUT 166, CAIRO 180, DAMASCUS 127.

Re EMBTEL 1035.

March 6 press and public reaction to Ben-Gurion's speech to Knesset last night explaining decision withdraw forces from Sharm E-Sheikh and Gaza has general air of calm resignation but approval decision as only course open. Opposition press and representatives continue decry decision but coalition and independent press are united in support Ben-Gurion's policy. As HAARETZ puts it, time had clearly come "to be content with what had been obtained". Public reaction has seemed even calmer than Embassy expected and it appears significant that yesterday's much heralded Herut demonstration in Jerusalem protesting withdrawal was poorly attended and dispersed quietly, making unnecessary heavy police barricades along route to Knesset. Israelis in general seem accept Ben-Gurion's explanation necessity withdraw but it is believed that struggle is not (repeat not) yet over either on domestic front or foreign front.

Embassy believes danger of cabinet crisis may now be past if reports that Achdut Avoda MAPAM having agreed vote against opposition non-confidence measures prove to be true. However, Embassy is informed by Foreign Ministry that pressure still being actively exerted by progressive party for presentation positive government resolution at conclusion Knesset debate today. Ben-Gurion was expected to meet progressive leaders this morning in effort find solution conflict between this party and MAPAM-Achdut Avoda, both of whom are opposed to positive government resolution.

Foreign Office source was unable predict outcome coalition dispute but noted "some constitutional question" appears to be involved. Nevertheless

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-2-1045 March 6, 6 p.m., from Tel Aviv

Nevertheless, press this morning is fairly confident present coalition will remain in power.

Again according Foreign Office source, debate on Ben-Gurion statement now proceeding in Knesset is "stormy" and position of government has been made "more difficult" by press account of secretary's press conference yesterday. Editorial press comment today generally takes view secretary reduced value "assurances" received by Israel prior withdrawal.

Atmosphere of public calm may be expected to vanish tonight with publication information on anti-Israeli riots in Gaza Strip last night (EMBTELS 1043 and 1044) in which one IDF soldier killed and at least two others wounded. If strong public and official reaction to this news develops as might well be expected, there will be inevitable disturbing effect on present Knesset debate and public attitude toward withdrawal.

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FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1046, MARCH 6

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1046; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 179 BEIRUT 168
CAIRO 18 DAMASCUS 129 LONDON 202 PARIS 168 USUN 66.

GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE HAS MADE FOLLOWING RELEASE:

"DURING LAST NIGHT (MARCH 5-6) THREE CASES OF
FIRING FROM AMBUSH ON ISRAEL MILITARY AND POLICE
VEHICLES OCCURRED IN GAZA AREA. FIRE WAS ALSO DIRECTED
TO TRAIN PROCEEDING NORTHWARDS FROM RAFA. A GRENADE
WAS THROWN AT PRIVATE HOUSE IN GAZA WHICH RESULTED IN
SLIGHT DAMAGE. AS RESULT OF ABOVE INCIDENTS ONE
ISRAEL SOLDIER AND ARAB RESIDENT OF GAZA WERE KILLED
AND TWO ISRAEL SOLDIERS WERE WOUNDED. CURFEW HAS BEEN
IMPOSED ON GAZA AREA AS OF THIS MORNING."

LAWSON

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Control: 3670
Rec'd: MARCH 6, 1957
3:27 PM

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FROM: Tel Aviv

Control: 3678

Rec'd: March 6, 1957
3:33 p.m.

Info

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1048, March 6, 7 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1048; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 2003, PARIS 169, AMMAN 180, BEIRUT 169, CAIRO 183, DAMASCUS 130, USUN 67.

Knesset debate on government decision withdraw Sharm E-Sheikh and Gaza has ended with firm rejection opposition, no-confidence motions. Communist motion rejected 100-6, Herut and general Zionist motions by 85-25. This victory of Ben Gurion's parliamentary procedure (no positive government resolution approving withdrawal decision was presented for vote) is favorable to continuation present coalition government.

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Control: 3671
Rec'd: March 6, 1957
3:02 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Jerusalem

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 242, March 6, Noon

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SENT DEPARTMENT 242, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY AMMAN 152
PRIORITY CAIRO 71, BEIRUT 58, DAMASCUS 56, LONDON 32, TEL AVIV
UNNUMBERED.

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Demonstration in Jerusalem organized by Herut leaders March 5 went off without incident. Crowd of possibly 6000 persons gathered vicinity King George Avenue and Jaffa Road remained orderly with some listening speeches by party leaders but most inattentive and lacking any apparent enthusiasm. Banners on display bore such slogans as "yesterday we lost El Ariseh, today Gaza, tomorrow Jerusalem."

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Police formed perimeter around demonstration area and established road blocks across streets leading into it. According press reports groups of young men who had gathered just outside area were "shock troops" mustered by Histadrut to engage any demonstrators who might break through police ranks. Large numbers police and presence firefighting equipment indicative government determination dominate any possible disorders. According Jerusalem district commissioner, government earlier apprehensive Herut leaders might instigate unruly mob actions. However, fact was leaders desired orderly demonstration only and were successful restraining any would-be extremists.

District commissioner and other contacts of Consulate General insist resentment against withdrawal Gaza and Sharm-El Sheikh genuine and wide-spread among people. Young persons, especially those with recent service in IDF and Sabras with highly localized viewpoint most unreasoning and vociferous in protests. Other classes Jerusalem population appear accept situation with usual equanimity. Intellectual and professional groups appreciate necessity Ben-Gurion's policy, but somewhat fearful UN may eventually return Gaza strip and Straits to Egyptian control with subsequent recrudescence border skirmishes thereafter leading to need for "second round" against Egypt.

MGG:DEM/10

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FROM: DAMASCUS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2036, MARCH 6, 11 AM

SENT DEPARTMENT 2036; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN, BAGHDAD,
BEIRUT, CAIRO, JIDDA UNNUMBERED.

JOINT STATE-USIS.

UNUSUALLY VICIOUS COMMENTARY SYRIAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM
MARCH 6 DECLARES "WHEN IMPERIALISTS TALK ABOUT STABILITY IN
MIDDLE EAST (WHICH MAKES THEIR MOUTHS WATER) THEY MEAN PEACE
WHICH SECURES THEIR ENDS. THEY DISTORT FACTS TO ACHIEVE
THESE. FOR EXAMPLE THEY TURN TERRITORIAL WATERS INTO
INTERNATIONAL... ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL DID NOT OCCUR UNTIL
AFTER SERIES OF TRICKS... IMPERIALISTS ARE RENEWING
MALICIOUS ATTEMPTS INTERNATIONALIZE GAZA AND AQABA... TO
KILL ARAB NATIONALISM AND IMPOSE CONTROL ON WHOLE ARAB WORLD...
ALL ARAB PEOPLE SUPPORT ARAB LEADERS TO REPEL EVERY AGRESSOR..."

ALL PRESS PUBLISHES MAJOR PARTS SECRETARY DULLES PRESS CONF
ERENCE BUT SOME HEADLINES MISLEADING. G-2, ASRP RAI AL-AM
SAYS SECRETARY ANNOUNCE SUPPORT REMOVAL EGYPTIANS SOVEREIGNT
OVER ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS. COMMUNIST AL NUR CLAIMS HE
PRAISES ISRAEL AND AGAIN ANNOUNCES ISRAELI PIRATES
RESPECT VIEWS HUMANITY. MOST HEADS STRESS THEME SECRETARY
"CALLS ON " EGYPT OPEN CANAL.

COMMENT: SINCE SBS REFLECTS VIEWS FOREIGN MINISTER AND ARMY
TODAY'S COMMENTARY PROBABLY INDICATES GOS PUBLIC LINE GAZA
AND AQABA QUESTIONS COMING WEEKS.

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Action
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FROM: NEW YORK

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 854, MARCH 6, 9 PM

MESSAGE CENTER

Control: 3868
Rec'd: MARCH 6, 1957
9:47 PM

PRIORITY

RE PALESTINE: ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL; INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS.

AFTER PHONE CALL WITH SECRETARY THIS MORNING, LODGE CALLED ON SYG HAMMARSKJOLD TO CONVEY SECRETARY'S VIEWS. LODGE TOLD HIM WE FELT HE SHOULD DISREGARD COMPLETELY WHAT MRS. MEIR SAID YESTERDAY AND PROCEED WITH WITHDRAWALS ON BASIS OF PUBLIC RECORD. ISRAEL KNEW US DID NOT SUBSCRIBE 100 PERCENT TO THEIR VIEWPOINT AND US POSITION FULLY CONTAINED IN PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. SECY FELT HAMMARSKJOLD SHOULD TRY TO GET UNEF STATIONED ON ISRAELI SIDE OF LINE. ISRAEL'S POSITION ON THIS HAD BEEN COMPLETELY IN WRONG AND SYG SHOULD MAKE THIS ISSUE FULLY PUBLIC. SECRETARY REFERRED SYG TO HIS PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY. HE EXTENDED HIS BEST WISHES AND THANKS FOR GOOD JOB SYG DOING.

HAMMARSKJOLD EXPRESSED GRATEFUL APPRECIATION FOR SECRETARY'S MESSAGE. HE REFERRED TO ONE SECTION OF SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH SECRETARY SAID MRS. MEIR'S MARCH 1 SPEECH, ON UN BEING EXCLUSIVE AGENT DURING INITIAL TAKEOVER IN GAZA, DIRECTLY USED WORDS IN SYG'S STATEMENT TO PLENARY OF FEBRUARY 22. SYG NOTED THAT HIS LANGUAGE OF FEBRUARY 22 REFERRED TO EXCLUSIVE UN ROLE "IN THE FIRST INSTANCE". HE SAID WHEN PINEAU (FRANCE) HAD SHOWN HIM NOTES ON WHAT MRS. MEIR WOULD SAY TO GA ON MARCH 1, SENTENCE READ "INITIAL TAKEOVER," BUT WORD "INITIAL" HAD BEEN CROSSED OUT. WHEN ISRAELI STATEMENT DELIVERED, IT OMITTED WORD "INITIAL". SYG SAID SECRETARY DULLES WAS RELYING ON HIS UNDERSTANDING OF ISRAELI TEXT, BUT ISRAELIS HAD MADE THIS SLIGHT BUT SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT INFORMING SECRETARY.

HAMMARSKJOLD WENT ON TO NOTE THAT MRS. MEIR HAD, UNWISELY IN HIS

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-2- DELGA 854, MARCH 6, 9 PM FROM NEW YORK

HIS OPINION, TOLD HER PRESS LUNCHEON YESTERDAY ISRAEL WAS OPPOSED TO EGYPT'S RETURN TO GAZA IN "ANY SHAPE OR FORM." LODGE NOTED THERE WAS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HER SAYING THAT IN PRIVATE, OR TO PRESS LUNCHEON, AND ON FLOOR OF GA. SYG AGREED IT WAS NOT SAME THING, BUT ALL THE SAME REGARDED IT AS DANGEROUS.

SYG THEN REPORTED CALL FROM EBAN LATE LAST NIGHT IN WHICH LATTER EXPRESSED CONCERN AS TO LENGTH OF INITIAL TAKEOVER PERIOD. HAMMARSKJOLD HAD TOLD EBAN HE HAD NO FIXED PLAN, AND AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, "THE LONGER THE BETTER". REASONS HE HAD AS YET NO PLANS INCLUDED FACT OF MRS. MEIR'S STATEMENT TO HIM OF ISRAEL'S POSITION, WHICH, AS EBAN KNEW, WAS NOT COMPLETELY ENDORSED. SYG SAID EBAN OBVIOUSLY DEDUCED THAT SYG KNEW WHAT MRS. MEIR HAD SAID REGARDING US ENDORSEMENT WAS UNTRUE, AND CONSEQUENTLY SOUGHT TO RESTATE THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF WASHINGTON POSITION AS "WANTING TO SEE ISRAEL'S EXPECTATIONS FULFILLED, BUT NOT BEING ABLE FIND LEGAL FORMULA THEREFOR."

HAMMARSKJOLD HAD CONCLUDED HE MUST PROCEED IN SPITE OF RISKS. HE SAID THERE WAS STILL BASIC CONTRADICTION IN POSITIONS, BUT HE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ITS BEING PARTLY "ARTIFICIAL," (OR BLUFF) FROM ISRAELI SIDE. IF GREATER CLARITY WERE SOUGHT, REGARDLESS OF HOW CAREFULLY IT WAS DONE, HE FELT THERE WAS RISK OF NEW CONFUSIONS. ON BALANCE HE WAS INCLINED TO GAMBLE, PROCEED ON BASIS PRESENT RECORD AND TAKE CALCULATED RISKS.

SYG THEREFORE INTENDED MAKE REPORT TO GA, ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE REPORTED YESTERDAY. IN IT HE WOULD SET OUT SCHEDULE FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. HE WOULD THEN SAY, IN EFFECT, "LET'S GET ON WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF RES 11 OF FEBRUARY 2", AND IN PARTICULAR PARTS OF HIS JANUARY 24 REPORT WHICH GA CALLED FOR PUTTING INTO EFFECT. THIS WOULD INCLUDE PLACING UNEF ON BOTH SIDES OF ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE.

LODGE SAID AT THIS POINT HE HEARTILY ENDORSED THIS PROCEDURE AND WOULD PUBLICLY STATE, PROBABLY IN GA, THAT HAVING UNEF ON ISRAEL'S BORDER, INSIDE ISRAELI TERRITORY, WOULD BE GREATEST ASSURANCE OF SECURITY ISRAEL COULD POSSIBLY ACHIEVE.

SYG THEN OUTLINED RISKS AS HE SAW THEM. HE WOULD HOPE TO HAVE INITIAL TAKEOVER PERIOD LAST AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. THERE WAS POSSIBILITY EGYPT COULD CONTINUE TO LIVE WITH LACK OF CLARITY ON ADMINISTRATION IN GAZA. HE FELT HE MIGHT BE ABLE CONVINCE
EGYPT

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-3- DELGA 854, MARCH 6, 9 PM FROM NEW YORK

EGYPT OF DESIRABILITY OF MORATORIUM ON PUBLIC COMMENT ON GAZA ISSUE. THAT WOULD WORK SO LONG AS THERE WAS NO PROVOCATION. FOR HIS PART, HE WOULD "LIE LOW, AND APPEAR REASONABLY HAPPY." IT WOULD BE LIKEWISE INCOMBENT UPON ISRAEL TO REFRAIN FROM PUBLIC BRAGGING OR OTHERWISE "DE FACTO PROVOKING" EGYPTIANS.

IF THINGS WENT WELL, SYG HOPED FOR 5-6 WEEK PERIOD OF CALM IN WHICH TO WORK MATTERS OUT. BY THEN, SOME EGYPTIANS MIGHT QUIETLY COME INTO GAZA. ISRAEL SHOULD BY THEN HAVE NO REASON FEAR ADVERSE DOMESTIC REACTION, ALTHOUGH EGYPT FOR ITS PART SHOULD NOT TRY TO MAKE BIG THING OF IT.

SYG SAID HE WAS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT ISRAEL'S INTENTION, ANNOUNCED TO HIM YESTERDAY, OF HAVING ISRAELI SHIPPING READY AND WAITING AT ENTRANCE SUEZ CANAL FOR OPENING OF CANAL. THEY SHOULD NOT, IN HIS OPINION, TRY TO FORCE CANAL ISSUE AT START, BECAUSE EGYPT WOULD BE BOUND TO DENY PASSAGE.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID CAIRO WAS KEEN ON MAKING PUBLICITY OUT OF HIS GOING TO CAIRO FOR NEGOTIATIONS. HE WOULD HOPE TO AVOID ANY NEGOTIATIONS FOR A WHILE ON GAZA AND STICK TO SUEZ ISSUE. HOWEVER, IT WAS DIFFICULT AVOID QUESTION OF GAZA SINCE THERE WERE ALWAYS ISSUES ON WHICH HE MIGHT HAVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH ONE SIDE OR OTHER. AS EXAMPLE, LAST NIGHT BURNS HAD CABLED ABOUT CURRENCY PROBLEM IN GAZA. BURNS HAD APPARENTLY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO EXCHANGE ALL ISRAELI POUNDS FOR EGYPTIAN PIASTERS. ISRAELIS WERE INSISTING ON THEIR RIGHT TO PASS UPON SUCH TRANSACTIONS. SINCE CURRENCY ISSUE INVOLVED ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGNTY, THIS WAS VERY TICKLISH ISSUE FOR BURNS AND UN TO HANDLE. THIS WAS PART OF RISK, HOWEVER, WHICH HE FELT HE AND UN MUST RUN.

L. LODGE

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 855, MARCH 6, 9 P.M.

PRIORITY

RE: PALESTINE: (1) ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL
(2) INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR CANAL

FURTHER DELGA 854:

1. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH SYG AFTER SECRETARY HAD CALLED HIM AND PERSONALLY CONVEYED US VIEWS, SYG EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION FOR CLARITY OF SITUATION AS IT DEVELOPED IN WASHINGTON, AND FOR CONFIRMING IN HIS MIND AGREEMENT BETWEEN US POSITION AND HIS OWN. HE SAID HE HAD THAT AFTERNOON "RUBBED IT IN" WITH GEORGES-PICOT (FRANCE) TELLING HIM HE HAD HAD CHANCE TO CROSS-CHECK SITUATION IN GREATEST DETAIL WITH WASHINGTON, AND THERE WAS NO DOUBT OF ACCURACY OF HIS UNDERSTANDING OF US POSITION.

HAMMARSKJOLD THEN REPORTED ON HOUR'S TALK HE HAD HAD WITH FAWZI (EGYPT) IN EARLY AFTERNOON. LATTER WAS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH SYG'S INTENTION TO PUT OUT SHORT REPORT NOTING WITHDRAWAL AND BRINGING OUT IN SOME FASHION THAT THING TO DO NOW WAS PROCEED WITH IMPLEMENTATION RES 11 OF FEB 2. FAWZI HAD ASKED HIM WHETHER HE REALLY FELT FURTHER RES ENDORSING HIS REPORT WAS NECESSARY. FAWZI SAID MOMENT THERE WAS FURTHER PAPER IT INVITED PEOPLE'S COMMENT WHICH WOULD NOT BE TOO HELPFUL. FROM HIS TALK WITH FAWZI SYG CONCLUDED ALL THAT WAS NEEDED WAS TO MAKE CLEAR IN HIS REPORT THAT NOTHING HAD SUPERSEDED RES 11; I.E., THAT WHAT TOOK PLACE IN WASHINGTON OVER LAST WEEKEND COULD NOT BE DEEMED TO HAVE MODIFIED ASSEMBLY'S PREVIOUS STAND. IF THIS WERE CASE, THEN ALL THAT WOULD HAPPEN IN PLENARY WOULD BE DEBATE ON REPORT, NO RES, AND THEN RECESS.

WE RAISED



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-2- DELGA 855, MARCH 6, 9 P.M., FROM NEW YORK.

WE RAISED WITH HAMMARSKJOLD SOMEWHAT DISCOURAGING CONVERSATION WITH CROSTHWAITE (UK) THIS AFTERNOON, IN WHICH LATTER HAD RAISED QUESTION OF UNEF PLACEMENT ON ISRAEL SIDE OF ARMISTICE LINE. HE ARGUED THAT SINCE THIS HAD APPARENTLY NOT BEEN RAISED IN WASHINGTON, NOR IN MRS. MEIR'S SPEECH, NOR IN SPEECHES ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 2 RES 11, PARTICULARLY THAT PART CALLING FOR STATIONING OF UNEF IN ISRAEL, HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED. WE INFORMED SYG WE COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH INTERPRETATION OF ERASING PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS BY OMISSION OF COMMENT. HAMMARSKJOLD AGREED WITH OUR INTERPRETATION, BUT EXPLAINED THAT HIS HAVING RAISED SUBJECT IN GENERAL WAY WITH DIXON (UK) MAY HAVE STIMULATED CROSTHWAITE'S THINKING AND HE (CROSTHWAITE) HAD PUSHED IDEA SO FAR IN HIS THINKING AS TO IMAGINE ALL UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES WHICH MIGHT FOLLOW FROM BRINGING UP THIS ISSUE, AND HAD THEREFORE BEEN ARGUING AGAINST IT ON THIS SOMEWHAT STRANGE BASIS. HAMMARSKJOLD FELT THAT ISRAEL, HOWEVER, MIGHT VERY LIKELY ARGUE THAT RES 11 HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED, SO HE INTENDED TO GIVE SLIGHT PUSH TO IDEA OF UNEF ON BOTH SIDES OF LINE AT THIS POINT, TO AVOID IMPRESSION IT WAS DEAD. IF ISRAEL OBJECTED, WE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT WHAT TO DO, BUT HE FELT HE COULD SO STATE THE MATTER AS TO AVOID PROMPTING NEGATIVE ISRAELI STAND IN PUBLIC. IN THIS CONNECTION HE THOUGHT IT USEFUL HAVE STATEMENT FROM US SUPPORTING IDEA AS BEING GOOD FROM ISRAEL'S OWN STANDPOINT.

RETURNING TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH FAWZI, SYG SAID HE HAD "CHECKED OUT" IDEAS ON FAWZI THAT HE HAD MENTIONED THIS MORNING TO US. FAWZI NOT ONLY HAD AGREED 100 PERCENT BUT HAD EVEN ELABORATED ON SYG'S LINE. FAWZI HAD SAID IF SYG DID NOT FEEL HE HAD TO "CRACK THE NUT" OF TALKING WITH EGYPT ABOUT ADMINISTRATION IN GAZA AT THIS TIME, HE BELIEVED IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY FOR SYG GO TO CAIRO NEXT WEEK, AND IN FACT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE PERIOD OF CALM AND QUIET, WITH NO BORDER RAIDS OR INCURSIONS, SO THAT EGYPT COULD MOVE INTO STAGE OF SERIOUS TALKS. HE SUGGESTED, AND SYG AGREED, THAT IF SYG DID NOT NEED GO TO CAIRO NEXT WEEK, SYG SHOULD WAIT UNTIL AFTER HIS TRIP TO TUNISIA TO ATTEND INDEPENDENCE DAY CELEBRATION (MARCH 20?) AND AFTER CAIRO, FAWZI

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-3- DELGA 855, MARCH 6, 9 P.M., FROM NEW YORK.

CAIRO, FAWZI SAID, SHOULD GO TO JERUSALEM. IN THIS CONNECTION FAWZI EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT BEN GURION SPEECH TO KNESSET YESTERDAY, NOT OF COURSE WHERE IT SPOKE OF ISRAEL RETURNING TO GAZA, BUT BECAUSE IT IN EFFECT RECOGNIZED FUTURE POSSIBILITY OF EGYPT GOING INTO GAZA. THIS TOOK BURDEN OFF CAIRO.

2. FAWZI TOLD SYG HE WOULD TRY WITHIN NEXT THREE OR FOUR DAYS TO OBTAIN FROM CAIRO A UNILATERAL DECLARATION RE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUEZ WHICH WOULD MAKE NEGOTIATIONS THIS REGARD UNNECESSARY. IT WOULD NOT BE BARGAINING POSITION BUT WOULD GO "ALL THE WAY". SYG SAID IF FAWZI SUCCEEDED, HE FELT WE WOULD GET MORE THROUGH HIM OUT OF CAIRO THAN THROUGH ANYONE ELSE NEGOTIATING FOR USERS'S INTERESTS. HE FELT IT WOULD BE DECLARATION TO WHICH NO ONE COULD REASONABLY OBJECT ALTHOUGH THERE WOULD BE SOME "SCREAMS" ABOUT IT. HE SAID IT WOULD PROBABLY PROVIDE FOR PAYMENT INTO ACCOUNT WHICH EGYPT WOULD DRAW UPON ONLY UP TO ABOUT 50 PERCENT FOR OPERATING EXPENSES. REMAINDER EGYPT WOULD NOT TOUCH, AND WOULD HOLD FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT WHICH SHOULD NOT BE TOO LONG IN FOLLOWING. EGYPT'S SCHEME WOULD APPARENTLY ALLOW FOR "ALL KINDS OF RESERVATIONS" SO THAT US SYSTEM OF PAYMENTS WOULD BE FULLY RECOGNIZED.

HAMMARSKJOLD ASKED PARTICULARLY THAT THIS IDEA OF UNILATERAL DECLARATION AND PROBABLE CONTENTS NOT BE DIVULGED OUTSIDE US GOVERNMENT.

IF FAWZI DID NOT SUCCEED IN GETTING ABOVE OUT OF CAIRO IN THREE OR FOUR DAYS, HE THOUGHT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES HAMMARSKJOLD WOULD HAVE TO GO TO CAIRO NEXT WEEK. THAT WOULD BE ONLY CONDITION ON WHICH SYG WOULD, IN FAWZI'S OPINION, HAVE GO THERE, UNTIL AFTER MARCH 20.

IN THIS GENERAL CONNECTION SYG RETURNED TO WHAT HE SAID BEFORE: THAT IT WOULD BE FOLLY FOR ISRAEL TO TRY TO FORCE ISSUE OF ISRAELI PASSAGE THROUGH CANAL ON OPENING DAY, OR IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE, THAT COULD WRECK EVERYTHING. MOREOVER HE SAID HE FELT IF ISRAELIS SENT WARSHIPS THROUGH STRAITS TIRAN HE WOULD, AS LAWYER,

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-4- DELGA 855, MARCH 6, 9 P.M., FROM NEW YORK.

AS LAWYER, FEEL EGYPT JUSTIFIED IN STOPPING ISRAELI COMMERCIAL SHIPPING IN CANAL, ON GROUNDS THAT WARSHIP IN EGYPT'S CLAIMED TERRITORIAL WATERS HAD OBVIOUS APPEARANCE OF HOSTILE ACT WHICH WOULD ENTITLE EGYPT TO ASSERT ITS BELLIGERENCY BY STOPPING ENEMY SHIPPING THROUGH CANAL. HE THEREFORE HOPED US AT APPROPRIATE TIME MIGHT USE ITS INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE ISRAELIS OF WISDOM OF NOT PUSHING THIS ISSUE AT THIS TIME.

LODGE

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re Gaza settlement*

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FROM : Amembassy Cape Town

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TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

DESP. NO.
CapeTown Series 3/15 March 6, 1957

DATE

REF :

15 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.	PORT ELIZABETH-1 DURBAN-1
	NEA-4	RM/R-2	JOHANNESBURG-1 CAPE TOWN-1 S/EWC-1
	REC'D	OTHER	4/0-1
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			CIA-12 OSD-4 USIA-10 OCB-1 ARMY-4

SUBJECT: South Africa Strongly Supports Israel on Withdrawal Question

SUMMARY

South African public opinion strongly supports Israel's action in not wanting to withdraw from Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba without adequate guarantees. The Union's attitude is also strongly opposed to sanctions on Israel which are considered unjust. The English and Afrikaans-language press and both sections of the population are in agreement on this issue. There has been considerable press and public criticism of the United States' attitude which has been interpreted as favoring sanctions on Israel.

The South African press and public opinion have been almost unanimous in support of Israel in the current crisis. Editorials in most English and Afrikaans-language newspapers have declared that Israel is correct in not wishing to withdraw from Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba; they have also been critical of the United States' policy of pressure on Israel to enforce compliance with the United Nations' decisions. Public opinion seems unanimously against sanctions on Israel, which are deemed "cynical and unfair".

Die Burger in Cape Town, Die Transvaler in Johannesburg and other Afrikaans-language papers have alleged that the U. S. bears a large share of responsibility for the present situation. They claim it is extremely unjust for the United Nations to consider sanctions against Israel when similar punishment has not been imposed on Russia, India and other states which have defied the U. N. They allege that the United Nations is discriminating against Israel because she is a small state and that the United States is prejudiced in favor of Egypt. Die Transvaler's editorial of February 26 may be said to represent the typical point of view and is entitled "Victims of Cynicism". It declared that Israel had consistently been denied the right of existence by her neighbors but she had received nothing from the U. N. except an uncertain and doubtful truce. At the same time, the United Nations had allowed Egypt to close the Suez Canal to Israel and had failed to protect Israel against Egyptian raids--yet when Israel asserted herself she was branded as an aggressor. Die Transvaler claimed that the United Nations (and the United States) had taken a "ruthless stand" against

WLWright, Jr./dbl

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Israel while permitting India and Russia to ignore U. N. resolutions. It declared that "the big sinners go free while the small one must pay the penalty".

The English-language press in Johannesburg, Cape Town and other large cities in the Union has taken an even stronger line in favor of Israel and in opposition to any sanctions. They have also criticized United States' policy and have blamed President Eisenhower for "not getting tough with Nasser". The Rand Daily Mail of February 22 accused Eisenhower of "ivory tower remoteness from reality" and of "pious words". The Mail thought that Eisenhower should lecture President Nasser on international behavior. The Cape Argus of February 21 remarked that President Eisenhower was arousing widespread opposition in the U. S. It refused to accept his argument that "two wrongs do not make a right"; and it predicted that the Afro-Asian bloc would always prevent the imposition of sanctions against Egypt in similar circumstances. The Argus claimed that U. S. policy was merely an attempt to curry favor with the Afro-Asian countries.

The Cape Times in editorials of February 20 and February 22 seemed to take satisfaction from "President Eisenhower's embarrassing difficulties". It claimed that the United States was in trouble through trying to work with the United Nations, which, it alleged, is dominated by the Afro-Asian bloc. The Cape Times said President Eisenhower was placing "immediate practical considerations ahead of justice"; if the U. S. supported sanctions against Israel it would be voting with Russia and India and would be supporting "a great victory for the dishonourable Nasser". The Johannesburg Rand Daily Mail said also that "to force Israel to withdraw from the Gulf of Aqaba would be another triumph for Nasser and another defeat for the West".

The Port Elizabeth Evening Post of February 21 also offered strong support to Israel and felt that country was entirely justified in its position. It called for "strong moral and dollar pressure" from the U. S. on the "Arab chieftains" and thought the U. S. should seek proof of good faith from Nasser. The Eastern Province Herald of Port Elizabeth declared that President Eisenhower was trying to apply a multiple standard of morality in international affairs. It felt that "Nasser must be laughing up his sleeve at the Washington moralists". The Herald therefore strongly supported Israel in her demand for firm guarantees before any withdrawal. The Natal Mercury in an editorial of February 27 said, "Israel is right. America has for months past, to suit her own purposes, loaded all of the dice in favor of Nasser". It declared that the United Nations had one rule for the weak and another for the strong; and that Israel's demands were reasonable enough. The Natal Daily News also was strongly opposed to sanctions on Israel and felt that she should not be forced to submit to the U. N. unless similar action were taken against Russia, India and Egypt.

The Cape Times of March 4 ran an editorial entitled "Israel's Agony". It claimed that Israel's defiance of the U. N. had won important advantages and

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had brought widespread sympathy for Israel's cause. It said further that the United States now had an increased responsibility to safeguard Israel's future since the U. S. "had pressured Israel into withdrawing".

The Pretoria News, as far as the Embassy can determine, is the only English-language newspaper which has expressed even mild editorial support of President Eisenhower's attitude in the current crisis. It noted that President Eisenhower spoke of United Nations pressure, but did not mention sanctions. The News added that the United States and the United Nations would, following President Eisenhower's stand, have a strong case for demanding action against Egypt should she subsequently show belligerence. It agreed with President Eisenhower's view that two wrongs do not make a right and said: "It is impossible for us to understand why the United Nations should take the line that because it is powerless to right a major wrong it should therefore not try to right a minor one."

Meanwhile, on February 27 the Cape Times carried a long interview with Colonel Abraham Yoffe, Commander of the Ninth Israeli Brigade and the "captor of Sharen El Sheikh" who was on a visit to South Africa. Colonel Yoffe alleged that the "little war" in the Sinai had postponed a major conflict. He was quoted as deprecating the action of major nations who spoke of world peace and then gave arms to the Arab countries. Colonel Yoffe is at present busy addressing public meetings in the Union.

The Union Government and high officials have issued no statement on the present U. N.-Israeli crisis; for once the Minister of External Affairs wisely refused to be drawn into controversy. United Party spokesmen in Parliament are strongly opposed to sanctions on Israel and they have urged the Minister of External Affairs to make clear South Africa's position on the question. The Minister would make no commitments, however, and said merely that the matter would be considered when and if it became necessary.

Embassy Comment

The South African Government would probably either abstain or oppose sanctions against Israel should it be forced to take a position in the United Nations. The Union's attitude is motivated primarily by its dislike for Nasser and by widespread public sympathy for Israel. The Africaans-speaking element has in past years been accused of being anti-Jewish; although some of this feeling remains, there is even stronger anti-Egyptian sentiment. Most South Africans, but particularly the Nationalists, are concerned over Egyptian radio broadcasts to Africans, and they have the utmost distrust and dislike of the so-called Afro-Asian bloc. On the other hand, the English-speaking South Africans are influenced to sympathize with Israel by the large number of Jewish persons in Johannesburg, by their support for England in the Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt, and by an equal dislike of Nasser and the Egyptians.

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Considerable influence has apparently been exercised by Mr. I. Bavly, Israeli Minister to South Africa, who has been an active, astute and aggressive proponent of his country's policies. He has gone almost beyond the bounds of propriety in addressing Jewish groups, attending public meetings and holding press conferences urging support for Israel's views. On the other hand, the Egyptian Minister to the Union, Mr. Seif El Nasr Ahmed Hamdy, has been quiet and unassuming, and has seldom appeared publicly during his stay in South Africa. His only activity, so far as is known, has been the alleged circulation of propaganda leaflets purporting to depict atrocities carried out during the British-French-Israeli attack.

South African criticism and distrust of United States policy in the current crisis and in the Middle East generally is based solely on the fear that the U. S. is becoming too friendly with the Arab-Asian countries; that the United States will forsake Western Europe and incidentally, South Africa, in order to win favor with the non-White countries of the world.

For the Ambassador:

Wm L. Wight Jr.

William L. Wight, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

Please send copies to: Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, Durban and Amcongen
Cape Town

175
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 6, 1957

SUBJECT: UN ADMINISTRATION OF GAZA STRIP

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Alphan
Mr. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
Mr. Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor, French Embassy
NEA - Mr. William M. Rountree
NEA - Mr. James M. Ludlow
EUR - Mr. Richard Kerry
IO - Mr. Francis O. Wilcox
UNP - Mr. Samuel DePalma
UNP - Mr. David L. Gamon

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Ambassador Alphan said that he was concerned over a conversation Georges-Picot had had with the Secretary General yesterday in which the Secretary General had indicated the desirability of another resolution defining the role of UNEF in the Gaza Strip. Ambassador Alphan felt this to be most unfortunate, as consideration of such a resolution would raise many legal problems and he doubted that it would get two-thirds support. It would be far preferable, he said, to continue the present de facto basis for UN administration of the Strip. The Ambassador said that the Secretary General had told Georges-Picot that the Advisory Committee felt that agreement with Egypt was necessary on United Nations administration of the Strip. The Secretary General also told Georges-Picot that UNEF would have to be deployed on both sides of the Gaza Strip and he had raised the question of how the United Nations could ignore Egyptian rights in the Gaza Strip which derive from the general Armistice Agreement.

Mr. Wilcox agreed with the Ambassador that, at the present stage, the Secretary General has sufficient authority to deal with the situation in the Gaza Strip. He added that, according to reports the Department had from Ambassador Lodge, based on conversations he had had with the Secretary General yesterday, the Secretary General does not feel that an additional resolution on the role of UNEF is now necessary. The Secretary General had mentioned the possible necessity of having to go to the General Assembly for financial assistance and that some sort of procedural resolution accepting the report on the UN take-over which the Secretary General expected to submit within a day or two might be necessary. But the Secretary General clearly had stated he did not feel that a resolution was necessary for the UN administration in the Gaza Strip.

Ambassador Alphan suggested that it might be a good idea to confirm this understanding through the United States Delegation, which Mr. Wilcox agreed to do.

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Ambassador Alphand then again raised the matter of placing UNEF on both sides of the Armistice Line. Mr. Wilcox said that the Department understands that the Secretary General might pursue this matter with Cairo and Jerusalem and that he feels that the life expectancy of UNEF would be very limited if no United Nations troops were allowed on the Israeli side of the Armistice Line. He added that the United States agrees with this point of view. In answer to a question from Mr. Lucet as to whether it was thought that the stationing in the El Auja zone would be sufficient, Mr. DePalma recalled Ambassador Lodge's statement of January 28 which endorsed the Secretary General's recommendation concerning the deployment of UNEF on both sides of the Armistice Line, particularly with regard to the sensitive positions in the Gaza and El Auja sectors.

Ambassador Alphand said that he felt that the Secretary General's report of February 22 covered the situation adequately, that it dealt with the presence of UNEF in the Gaza Strip and indicated the acquiescence of Egypt. He said that the French view is that the duration of the take-over should be extended in time and that the presence of UNEF should not be linked with any legal justifications. Mr. Wilcox pointed out that the United States and Israel were in disagreement on the matter of the Armistice Agreement. The United States position had been described by Ambassador Lodge in the General Assembly when he pointed out the necessity of taking measures within the framework of the Armistice Agreement as the most solid basis for future action. Ambassador Alphand said that might be correct, but if the question were raised now, a solution to the withdrawal problem might be made more difficult.

Mr. Rountree then explained that the United States is trying to avoid a legalistic approach to the problem, yet is attempting to find some sound basis for proceeding. He said that while Egypt has certain rights in the Gaza Strip which derive from the Armistice Agreement, Egypt has indicated its acquiescence in waiving these rights in favor of the United Nations. The basis on which this has been done has a bearing on other important matters. If the United States were to subscribe to the Israeli position, this might result in wrecking the one instrument which can serve to prevent Egypt from exercising rights of belligerency in the Strait of Tiran. The United States, he said, does not want to exacerbate the problem in the Gaza Strip and does not want to get into legalistic arguments. Rather, he said, the United States prefers to accept the situation as described by the Secretary General in his report. What the United States is trying to do, he explained, is to give effect to the de facto arrangement in the Gaza Strip within the framework of the Armistice Agreement and on an interim basis. The United States has expressed a hope that this situation can continue until a settlement on Gaza is reached. He explained that this expression of hope is the weakest element in the United States position, but that this hope could be strengthened if Israel were to permit United Nations troops on both sides of the Armistice Line. The presence of UN troops on both sides of the Armistice Line is not essential to the success of the initial phases of the UN take-over in the Gaza Strip, Mr. Rountree pointed out, but may have a direct bearing on the length of time UNEF will be allowed to continue to operate there. Mr. Wilcox added that there is no indication that the Secretary General is likely to insist on a speedy conclusion of UN administration in the Gaza Strip. The United States feels, he said, that the United Nations should take time in arriving at the final

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administrative set-up there. The Secretary General, he added, would be the first person to want to prevent an impasse in the General Assembly. The contents of his anticipated report on UNEF take-over is not yet known, he added, and the United States hopes with confidence that the report will not be controversial.

Mr. Rountree added that, as of the present juncture, the United States position has been fully set forth in public documents, with no secret understandings, and that it is desirable to continue on such a basis.



Francis O. Wilcox

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FROM

UNP - Mr. Gamon

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 6, 1957

SUBJECT: SUEZ SETTLEMENT

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Alphan
Mr. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
Mr. Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor, French Embassy
NEA - Mr. William M. Rountree
NEA - Mr. James M. Ludlow
EUR - Mr. Richard Kerry
IO - Mr. Francis O. Wilcox
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During a conversation on another topic Ambassador Alphan asked if there were any new developments with regard to the Suez Canal. Mr. Rountree answered that, if work on clearance were to proceed without any further delays, the Canal might be cleared within ten days, according to unofficial reports.

The Ambassador then referred to the 4-Power proposal on interim arrangements which had been given to the Secretary General for submission to the Egyptian Government and expressed concern that the Secretary General might not be going ahead with the matter as expeditiously as he might. Mr. Rountree ventured the opinion that the Secretary General might not be pressing the matter pending Israel's withdrawal. Mr. Wilcox added that it was understood that the Secretary General feels that it might be best for him to discuss the 4-Power proposal directly with Nasser and that, if the Israeli withdrawal proceeds as anticipated, the Secretary General might be able to leave for Cairo during the early part of next week.

Francis O. Wilcox

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Dear Madam Minister:

I know that the Secretary will greatly appreciate the kind thoughts you expressed in your letter of March 6, 1957. The major efforts made by so many nations to achieve a constructive solution to problems resulting from recent developments in the Middle East will, I am sure, prove to be important contributions to area and world peace.

As we have stated publicly, we foresee no obstacles to passage through the Gulf of Aqaba by ships of United States registry proceeding on commercial voyages to ports in the Gulf.

With regard to your comments concerning Gaza, there are as you know points on which we hold differing views. As the Secretary told Ambassador Eban on March 2, we would not feel that mere presence of Egyptian personnel in territory which under the Armistice Agreement Egypt is entitled to occupy would give Israel the right to act. While we feel that arrangements for the administration of Gaza must be within the legal framework brought about by

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Her Excellency

Golda Meir,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel.

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the Armistice Agreement, it is, as you know, our desire that the United Nations remain in Gaza pending an agreement on the future of that area or a permanent settlement.

We share your hope that there can be a period of relative tranquility which will enable the United Nations and its member states to turn to constructive tasks. We look forward to the return to the Middle East of an atmosphere which will enable normal United States Government activities in the area to be resumed.

Sincerely yours,

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
Acting Secretary

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March 6, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. A.J. GOODPASTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Statement by Ambassador Lodge
in Plenary Session on the
Middle East

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I am enclosing, in accordance with
your request this afternoon, a copy of
Ambassador Lodge's statement of March 1
in the Plenary Session of the UN General
Assembly, following Israel's announcement
of withdrawal behind the Armistice line.

FISHER HOWE

Fisher Howe
Director
Executive Secretariat

Enclosure:

As stated. (Press
Release No. 2635 of the
US Delegation to the
UNGA)

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MAR 6 1957

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

You have asked me to set forth the position which the United States has taken in discussions with Israeli representatives with respect to certain aspects of the statement concerning Gaza made at the General Assembly by the Israeli Foreign Minister on March 1.

In her statement, Mrs. Meir set forth certain assumptions, hopes and expectations in connection with the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in accordance with the General Assembly Resolution (1) of February 2. She also stated, but not as an "assumption or expectation" that "it is the position of Israel that if conditions are created in the Gaza Strip which indicate a return to the conditions of deterioration which existed previously, Israel would reserve its freedom to act to defend its rights".

In your own statement of that date, you took note of the declarations by Mrs. Meir and stated that "For the most part, the declarations constitute, as we understand, restatements of what has already been said by this Assembly or by the Secretary General in his reports, or hopes and expectations which seem to us not unreasonable in the light of the prior actions of this Assembly".

Following this session of the General Assembly, the Ambassador of Israel discussed with me on March 2 and March 3 the extent to which the United States would support or understand Israel's position with respect to the circumstances in which Israel would feel that it had the right to act under Mrs. Meir's declaration quoted above. In these discussions with the Israeli Ambassador there was an often expressed desire on the part of his Government that the United States should in some way acquiesce in the view that Israel's "rights" would include

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The Honorable
Henry Cabot Lodge
United States Representative
to the United Nations
New York, New York

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include the right forcibly to reconquer the Gaza Strip if Egyptian administration reoccurred in any form or to any degree. I constantly made it clear that the United States could not accept this thesis. We naturally could not object to Israel in the future enjoining its "rights" but we refused to agree in advance as to what its rights might be under various hypothetical conditions. We adhered scrupulously to the position set out by you in your statement that "It is the view of the United States that from a juridical standpoint the future of the Gaza Strip must, as the Secretary General said, be worked out within the framework of the Armistice Agreement."

"Obviously these matters are not for the United States alone to decide, but the United States can, I think, properly entertain the hope that such a useful role for the United Nations and its appropriate subsidiary bodies as the Secretary General has described could usefully continue until there is a definitive settlement respecting the Gaza Strip or some final general agreement between the parties."

I also recall your statement as follows:

"If, following the Israeli withdrawal, there should be any recurrence of hostilities or any violation by either party of its international obligations, including those of the Armistice Agreement, this would create a situation for United Nations consideration. The United States would consult with other members of the United Nations to consider appropriate action which they or the United Nations might take with the object of restoring peace and harmonious relations in conformity with the principles of justice and international law."

I steadfastly informed the Ambassador that I felt the matter should be left to stand as described in various public documents, notably your speech in the General Assembly of March 1 and the President's letter of March 2 to Prime Minister Ben Gurion in which he said with respect to the hopes and expectations voiced in the speech of the Foreign Minister of Israel and others based on resolutions of the General Assembly: "I believe that it is reasonable to entertain such hopes and expectations and I want you to know that the United States as a friend of all the countries of the area and as a loyal member of the United Nations will seek that such hopes prove not in vain."

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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ARMY SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED ISRAEL FORCES BEGAN TRANSFER GAZA
STRIP ADMINISTRATION TO UNEF 7 P.M. YESTERDAY. OPERATION
TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 24 HOURS. ADMINISTRATION OF SHARM EL
SHEIKH TO BE HANDED OVER TO UNEF MARCH 8.LARGE CONTINGENT ISRAEL PRESS REPRESENTATIVES COVERED ENTRY
UNEF INTO GAZA TOWN LAST NIGHT AND PRESS THIS MORNING DESCRIBED
TAKEOVER. DOUBT THAT UNEF WILL HAVE EASY TIME IS IMPLICIT
IN PRESS COMMENT: UNEF SOLDIERS DESCRIBED AS LOOKING "AS IF
THEY ON SCHOOL OUTING." PRESS ALSO NOTES WORKERS IN ISRAELI
BORDER SETTLEMENTS NOW OILING THEIR WEAPONS AND RESUMING
ARMED GUARD REGIME PREVALENT BEFORE SINAI CAMPAIGN. THEY
DESCRIBED AS TRUSTING IN ASSURANCES GIVEN BY GOVERNMENT OF
ISRAEL IN DECIDING WITHDRAW BUT ALSO IN THEIR WEAPONS.
JERUSALEM POST ARTICLE NOTES BORDER SETTLEMENT GUARDS NOW
FACE ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTY OF DISTINGUISHING INFILTRATOR
CROSSING BORDER FROM UNEF SOLDIER.JERUSALEM POST EDITORIAL EXPRESSES OPINION ISRAEL-UNITED NATIONS
JOINT ADMINISTRATION OFFERED BEST HOPE FOR GAZA AND CONCLUDES
"EVEN SHOULD PEACE BE PERMANENTLY PRESERVED THERE WHICH SEEMS
SCARCELY POSSIBLE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN LONG RUN
PEOPLE OF GAZA HAVE LITTLE TO BE EATUWBHPINE# ON UNITED NATION'S
TREATMENT THEIR CASE". OTHER PAPERS CALL PRE-EVACUATION
RIOTS "EVIL OMEN" FOR FUTURE AND DEMAND STRENGTHENING OF
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DEPARTMENT PASS USUN 68.

ARMY SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED ISRAEL FORCES BEGAN TRANSFER GAZA
STRIP ADMINISTRATION TO UNEF AT 10:00 P.M. YESTERDAY.
OPERATION TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 24 HOURS. ADMINISTRATION
OF SHARM EL SHEIKH TO BE HANDED OVER TO UNEF MARCH 8.

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DESCRIBED TAKE-OVER. DOUBT THAT UNEF WILL HAVE EASY TIME
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WORKERS IN ISRAELI BORDER SETTLEMENTS NOW (RPT NOW) OILING
THEIR WEAPONS AND RESUMING ARMED GUARD REGIME PREVALENT BEFORE
SINAI CAMPAIGN. THEY DESCRIBED AS TRUSTING IN ASSURANCES
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JERUSALEM POST ARTICLE NOTES BORDER SETTLEMENT GUARDS NOW
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JERUSALEM POST EDITORIAL EXPRESSES OPINION ISRAEL-UNITED
NATIONS JOINT ADMINISTRATION OFFERED BEST HOPE FOR GAZA AND
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WHICH SEEMS SCARCELY POSSIBLE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN
LONG RUN PEOPLE OF GAZA HAVE LITTLE TO BE THANKFUL FOR IN
UNITED NATION'S TREATMENT THEIR CASE". OTHER PAPERS CALL
PRE-EVACUATION RIOTS "EVIL OMEN" FOR FUTURE AND DEMAND
STRENGTHENING OF BORDER SETTLEMENTS.

Correction made
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-2- 1049 MARCH 7, 1 PM FROM TEL AVIV

ACCORDING RELIABLE SOURCE UNEF AND ISRAEL CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
PERSONNEL MEETING AT LYDDA AIRPORT THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS
TECHNICAL DETAILS

LAWSON

JS

NOTE: PASSED USUN 3/7/57, 2 PM FW

NOTE: CORRECTIONS PASSED USUN 3/8/57, 4 PM FW

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March 8, 1957
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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1053, March 7, 6 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1053 REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 171, LONDON 205,
AMMAN 18, BEIRUT 171, CAIRO 185, DAMASCUS 132

Six hours of heated and even disorderly Knesset debate on GOI decision withdraw from Sharm E-Sheikh and Gaza ended last night with decisive defeat of Herut and Communist no-confidence motion as well as general Zionist motion demanding immediate halt to withdrawal. Although Ben Gurion's left wing coalition partners (Achdut Avoda and Mapam) joined in opposing motions, their speakers in debate announced opposition toward decision withdraw and coalition unity was preserved only by government policy of presenting no (repeat no) positive motion supporting withdrawal for even motion taking note of government decision. Record number of Knesset members were present for debate and vote.

Ben Gurion was final speaker in debate and defended government decision in terms similar his speech March 5 (EMBTel 1038) with emphasis on importance moral responsibility incurred by nations making declarations in regard Israel's rights to free passage Tiran and security in Gaza. He also stressed international recognition Israel's right to self-defense under Article 51 of UN charter. In obvious response to Secretary's reported remark at press conference March 5 Mengytison said "statement has been made that future Gaza Strip would be governed by armistice agreement. We deny this completely not (repeat not) because we deny our signatures to the agreement but because all through years other side did not (repeat not) honor its signature." According JERUSALEM POST Ben Gurion then said "If nothing was done in Gaza on basis of agreement (GAA) which would restore position that existed four months ago Israel would exercise her rights and defend herself".

According HAARETZ Ben Gurion commented on Mapam's hope of improved relations with USSR saying "I am ready join in that prayer but when same thing is said over and over again in and out of season, it makes strange impression. It is like continuing to observe shattered religious belief".

Knesset debate apparently followed district party line with

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-2- 1053, March 7, 6 p.m., from Tel Aviv

with only Mapai and pro-soviet speakers favoring decision to withdraw. Opposition and Mapam and Achdut Avoda speakers unanimously attacked decision. Speakers for Mapam and Achdut Avoda exhibited little embarrassment over opposition to withdrawal decision and openly stated they had no responsibility for it. They disagreed with Ben Gurion's thesis all members government responsible and stated responsibility belonged only to Cabinet ministers who had voted for decision. Opposition speakers continued attack withdrawal decision in familiar terms with general Zionists ridiculing nature of "assurances" upon which government decision assertedly based. Most opposition efforts however seem to be concentrated in heckling coalition speakers. Under particularly heavy fire from opposition were Achdut Avoda and Mapam speakers who were accused of agreeing with opposition but refusing leave government.

Moshe Sharett, participating in Knesset debate for first time since resignation as Foreign Minister June 56, defended government decision as necessary to promote conditions favorable to immigration absorption and stressed vital interest Israel in: renewing efforts toward closer relations with Asian countries. Sharett closed his statement with "personal comment" there was no truth in reports his resignation as Foreign Minister had had anything to do with negotiations at that time for arms purchased.

No surprise has been exhibited by press or publication government's Knesset history. Aside from comment indicating concern over future of coalition, attention now appears to be centered on future difficulties confronting nation, particularly connection with evacuation of Gaza. Security of border settlements is seen imperiled.

Evacuation, which various sources assert was speeded up because of anti-Israel riots in Gaza and because of desire permit rapid windup UN debate on Middle East, is regarded as having created situation where UN and particularly US are now responsible for security Israel-Egyptian frontier. News of Israeli casualties in Gaza prior to evacuation has so far been received with surprising calm but Herut Party public demonstration is scheduled Tel Aviv this evening and Begin may try exploit issue.

LAWSON

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FROM: DAMASCUS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2048, MARCH 7, 5PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2048, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, JIDDA, UNNUMBERED

NOW ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL UNDERWAY SYRIAN PRESS MARCH 7 ARDENTLY PRESENTING NEXT DEMANDS: RETURN GAZA EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION, NO INTERNATIONALIZATION AQABA WATERS, AND PROMPT PAYMENT REPARATIONS EGYPT. EDITORS CAREFULLY AVOIDING ANYTHING BUT MOST LIMITED COMPLIMENTS US FOR ROLE IN WITHDRAWAL ACTION. TYPICAL EDITORIAL COMMENTS: EGYPT WOULD NOT OPEN CANAL AND PERMIT PASSAGE AGGRESSORS SHIPS BEFORE RECEIVING REPARATIONS (PRO-SOVIET AL-NASR); STATUS QUO ANTE AGGRESSION NOT BE ATTAINED UNTIL RETURN EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION GAZA OR SO LONG AS WEST SUPPORTS ISRAELI CLAIM NAVIGATION RIGHT AQABA (G-2, ASRP RAI AL AM); WE OPPOSE THOSE WHO PICTURE US AS ARAB RESCUER BECAUSE HIGH US CIRCLES CONTINUE AS ZIONIST SERVANTS (PRO-SOVIET AL JUMHUR) PAPERS WITH MODICUM PRO-US INCLINATIONS SILENT.

SEVERAL JOURNALS PUBLISH COMMENTARY ATTRIBUTED SYRIAN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES SAYING (1) US PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON WITHDRAWAL INCLUDING FEBRUARY 11 AIDE MEMOIRE TO ISRAEL ARE AMBIGUOUS AND MAY BE INTERPRETED MEAN US HAS GIVEN ISRAEL INFORMATION YET UNKNOWN (2) ISRAEL'S AGREEMENT WITHDRAW SHOWS CONVICTION US SUPPORT AFTER WITHDRAWAL (3) US SUPPORT OF ISRAEL'S DEMANDS NOT AS OBVIOUS AS UK AND FRANCE BECAUSE US WANTS AVOID EXPOSURE ARAB RAGE AND RANCOR.

COMMUNIST AL-NUR PROVIDES FILLIP DAY'S NEWS WITH ATTACK UPCOMING RICHARDS MISSION AS OPEN INTERFERENCE ARAB INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND CHALLENGE SOVEREIGNTY SYRIA WHICH HAS REJECTED US ME PLAN AND EGYPT AND JORDAN WHICH HAVE DEPLORED VACUUM THEORY.

MOOSE

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AIR

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 858, MARCH 7, NOON

PRIORITY

RE PALESTINE

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT STATEMENT FOR UN GA MEETING TOMORROW (MARCH 8) TO BE MADE AFTER SYG'S REPORT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS. THE SPECIFIC ENDORSEMENT OF THE SYG'S VIEWS IN STATIONING UNEF ON BOTH SIDES OF LINE IS DIRECTLY IN PURSUANCE OF MR. DULLES' STATEMENT TO ME WEDNESDAY AM, MARCH 6, IN WHICH HE FAVORED VIGOROUS AND PUBLIC ESPOUSAL BY SYG OF SUCH A COURSE.

"TODAY MARKS COMPLIANCE WITH OUR FIRST RESOLUTION OF FEBRUARY 2 FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM EGYPT. THE WAY NOW LIES OPEN TO CARRY OUT OUR SECOND RESOLUTION WHICH AIMS AT ACHIEVING PEACEFUL CONDITIONS AFTER WITHDRAWAL.

"THIS IS AN EVENT IN THE HISTORY OF THE UN WHICH IS FULL OF DEEP MEANING FOR ALL PEOPLE IN THE WORLD -- WHEREVER THEY MAY BE -- WHO WISH TO BE SAVED FROM THE SCOURGE OF WAR.

IT IS AN EVENT WHICH REFLECTS CREDIT ON ISRAEL, A NATION WHICH HEEDED THE CALL OF WORLD OPINION AND WITHDREW OF HER OWN FREE WILL.

IT IS AN EVENT WHICH REFLECTS CREDIT ON EGYPT FOR ITS STEADFAST FAITH IN THE UN.

IT IS AN EVENT WHICH REFLECTS CREDIT ON THE SKILL AND THE PATIENCE AND THE FOREBEARANCE OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE UN WHO TOOK A PART IN BRINGING IT ABOUT.

IT IS AN EVENT WHICH PROVES AGAIN THE VALUE OF THE UN AS AN

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-2- DELGA 858, MARCH 7, NOON

FROM: NEW YORK

ORGANIZATION WHICH PLAYS AN INDISPENSABLE PART IN CAUSING THE WORLD, AS IN THIS CASE, TO TAKE A TURN AWAY FROM WAR.

"SURELY IT IS CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT, IF WE [ALL] HAD NOT HAD THIS PLACE IN WHICH TO WORK, [AND] IF WE HAD NOT HAD THE STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN THE CHARTER TO APPLY TO THE PROBLEM WHICH CONFRONTED US, [THAT] WE WOULD BY NOW BE OVER THE ABYSS ON THE EDGE OF WHICH WE HOVERED DURING SO MANY DANGEROUS WEEKS.

the report
NOW COMES THE REPORT OF THE SYG. THE US WELCOMES IT AND PLEDGES ITS SUPPORT TO ASSURE THAT WHAT HAS NOW BEEN ACHIEVED WILL BE USED AS A FOUNDATION ON WHICH TO BUILD A GOOD FUTURE FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE NEAR EAST FREE FROM THE DANGER OF CONFLICT.

"AS IS FITTING, THE REPORT DWELLS ON THE CONSTRUCTIVE PURPOSES OF OUR SECOND RESOLUTION OF FEBRUARY 2. THIS RESOLUTION STATED THAT AFTER FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH AND GAZA AREAS, THE SCRUPULOUS MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT REQUIRED THE PLACING OF UNEF ON THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAEL DEMARCATION LINE AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OTHER MEASURES PROPOSED IN THE SYG'S REPORT OF 24 JANUARY TO ASSIST IN ACHIEVING SITUATIONS CONDUCIVE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL CONDITIONS IN THE AREA.

Grant → WE WELCOME IN PARTICULAR THE SYG'S STATEMENT THAT THE UNEF CAN BEST FULFILL ITS MISSION IF IT IS DEPLOYED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ARMISTICE LINE.)

FOR A LONG TIME WE HAVE DEEPLY SYMPATHIZED WITH THE FEAR WHICH HAS ANIMATED THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL THAT THEY WOULD BE AGGRESSED UPON. WE HAVE ALSO SYMPATHIZED WITH THE FEAR OF THE ARAB NEIGHBORS THAT THEY WOULD BECOME THE VICTIMS OF AGGRESSION. IT WAS ALTOGETHER NATURAL AND HUMAN THAT FEAR ON ONE SIDE SHOULD BEGET FEAR ON THE OTHER, AND OUT OF THIS FEAR COMES THE DANGER. FRANKLY, MR. PRESIDENT, THE US CAN IMAGINE NOTHING MORE HELPFUL TOWARDS ELIMINATING THE FEAR THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE AGGRESSED UPON OR THAT HER ARAB NEIGHBORS WOULD BE AGGRESSED UPON THAN TO HAVE THE UNEF DEPLOYED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ARMISTICE LINE. TO DO THIS IS A TANGIBLE, PRACTICAL AND SENSIBLE ARRANGEMENT. IT DOES NOT INVOLVE US IN INTERMINABLE LEGALISTIC

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-3- DELGA 858, MARCH 7, NOON

FROM: NEW YORK

DISCUSSIONS AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES AGGRESSION. ALTHOUGH CHEAP IN COST IT CAN MAKE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HAPPINESS AND MISERY -- BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE -- AS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE NEIGHBORING STATES.

ONE OTHER TRUTH DESERVES TO BE SET DOWN. IT IS THAT THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE UNEF IS VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR UN STRATEGY FOR THIS PART OF THE WORLD. WE COUNT ON THE UNEF TO STAY IN SHARM EL-SHEIKH. WE COUNT ON THE UNEF TO STAY IN GAZA. WE COUNT ON THE UNEF TO STAND ON THE DEMARCATION LINE. THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE UNEF IS THEREFORE VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR PLANS. BUT, MR. PRESIDENT, WHAT IS VITAL TO THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE UNEF IS THAT IT SHOULD BE DEPLOYED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINE BECAUSE IF IT IS MERELY TIED TO THE TERRITORY OF ONE STATE ITS DAYS ARE OBVIOUSLY NUMBERED.

WE HAVE MADE A WONDERFUL BEGINNING. WE HAVE NURSED THE PATIENT THROUGH SEVERAL CRISES. NOW LET US GIVE HIM A CHANCE TO PUT SOME FLESH ON HIS BONES, AND BUILD UP AN IMMUNITY TO FUTURE ILLNESS."

LODGE

JCK

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

March 7, 1957

TO: The Acting Secretary
THROUGH: S/S *G. S. M.*
FROM: NEA - William M. Rountree *WR*
SUBJECT: Suggested Message to King Saud

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Discussion:

122
1864 We attach a suggested message from the President to King Saud. This message is in response to the King's messages of February 28 from Cairo (Tab B) and March 4 from Riyadh (Tab C), and to the King's oral comments to our Charge d'Affaires in Riyadh (Tab D). The message is also intended to be responsive to the memorandum entitled "Comments on the Proceedings of the Cairo Conference, February 25-26, 1957" (Tab E). We do not contemplate any further reply to this memorandum.

While the message is long, we feel the length is necessary in order to be responsive to these several messages.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachments:

1. Memorandum to the President (Tab A).
2. Telegram 2745 from Cairo (Tab B).
3. Telegram 417 from Dhahran (Tab C).
4. Telegram 416 from Dhahran (Tab D).
5. Telegram 2746 from Cairo (Tab E).
6. Memo to Mr. Rountree from The Secretary (Tab F).

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RMR

RE:

WRITER ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN INFORMED
OF THIS REFERENCE

COMMENTS:

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Thank you.

SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DIVISION

NE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: March 7, 1957

SUBJECT:

Italian Interest in Middle East and African Affairs

PARTICIPANTS:

Mr. Egidio Ortona, Minister
Italian Embassy
NEA - Lampton Berry
WE - James Crane
NE - Lewis Hoffacker

MAR 15 1957

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Mr. Ortona, who called at his request, asked whether the United States Government had been informed officially of the Egyptian reaction to the proposed interim arrangement for the operation of the Suez Canal. Mr. Berry said that while the Egyptian attitude was not known officially, it was encouraging to note that unofficial Egyptian comments thus far did not reject the proposal. It remained to be seen, however, what Nasser's views would eventually be when the Secretary General increases his efforts to gain Egyptian concurrence in the arrangement.

Although he was not speaking under instructions, Mr. Ortona voiced displeasure over the omission of Italy from the countries who developed the interim proposal. He said that it was likely that the Italian Ambassador would raise this matter next week with Assistant Secretary Rountree and would propose that Italy be included among the countries to be consulted in connection with what Mr. Ortona regarded as inevitable Egyptian counter-proposals. Mr. Berry said that the United States would keep the Italian interest in mind but emphasized that much would depend on the recommendations of the Secretary General, who has considerable responsibility in this endeavor to get the Canal operating promptly and on a satisfactory basis for all parties concerned.

Mr. Ortona asked if the article by Dana Schmidt in this morning's edition of the NEW YORK TIMES concerning Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh events

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was factually correct. (At Mr. Berry's suggestion, Mr. Hoffacker telephoned to Mr. Ortona later in the day with the comment that while the Department could not vouch for the authenticity of any such press comment, Mr. Schmidt's article was "generally on the right track.") Mr. Berry stressed the point that the United States had given no secret guarantees to Israel in this connection and that the United States position had been amply spelled out in public statements.

During a general discussion of the Israel withdrawal issue, Mr. Ortona said that he understood that the Israel Government spent almost six hours translating the crucial term "assumption" into Hebrew and that the greatest victory in this instance was Ambassador Eban's victory over his own government, which after long hesitation finally accepted the Eban view.

Mr. Ortona referred again to "rumors" that the United States was supporting a Mediterranean or North African pact (memorandum of conversation, February 15, 1957). Mr. Berry repeated that while he had heard similar reports, he knew of no United States initiative in this respect.

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NEA:NE:LHoffacker:feg

LB. S

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